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ABSTRACT
It is well understood that decisions made under uncertainty di¤er from those
made without risk in important and signi…cant ways. Yet, there is very little research
into how uncertainty manifests itself in the most ubiquitous of decision-making envi-
ronments: Consumers’ day-to-day decisions over where to shop, and what to buy for
their daily grocery needs. Facing a choice between stores that either o¤er relatively
stable "everyday low prices" (EDLP) or variable prices that re‡ect aggressive promo-
tion strategies (HILO), consumers have to choose stores under price-uncertainty. I …nd
that consumers’ attitudes toward risk are critically important in determining store-
choice, and that heterogeneity in risk attitudes explains the co-existence of EDLP and
HILO stores —an equilibrium that was previously explained in somewhat unsatisfying
ways. After choosing a store, consumers face another source of risk. While know-
ing the quality or taste of established brands, consumers have very little information
about new products. Consequently, consumers tend to choose smaller package sizes
for new products, which limits their exposure to the risk that the product does not
meet their prior expectations. While the observation that consumers purchase small
amounts of new products is not new, I show how this practice is fully consistent with
optimal purchase decision-making by utility-maximizing consumers. I then use this
insight to explain how manufacturers of consumer packaged goods (CPGs) respond
to higher production costs. Because consumers base their purchase decisions in part
on package size, manufacturers can use package size as a competitive tool in order to
raise margins in the face of higher production costs. While others have argued that
manufacturers reduce package sizes as a means of raising unit-prices (prices per unit
i
of volume) in a hidden way, I show that the more important e¤ect is a competitive
one: Changes in package size can soften price competition, so manufacturers need not
rely on fooling consumers in order to pass-through cost increases through changes in
package size. The broader implications of consumer behavior under risk are dramatic.
First, risk perceptions a¤ect consumers’ store choice and product choice patterns in
ways that can be exploited by both retailers and manufacturers. Second, strategic
considerations prevent manufacturers from manipulating package size in ways that
seem designed to trick consumers. Third, many services are also o¤ered as packages,
and also involve uncertainty, so the e¤ects identi…ed here are likely to be pervasive
throughout the consumer economy.
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PREFACE
This dissertation is written in a three-essay style. However, each essay deals
with the subject related to consumer behavior under uncertainty and …rm optimal
response. Chapters 1 and 5 provide an introduction and conclusion applicable to
all three essays. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are self-contained and independent from one
another in terms of notations and equations.
xi
CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, US consumers spent over $579 billion on groceries, or consumer pack-
aged goods (CPG) (U.S. Census Bureau 2014). Despite the industrys fundamental
economic importance to consumer welfare, some practices, whether in retailing or
manufacturing, appear to be far from e¢ cient, or at least consistent with what we
understand as competitive behavior. First, some retail stores o¤er prices that vary
considerably from week to week (the HILO model used by Kroger, for example), while
others o¤er prices that are relatively constant (the everyday-low-price, or EDLPmodel
used by Walmart). According to standard economic theory, two store formats should
not be able to coexist in an e¢ cient, competitive market. Second, most new products
ultimately fail. Every year, more than 1,500 new brands are launched in the CPG
market, but nearly 80 percent of them failed to achieve more than $7.5 million in
year-one sales (SymphonyIRI 2012a). Third, when costs increase, manufacturers ap-
pear to reduce package sizes, raising unit-prices in a way that is not readily apparent
to consumers. In 2011, Heinz reduced the size of its ketchup products by an average
of 11%, but maintained package prices (McIntyre 2011). These observations appear
disparate, but may have a common cause. Namely, if suppliers manufacturers and
retailers are rational, and consumers make decisions in an environment of chronic
uncertainty, then pricing and product design decisions are fundamentally shaped by
considerations of risk. In this dissertation, I examine these two examples and show
that they are not market failures, but rather rational responses to pervasive sources
of uncertainty.
There are two sources of uncertainty: (1) unfamiliarity with the product, or
attribute uncertainty, implying a lack of information about how the product ts an
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individuals preferred attribute set, and (2) price variability over time and source,
implying a lack of information about price. Attribute uncertainty largely derives
from the fact that when consumers purchase an unfamiliar product, they cannot
know whether it will meet their prior expectations. While product information such
as nutritional and caloric content is observable on package labels, taste and aroma
are inherently indeterminable until the product is purchased and used (or experience
goods in the terminology of Nelson (1970)). Price uncertainty, on the other hand,
cannot be perfectly resolved through experience. Even through substantial purchase
or usage experience, consumers cannot have complete price information because prices
vary from day to day and from place to place due to price discounting. Attribute un-
certainty reduces expected utility and, hence, purchase probability (Meyer and Sathi
1985; Roberts and Urban 1987), while price uncertainty raises search cost and, again,
reduces purchase probability (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003). While these in-
sights are not new, there is little empirical research that formally examines how these
sources of risk a¤ect brand and store choice, and how product suppliers optimally
respond. Manufacturers and retailers recognize that consumers are inherently risk
averse, and, at least implicitly, adopt pricing, promotion, and product design strate-
gies in response.
Consumers are generally risk-averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and prefer
certainty in the prices they pay, and the products they buy. One of the reasons for
Walmarts growth lies in the fact that they o¤er consumers relatively stable, everyday-
low-prices. Consumers can expect the same price whenever they visit a store, so the
level of certainty o¤ered by Walmart often overcomes any other reservations shoppers
may have. Consider also new product introductions. Consumers are likely to be
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excited about trying a new product because it may o¤er a new function, taste, or
experience that they have not found in existing products. However, purchasing a
new product means losing an opportunity to benet from the product that they
usually purchase, and a potential waste of money. If a new product does not meet
their prior expectations, a loss in utility arises. Bacon-avored soda is one of many
examples. One of the ways consumers can limit their exposure to risk in purchasing
new products is simply to buy a smaller, trial amount. Manufacturers understand
this behavior, so have an incentive to o¤er a small package in response to consumers
risk-averse behavior. In general, risk has a signicant impact both on consumer
and supplier behavior, yet few have studied exactly how risk is manifest in CPG
market performance. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine how
consumers behave under uncertainty, how suppliers optimally react, and how this
joint recognition changes how we think about intermediation in the CPG market.
Attribute and price uncertainty a¤ects how consumers choose stores, brands,
and specic variants of each brand. In this dissertation, I consider each of these
problems in turn. Because consumer goods are generally purchased through retail
intermediaries, store-choice is of primary concern. When consumers choose a store,
they consider not only one item but also a collection of items they plan to buy their
"shopping basket" (Bell and Lattin 1998). The basket price is a source of risk because
consumers are usually not aware of price movements for every item in their basket.
In the rst essay, I show that risk preferences are an important determinant of store
choice. Bell and Lattin (1998) and Ho, Tang, and Bell (1998) explain how consumers
choose a store by using household demographic attributes and basket size, but do
not consider risk preferences. Because consumers are exposed to price uncertainty,
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and prices are fundamental drivers of any choice decision, my research provides a
more fundamental explanation of store-choice behavior. Price uncertainty, however,
reects only part of the problem.
In the second essay, I consider the question of why most new products fail.
While new brands may meet consumersneeds in new and often favorable ways, new
brands also represent a source of risk for consumers. When a new brand is launched,
consumers cannot know the specic "quality" or "t" of that brand relative to their
preferences. In this essay, I examine consumersrisk behavior associated with new
brand purchases and explain how their reaction to the uncertainty of new products is
manifest in the amounts they purchase. Perceived quality is one of the common risk
measures in CPG market analyses, but is not observable (Erdem and Keane 1996;
Erdem 1998; Erdem, Keane, and Sun 2008). My study proposes a new risk measure
that is tangible and relevant to manufacturers and retailers alike. In these rst two
essays, I establish a set of core ndings regarding the consumer-side of the uncertainty
problem.
On the supply-side, the decisions that drive price and attribute uncertainty are
commonly assumed to be exogenous. Rather, if suppliers are assumed to be rational,
they are likely to respond to consumer uncertainty in predictable ways. Indeed, inter-
actions among consumers, retailers, and manufacturers is commonly understood to
be critical to understanding CPG market performance (Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005;
Villas-Boas 2007). Therefore, in the nal essay, I consider how CPG companies op-
timally respond to the types of consumer behavior observed in the rst two. When
consumers purchase a new or unfamiliar product, they tend to choose a smaller pack-
age because it allows them to reduce the risk that the product does not meet their
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prior expectation. Manufacturers adopt product design strategies in response. In the
carbonated soft drink category, for example, Coca-Cola launched Coke Zero with both
large and small package options. Based on the Nielsen household panel scanner data
used in this essay, households tend to choose a small package on their trial purchase
while they choose a large package on repeat purchases. Package size may thus play
an important role in inducing consumers to try new products. In order to understand
how manufacturers choose package sizes, I investigate manufacturesdecisions regard-
ing package size and reveal how they vary in response to consumer preferences, the
cost of producing packages of di¤erent sizes, and competition among manufacturers.
While others argue that changes in package size represent a rational response to con-
sumerspreferences for price and convenience (Çak¬ra and Balagtas 2014), they do not
consider the cost nor strategic implications reected in manufacturerspackage-size
decisions. I show that these considerations are, in fact, fundamental to understanding
why changes in package size occur, and how they represent an important example of
supplier response to risk-averse consumers.
1.1 Essay 1: Price Uncertainty and Store Format Choice
In the rst essay, I investigate store-choice under uncertainty. Although retail-
ing involves a number of decisions on merchandising strategy, assortment, location,
and services, I focus on pricing strategy, or the "store-price format." The choice of
format implies a particular pattern of price variation, which frames the degree and
nature of uncertainty faced by consumers in choosing a store. Understanding how
consumers respond to store price formant is critical to describing how uncertainty
a¤ects the retailing function. When consumers decide where to buy, they generally
face two alternatives: (1) EDLP stores that o¤er lower average prices, that tend to
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vary less over time, or (2) promotion-based (HILO) stores that o¤er higher average
prices, but more variation over time. Formally, each format is characterized by a
specic price distribution, or a combination of the mean and the variance of basket
price. Walmart and Food Lion are typical examples of EDLP stores while Kroger
and Safeway are HILO stores (Ellickson and Misra 2008; Shankar and Bolton 2004).
While it would seem that one type of format should be preferred from a management
perspective, we observe di¤erent types of store price format in the same market. If
retail food markets are competitive, then how can they coexist? That is, if one format
is preferred, we would expect it to dominate the market. In this essay, I show that
there is a systematic relationship between consumersrisk preference and their choice
of store price format. Consequently, I demonstrate how consumer heterogeneity in
risk behavior explains why EDLP and HILO stores coexist in the same market.
Consumers choose stores for many reasons (Bell and Lattin 1998; Smith 2004),
but prices are both an important and transparent competitive tool (Arnold, Oum,
and Tigert 1983). While consumers may nd the best deal at HILO stores, there is
also a chance they may pay a higher price for the same product due to price dispersion
among stores. EDLP stores o¤er lower mean prices and less variability, but HILO
stores o¤er a chance to pay lower prices on some items, at the risk of paying more
for other items. Under price uncertainty, consumersrisk preferences may, therefore,
play a key role in explaining their store choice behavior.
Prior empirical studies nd that prices, store location, assortment size, basket
size, and consumer demographic attributes are all important determinants of store
choice (Arnold, Oum, and Tigert 1983; Lal and Rao 1997; Bell, Ho, and Tang 1998;
Bell and Latin 1998; Ho, Tang, and Bell 1998; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009).
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However, they do not consider consumersattitudes toward uncertainty with respect
to any store attribute. In the rst essay, I conduct an experiment that incorporates
consumer heterogeneity in risk preference in order to investigate the impact of con-
sumersrisk attitudes on their store choice decisions. I nd that risk-averse consumers
tend to choose EDLP stores and risk-loving consumers choose HILO stores because
consumers perceive shopping at HILO stores as more risky due to the greater varia-
tion in prices. Bell and Lattin (1998) nd that consumers who shop for many items
on each trip prefer EDLP stores, and those with smaller baskets prefer HILO stores,
so I conduct my experiment on both types of shoppers. Controlling for basket size,
I still nd that price variability dominates the store-choice decision. This study is
the rst to demonstrate how consumers with di¤erent risk preferences respond to re-
tailerspricing strategies. More generally, this study explains how EDLP and HILO
stores can coexist in the same retail market.
On a fundamental level, I show that what was once considered a behavioral
anomaly, or market failure, can easily be explained by natural heterogeneity in risk
preferences. Properly understood, risk can explain other features of the CPG industry
that are otherwise considered to be ine¢ ciencies or competitive failures.
1.2 Essay 2: Attribute Uncertainty and New Product Choice
After choosing a store, risk and uncertainty are also likely to be important
determinants of brand-choice. While there is little uncertainty regarding the quality or
taste of established brands, new products present a fundamentally di¤erent problem.
In the second essay, I consider the risk associated with consumerspurchases of new
products  products that di¤erent from existing, familiar products in important,
salient ways. When consumers purchase a new or unfamiliar product, they do not
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know how that product with their preferred attribute set. If consumers are risk averse,
they seek to avoid uncertainty, which is likely to be reected in the products they
buy. In the CPG market, most new products do not succeed. In 2011, nearly 80
percent of the new products that were introduced failed to achieve more than $7.5
million in year-one sales, and less than 3% of the new products achieve over $50
million in year-one sales (SymphonyIRI 2012a). Because the purchase of a new or
unfamiliar product involves a higher degree of uncertainty, poor sales performance
may be due to the risk that new products fail to meet consumersprior expectations.
In an expected-utility maximization framework, this risk a¤ects purchase behavior.
Consumers respond to the risk that a new product proves to be unacceptable
in two ways. One of the ways consumer may reduce risk is to use quality signals
such as brand, price, and advertising (Erdem 1998; Erdem, Katz, and Sun 2010;
Erdem, Keane, and Sun 2008; Ackerberg 2003; Anand and Shachar 2011; Byzalov
and Shachar 2004; Erdem and Keane 1996; Erdem and Sun 2002; Mehta, Chen, and
Narasimhan 2008). Another is to purchase a smaller amount than usual. Shoemaker
and Shoal (1975) nd that consumers tend to choose a smaller than usual package or
quantity on their trial purchase of a new product, but do not explain why. While the
role of quality signals has been studied extensively, consumerstendency to reduce
purchase quantity has not.
In order to understand why consumers choose smaller quantities of new prod-
ucts, I estimate a model of household-level demand for newly-introduced products
that includes a consideration of package-size choice. One empirical issue with household-
level demand models, however, is that consumers tend to purchase multiple, discrete
items, and in continuous quantities (Dube 2004; Richards, Gomez, and Pofahl 2012).
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Therefore, I specify and estimate a multiple-discrete continuous extreme value (MD-
CEV) model (Bhat 2005, 2008) in household panel scanner data from the yogurt
category. The MDCEV model identies household-level satiation points while con-
trolling for demographic attributes and other, unobserved sources of heterogeneity.
This model shows that when consumers purchase a new brand for the rst time, their
utility function is more concave and satiation occurs at a smaller quantity, suggesting
that consumers reduce the risk associated with the trial purchase of a new brand by
choosing a smaller quantity.
This study is unique in that it measures consumersrisk attitudes toward trial
purchases of new products, and, as such, provides an explanation for the reduced
purchased quantities observed by Shoemaker and Shoal (1975). More generally, it
again reveals the importance of risk in explaining what would otherwise be consid-
ered a market anomaly. From a managerial perspective, my ndings highlight the
importance of a practice some marketers understand intuitively o¤ering samples of
a new product is an e¤ective tool to build consumer interest.
1.3 Essay 3: Consumer Risk Behavior and Firm Response
In the rst two essays, I consider consumer behavior under uncertainty. The
primary implication of the second essay is that consumers choose package sizes, at
least in part, due to the perceived risk of a mismatch between product attributes,
and their own preferences. In the second study, I followed the existing literature by
assuming package size is exogenous, or determined in a prior stage of a multi-stage
game played between consumers and product manufacturers. If rms are rational,
they ought to be able to capitalize on how they expect consumers to react to the
uncertainty inherent in trying any new product. In fact, when manufacturers launch
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a new brand, they typically o¤er at least one small package to give consumers the
incentive to try that brand. So, in the third essay, I relax the assumption that package
sizes are exogenous and examine how CPG companies optimally react to consumers
quantity choice behaviors. Because purchase quantities are constrained by package
sizes in the CPG market, I focus on manufacturersoptimal package-size decisions.
Package size is an important element of the marketing mix, because a specic
combination of package size and price determines price per unit, and therefore has
a signicant impact on manufacturersprotability. Manufacturers simultaneously
choose the package size and price in response to consumer preferences for package
size and the cost associated with producing package of a particular size. According
to McIntyre (2011), for example, Heinz reduced some of its ketchup products by an
average of 11% and kept its package price the same. Kraft changed the amount of
crackers contained in its Nabisco Premium saltines and Honey Maid graham crackers
boxes by 15% while keeping box prices the same. PepsiCo reduced the size of its
half-gallon cartons of Tropicana by 8% and, in doing so, increased the carton price by
5 to 8%. In these examples, unit prices rose with a change in package size. However,
it is not clear whether these changes are driven by demand, cost considerations, or
recognition of the strategic nature of package sizes.
It seems reasonable that package size is a strategic variable among manufac-
turers, but has not been regarded as such in the literature. Prior studies focus on
how manufacturers and retailers set prices for di¤erent package sizes (Khan and Jain
2005; Cohen 2008; Gu and Yang 2010), but they do not consider that price and
package size are jointly determined. If consumers prefer smaller package sizes, as my
previous essay shows, then package size can be a point of competition. By competing
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in package sizes, rms may be able to soften the degree of price competition in the
downstream market, and raise margins accordingly.
Testing this hypothesis requires an equilibrium model of the interaction be-
tween consumers with heterogeneous preference for package size, and prot-maximizing
retailers and manufacturers. An equilibrium model is necessary to endogenize man-
ufacturerssimultaneous decisions regarding package size and price. On the demand
side, consumers are assumed to make a discrete choice among di¤erentiated products.
On the supply side, manufacturers set package sizes and wholesale prices simultane-
ously taking into account manufacturer costs, retailers response, and competition
among manufacturers, and retailers set retail prices taking into account retailer costs
and demand.
I apply a structural model of vertical equilibrium to store-level scanner data
for the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal category in the Chicago market. I nd that
package size decisions reect consumer preferences, costs, and manufacturersprice
competition in the consumer market. Consumers prefer a small package, in part
due to the perceived risk, and have heterogeneous responses to package size. At the
same time, the cost of producing packages of di¤erent sizes rises in a nonlinear way.
CPG manufacturers make package-size and pricing decisions in response to consumer
preferences, the structure of costs, and strategic considerations in the downstream
market.
Others nd that change in package size, especially package downsizing, is a
more e¤ective tool than a change in price because consumers are less responsive to
the former than the latter (Çak¬ra and Balagtas 2014). However, my results suggest
that package size and price are strategic complements downsizing causes competitors
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to lower their prices, which leads to further downsizing, and more price competition
until a particularly undesirable (from the manufacturersperspective) equilibrium is
reached. Therefore, package downsizing is not necessarily the best way to extract
surplus from consumers as the existing literature would lead us to believe. Rather, if
manufacturers o¤er larger packages in response to a cost increase, for example, price
competition would soften as competitors raise their prices in response. Margins rise
as a result, and the cost increase is covered more e¤ectively than if downsizing would
have been used. More generally, this study provides new insight into manufacturer
package-size decisions as I show that they are not driven by consumer response alone,
but also by market competition, and cost factors.
In competitive markets, pricing is the primary concern. But, this essay shows
that interdependence between price and package size determines manufacturer deci-
sions. Package size a¤ects consumer choice, market share, and competition, which
in turn inuences pricing decisions and vice versa. Such interdependence applies to
markets beyond the CPG industry, and describes a more general pattern of compe-
tition in price and product, or service, attributes. In the internet services providers
market, for example, rms o¤er multiple service packages that di¤er in price and
download speed. Consumers choose their services from among providers such as
Comcast, AT&T, CenturyLink, or any one of a number of local rms according to
not only price but also download speed. Those who watch the video online may pre-
fer a higher download speed while those who use only e-mail and social media may
choose a lower download speed. It is highly likely that rms compete in both price
and download speed, and the interdependence between them plays an important role
in explaining how rms set price and download speed of each package. In healthcare
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insurance, package size refers to coverage levels, the number of procedures included,
and the extent of the service network. Ultimately, rms compete in more than just
price.
1.4 Conclusion
This dissertation reveals that uncertainty plays a crucial role in explaining con-
sumersstore and product choices, and how their behavior conditions the products
o¤ered for sale. I nd that suppliers in the CPG market recognize that consumers are
exposed to a signicant risk, so use marketing strategies that limit consumersexpo-
sure to risk in order to increase their own prots. From a practical perspective, my
ndings allow retailers and manufacturers to better understand the role of consumer
risk in choosing stores, and products, and how to respond appropriately.
The concepts advanced in this dissertation are fundamental, general character-
istics of consumer behavior that are manifest in nearly every purchase environment.
For example, in the rst essay, I explain the coexistence of EDLP and HILO stores
by consumer heterogeneity in risk preferences. This mechanism is likely common in
many other elds. In insurance markets, for example, risk-averse consumers may
prefer a higher-deductible health plan while risk-loving consumers are satised with
a lower-deductible. Insurance products not only o¤er the ability to diversify risk, but
also screen consumers with di¤erent risk attitudes. The methodological framework
used in the rst essay may be applied to better understand the role of risk in not only
insurance-product choice, but many other types of nancial products that involve
risk, consumer durables, or even educational choices. Moreover, the risk behavior
considered in the second essay is typical not only of the CPG market, but also of
the service industries. Consumers usually make decisions about which services they
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choose and how much they use these services, while they are exposed to the risk that
expectations about these qualities will not be met. My insights may help understand
consumer behaviors in service industries such as why consumers choose a small us-
age level of a chosen service when they are uncertain about its quality. Once they
become familiar with the quality of the service, they will then be willing to commit
to longer-term, more lucrative contracts, often with additional service components.
Finally, the framework used in the third essay is not limited to the CPG
market. Package choices are often made in other markets such as wireless, cable,
and internet services providers, or healthcare and auto insurance. In the market
for wireless services, for example, carriers o¤er multiple service packages in which a
monthly line access fee is same, but a number of megabytes of data per month that
consumers can access is di¤erent across packages. For example, Verizon has a Verizon
JetPack 4G LTE in which consumers pay $20 for a monthly line access fee, and $40 if
they choose a data package up to 1GB, $50 if they choose up to 2GB, and so on. Some
users may frequently access the Internet through their mobile devices, but others
do not, which implies data allowance may be an important determinant of choice,
and a point of competition among rms. My ndings suggest that price and data
allowance are strategic variables, and, like the price and size of a box of cereal, they
arise through a strategic market equilibrium, and not a simple response to consumer
demand. Carriers consider consumer demand, costs, and competitorsresponses when
they set data-allowance package prices and sizes. The insights provided by my third
essay help us understand competition in price and non-price attributes more generally,
and apply to many industries beyond consumer goods.
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The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In the rst essay,
I study the relationship between price uncertainty, and consumers choice of store
format. The second essay follows in which I explain consumerschoice of package size
for new products as a function of their aversion to attribute uncertainty. Next, the
third essay applies these insights to equilibrium rm behavior, using rmschoice of
package size and price as an example. I reserve my concluding remarks, and o¤er
more general implications of my ndings, for a nal chapter.
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CHAPTER 2.
ESSAY 1: PRICE UNCERTAINTY AND STORE FORMAT CHOICE
2.1 Introduction
Retail pricing strategies tend to follow patterns that are repeated over thou-
sands of products o¤ered throughout each store. These patterns are referred to gener-
ically as the "pricing format," of the store, which can be either everyday low price
(EDLP) or promotion-based (HILO). Whereas EDLP stores set prices that are rela-
tively constant over time, HILO stores set prices that are higher than EDLP stores on
average, but use frequent sales featuring deeply-discounted prices on a smaller set of
products. More formally, store price format can be dened by the mean and variance
of prices. In reality, there are no pure examples of either as pricing strategies tend to
be located on a continuum between pure EDLP and pure HILO depending observed
degrees of price variability. Walmart and Food Lion are the closest examples to pure
EDLP stores, while Kroger and Safeway are the closest to pure HILO (Shankar and
Bolton 2004; Ellickson and Misra 2008). However, it is not obvious how di¤erent
types of store format can coexist in the same market. Consumer heterogeneity is one
explanation. While others nd that consumer heterogeneity in shopping frequency
and basket size may explain how both formats can survive together (Bell and Lattin
1998; Ho, Tang, and Bell 1998), the observation that the fundamental di¤erence be-
tween store formats lies in the riskiness of the value proposition o¤ered to consumers
suggests that heterogeneity in risk preferences may be equally important. Therefore,
in order to explain the coexistence of HILO and EDLP store formats, I examine the
relationship between heterogeneity in consumer risk preferences and the preference
for store price format.
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Retail stores are largely di¤erentiated on the basis of a variety of non-price
attributes. Market shares di¤er, in part, due to heterogeneity in consumer preferences
for these attributes. A number of studies nd that consumers base their store selection
decisions not only on prices, but also on non-price attributes such as store location,
service quality, and product variety (Arnold, Oum, and Tigert 1983; Bell, Ho, and
Tang 1998; Bawa and Ghosh 1999; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009). These
ndings lead to the conclusion that retailers have a signicant degree of market power,
and tend to act as local monopolists once consumers are in the store (Walters and
McKenzie 1988; Slade 1995; Besanko, Gupta, and Jain 1998). Retailers may use
consumerspreferences for non-price attributes to di¤erentiate themselves into local
monopoly markets. Somewhat paradoxically, Lal and Rao (1997) nd that store
price format can be regarded as a non-price attribute, and can therefore serve as a
key element of a positioning strategy. In an equilibrium framework, they show that
di¤erent store price formats may exist if consumers di¤er in terms of the opportunity
cost of their time spent traveling. In a series of experimental studies, I identify
consumer heterogeneity regarding risk preferences and explain how EDLP and HILO
stores can coexist in the same market via systematic relationship between store price
format and consumers it attracts in terms of risk preferences.
Consumers are uncertain about retail prices that vary from day to day and
place to place, even for frequently-purchased items, so their attitudes toward risk
likely inuence their store choice. Consumers typically purchase many products across
many categories on a single purchase occasion, yet do not make a detailed purchase
plan, nor do they have complete price information before their trip. SymphonyIRI
Group (2012b) reports that motivations for a "quick trip" account for 56% of all
17
purchase occasions and that the rest (44%) involve more complete "stocking up" pur-
chase behaviors. When making a quick trip, consumers need few items immediately
and may not have enough time to search for these prices. When consumers stock up
on many items, on the other hand, they may nd it costly to search for every price
of item included in their basket. Also, Point of Purchase Advertising International
(2012) reports that 76% of consumers purchases result from unplanned and in-store
decisions. These shopping behaviors do not allow consumers to search for every price
in their basket, so consumers ultimately decide where to shop under a veil of uncer-
tainty as to what the total shopping basket price will be. In the consumer packaged
good (CPG) market, consumersrisk attitudes a¤ect their product choice (e.g. Erdem
and Keane 1996; Erdem 1998; Erdem, Zhao, and Valenzuela 2004; Erdem, Keane,
and Sun 2008), so the same is logically true of their store choice. Because consumers
tend to choose a store before choosing a specic product (Bell and Lattin 1998), their
attitudes toward risk may inuence store choice as well. Therefore, I hypothesize that
price variation forms a key source of uncertainty that drives consumersstore-choice
decisions.
How shopping basket size and shopping frequency inuence preferences for
store-price format is relatively well understood. Bell and Lattin (1998) and Ho,
Tang, and Bell (1998) show that large basket shoppers (i.e. those who buy more
and shop less) prefer EDLP stores because they do not have the exibility to take
advantage of occasional price deals on each product in their basket. On the other
hand, small basket shoppers (i.e. those who buy less and shop more) prefer HILO
stores because they can take advantage of price variations for each product. Small
basket shoppers can lower their basket price by buying each product on sale, despite
18
the higher average store-price. Such heterogeneity in consumer shopping behavior
allows EDLP and HILO stores to coexist in the same market. Both studies, however,
assume consumers are risk neutral. That is, they are silent on how consumersrisk
attitudes under basket price uncertainty inuence their choice of store price format.
In this paper, I analyze the role of consumers risk attitudes in their store-choice
decisions. Further, I explain the coexistence of EDLP and HILO stores in terms of
heterogeneity in consumersattitudes toward risk.
My model of store choice assumes consumers choose from among several stores
in order to purchase their typical shopping basket, or choose not to shop at all. Util-
ity implicitly depends on store price format in that it is a function of the variability
of prices within the shopping basket, and other non-price attributes such as store
location and product variety. A unique aspect of my demand model is that I explic-
itly incorporate consumersrisk attitudes into the marginal utility from choosing a
particular store price format.
I test this model using data from a two-stage experimental design. In the rst
stage, I elicit consumersrisk attitudes using an incentive-compatible lottery-choice
experiment (Holt and Laury 2002). The primary advantage of using the Holt and
Laury (2002) framework is that it is more likely to capture actual individual behavior
under uncertainty, because real money is at stake. Further, it is context free so it is
widely used in experimental economics to measure risk preferences (Lusk and Coble
2005; Anderson and Mellor 2008; Nguyen and Leung 2009; Dohmen and Falk 2011;
Anderson, Freeborn, and Hulbert 2012).1 However, there is no evidence as yet that
1There are several alternatives to the Holt and Laury (2002) method of eliciting
risk preferences, di¤ering in the trade-o¤ between simplicity and richness of elicited
risk preferences. Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) design a simple way to elicit risk
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links risk attitudes to store choice. Conditional on consumers revealed attitudes
toward risk, I then implement an incentive-compatible choice-based conjoint study
that provides data on subjects store-price format preferences. Price variation in
the context of store choice is fundamentally di¤erent from that observed for typical
nancial assets in that nancial assets tend to reect either high risk and high return
or low risk and low return. The risk-return reward for store choice is more subtle,
and yet more pervasive in consumersdaily consumption decisions. Muthukrishnan,
Wathieu, and Xu (2009) use a similar approach to test for a relationship between
ambiguity aversion in a lottery choice experiment and a preference for established
brands. Although the context of my experiment di¤ers from theirs, these authors
demonstrate the validity of a two-stage approach to estimate the e¤ect of attitudes
on choice. My goal is similar in nature to theirs, namely to seek evidence that links
consumersattitudes toward risk to their store-choice decisions.
My results show strong support for the hypothesis that consumers self-select
store-price format based on their risk attitudes. Specically, more risk-averse con-
preferences in which subjects are asked to make a single choice among ve lotter-
ies with constant probabilities, but changing payo¤s. However, their approach does
not allow me to di¤erentiate between degrees of risk loving behavior, and I require
consumer heterogeneity in both the risk-averse and risk-loving domains. Gneezy and
Potters (1997) and Charness and Gneezy (2012) propose a risk elicit method in which
subjects are asked to allocate their endowment between safe and risky investments.
However, this method cannot reveal subjects heterogeneity in risk loving behav-
ior. Lejuez, Read, Kahler, Richards, Ramsey, Stuart, Strong, and Brown (2002) and
Crosetto and Filippin (2013) develop a pictorial method of eliciting risk preferences
without explicitly using the probability distribution of the realization of risky out-
comes. In my empirical model, though, I require quantitative information on subjects
risk preferences, so their approach is not suitable. Finally, Dohmen, Falk, Hu¤man,
Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2011) use self-reported questions to elicit risk attitudes
that are relatively easy to understand. Similar to the previous approach, this method
does not enable me to calibrate expected utility functions, nor are subjects incen-
tivized to respond accurately. In sum, while other methods are superior in some
aspects, the Holt and Laury (2002) method is the most suitable for the problem at
hand.
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sumers are likely to choose EDLP stores rather than HILO stores. They perceive that
shopping at HILO stores is risky due to the higher price variability for the goods that
comprise their typical shopping basket and, therefore, have an incentive to choose
EDLP stores. On the other hand, more risk-loving consumers prefer HILO stores
because they have a positive probability of nding a product with lower price. Also,
I nd that the risk-attitude e¤ect becomes less important with smaller basket sizes,
a nding that suggests risk preferences are the mechanism underlying the ndings
of Bell and Lattin (1998) and Ho, Tang, and Bell (1998). My ndings also provide
evidence that the coexistence of EDLP and HILO stores in the same market is at
least in part due to heterogeneity in risk preferences. Choosing a store price format
is not only a form of strategic pricing, but also screening device to sort consumers
with di¤ering attitudes toward risk.
My research contributes to the empirical marketing literature in two ways.
First, I am the rst to combine experimental evidence on risk aversion and store choice
in a consistent way. To the best of my knowledge, experimental risk preferences have
not been used in store-choice experiments. Second, this is the rst store-choice study
to incorporate consumersrisk attitudes. I provide both an analytical model of store
choice that recognizes the importance of risk attitudes, and experimental evidence
that supports the hypotheses that follow. I make a signicant contribution to the
literature by o¤ering a new explanation regarding how EDLP and HILO stores can
coexist in the same market, and o¤er a new interpretation of prior ndings. On a
more practical level, I recognize that each retail chains tend not to choose pure EDLP
or HILO strategies, but typically arrive at something in-between. My results suggest
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that retail managers would be well-advised to better understand the risk preferences
of their market in order to tailor a strategy that maximizes market share.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, I de-
scribe the experimental design used to generate the data and test my hypothesis. In
the third section, I describe my econometric model, and how it is used to examine the
relationship between consumersrisk attitudes and store choice. I present and inter-
pret the data and estimation results in the fourth section. Conclusions, implications,
and potential extensions are described in the nal section.
2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Overview
In this essay, I o¤er evidence from a two-stage, incentive-compatible experi-
ment that shows how consumersrisk attitudes a¤ect their choice of store price format.
Household-panel data can also be used for this purpose, but has signicant drawbacks.
First, it is di¢ cult to dene a shopping basket over time as consumers do not always
purchase the same item on every purchase occasion. Second, because there are no
pure examples of EDLP or HILO stores, identifying and classifying stores into di¤er-
ent pricing formats is di¢ cult with household panel scanner data. In fact, Ellickson
and Misra (2008) point out that most stores do not announce their pricing strategies
and, moreover, individual stores within the same chain often adopt di¤erent pricing
strategies depending on their location and competition. Third, it is impossible to ob-
tain a precise measure of the distance between store locations, and between stores and
individual households. Further, there are many variables that are important to store
choice, but are inherently unobservable: Assortment depth, availability, and product
quality, for example. My experimental approach overcomes each of these problems.
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Experimental data allows me to design a very specic set of pricing strategies using
the mean and the variance of a basket price, to control for store location, assortment
depth, and product quality, and to precisely estimate the e¤ect of consumersrisk
attitudes on store preference.
The experiment consists of two stages. I identify subjectsrisk attitudes in the
rst stage, and preference for store price format in the second stage. Each stage is
implemented using the Qualtrics online research panel (http://www.qualtrics.com).
To participate in the experiment, subjects had to be 18 years old or above, live in
the United States, purchase grocery items for their household at supermarket at least
once a month, and usually drive to their chosen supermarket. A total of 275 subjects
participated in the experiment. The experiment is incentive compatible in that sub-
jects are paid depending on their performance during each stage. Compensation was
recorded during the experiment in monetary units called "experimental units (EU),"
and one EU was converted into 0.25 dollars for payment at the end of the experiment.
2.2.2 First-Stage Experiment
In the rst stage, I conduct an incentive-compatible lottery experiment (Holt
and Laury 2002) in order to identify subjectsrisk preferences. Subjects were pre-
sented with ten choice tasks, each task consisting of two lotteries (called option A
and option B), and were asked to choose between the options in each task. Table
2.1 shows the specic choice tasks the subjects faced. In any choice task, option A is
referred to as the "safe" choice and option B as the "risky" choice because the payo¤s
from option A are less variable than option B. As subjects proceed through the choice
tasks, the expected value of both options increase, but the expected value of option B
becomes greater than that of option A. In my lottery choice experiment (as in others),
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subjects typically begin by choosing option A and switch to option B, and continue
to choose option B until the end. Risk-neutral subjects are expected to choose option
A in the rst four choice tasks and option B in the last six choice tasks, because the
expected payo¤ from option A exceeds that from option B in the rst four choice
tasks. Risk-loving subjects are expected to start by choosing option B prior to the
fourth choice task, and risk-averse subjects are expected to continue to choose option
A even after the fth choice task, switching to option B somewhere between the sixth
and tenth choice task. One lottery is randomly chosen for payment, and subjects are
paid the amount indicated by their selection. It is through this mechanism that the
Holt-Laury experiment is incentive compatible.
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With certain assumptions about the functional form of utility, lottery choices
are used to identify either the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion or the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion. I assume utility takes a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
form:
U(Y ) =   exp ( iY ) ; (2.1)
where i is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion for subject i and Y is the payo¤
in the lottery. Consider a subject who chooses option A in the rst three tasks and
then chooses option B in the subsequent tasks. The lower bound of i for this subject
is determined such that she or he is indi¤erent between option A and option B in the
third choice task. That is, i must satisfy the following equation:
 0:3 exp ( 20i) 0:7 exp ( 16i) =  0:3 exp ( 38i) 0:7 exp ( 2i), i =  0:030:
(2.2)
For the same subject, the upper bound of i can be obtained by:
 0:4 exp ( 20i) 0:6 exp ( 16i) =  0:4 exp ( 38i) 0:6 exp ( 2i), i =  0:008:
(2.3)
Because this process identies only a range for the constant absolute risk aversion
coe¢ cient, I use the midpoint of the upper bound and lower bound of i and use
this as the coe¢ cient of risk aversion in the subsequent analysis (Lusk and Coble
2005; Anderson and Mellor 2008; Nguyen and Leung 2009; Dohmen and Falk 2011;
Anderson, Freeborn, and Hulbert 2012). In the above example, i is set to  0:019;
and i for other lottery choices can be similarly obtained as reported at table 2.2. A
value of i < 0 indicates a risk-loving subject, while i = 0 indicates risk neutrality,
and i > 0 risk aversion.
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Table 2.2
Coe¢ cient of Absolute Risk Aversion
Choice task in which
subject switches to option B Lower bound Upper bound Midpoint
First choice task  0:095  0:095  0:095
Second choice task  0:095  0:056  0:075
Third choice task  0:056  0:030  0:043
Fourth choice task  0:030  0:008  0:019
Fifth choice task  0:008 0:013 0:002
Sixth choice task 0:013 0:033 0:023
Seventh choice task 0:033 0:056 0:044
Eighth choice task 0:056 0:084 0:070
Ninth choice task 0:084 0:126 0:105
Tenth choice task 0:126 0:126 0:126
2.2.3 Second-Stage Experiment
In the second stage, I administer an incentive-compatible choice-based conjoint
(Louviere and Woodworth 1983; Louviere 1988; Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000)
experiment designed to elicit data on subjectsstore-choice behavior. The "stores"
are dened as generic supermarkets that di¤er in terms of the variability of shopping-
basket prices, the number of brands available in each product category, and distance
from the shopper. Basket-price variation is the key attribute as it denes the pricing
format for each store. In addition to prices, selection and convenience are important
choice criterion (Arnold, Oum, and Tigert 1983; Bell, Ho, and Tang 1998; Bawa
and Ghosh 1999; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009). In my experiment, I use the
number of brands as a measure of selection and distance (driving time) as a measure
of shopping convenience. Arnold, Oum, and Tigert (1983) also nd that the quality of
fresh produce is also an important determinant of store choice. I control for this e¤ect
by instructing subjects that they are only shopping for CPGs. When shopping for
CPGs, quality does not vary from store to store. Shopping basket size is an important
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chooser-attribute in determining store choice (Bell and Lattin 1998; Ho, Tang, and
Bell 1998), so I hold shopping-basket size constant on each choice occasion.
Basket-price variation is represented by presenting subjects with a set of "usual"
and "sale" prices for products in a typical shopping basket. By presenting each sub-
ject with two prices (usual and sale), they do not know the exact price charged for
each product in the basket before shopping and, therefore, are forced to make their
store-choice decision under a condition of price uncertainty. The degree of uncertainty
assumes three levels, indicating either an EDLP store, HILO store, or something in-
between that I refer to as a Hybrid store. In this way, basket-price variation reects
the revealed pricing pattern of each store price format in a general way. That is,
subjects are not told that a particular store is EDLP, HILO, or Hybrid, but only
observe the variation in prices I reveal to them (Ellickson and Misra 2008). In order
to maintain consistency with prior store-choice research, I dene the shopping basket
as consisting of 12 CPGs (bacon, butter, margarine, ice cream, soda crackers, liquid
detergent, ground co¤ee, hot dogs, soft drinks, granulated sugar, tissue, and paper
towels), and generate price variability using the mean and variance of the basket price
calculated by Bell and Lattin (1998). Specically, I use their mean price as my usual
price and their mean price minus two standard deviations as my sales price, assuming
the basket price follows a normal distribution.
The number of brands available in each category has three levels: One brand,
three brands, and six brands. This assumption is based on the observation that, on
average, consumers consider approximately three alternatives and choose one when
purchasing CPGs (Hauser and Wernerfelt 1990; Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2003).
One-brand represents no selection at all, three-brands an average selection, and six-
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brands an extensive selection. Finally, driving time has three levels: 5 minutes,
10 minutes, and 20 minutes. I choose these levels based on Fox, Montgomery, and
Lodish (2004), who report the average shopping-trip time of around 10 minutes. All
attributes and levels are summarized at table 2.3.
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I use SAS experimental design macros (Kuhfeld 2010) to create full-factorial
choice design with three three-level attributes. I rst set the number of alternatives
to three and create possible combinations of the attributes and the attribute levels
for one alternative at a time. Then, I search for an e¢ cient design for a main-e¤ects
model, i.e. a design in which the variances of the parameter estimates are minimized
under the assumption that the parameter vector of the design matrix is equal to zero.
My design, therefore, consists of three alternatives plus a "no shopping" option and
nine choice sets. In this design, all parameters for a main-e¤ects model are estimable
and the variances are similar and close to the minimum which is the inverse of the
number of choice sets.2
I use a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM 1964) procedure to ensure that it is
in a subjects best interest to reveal his or her true preferences. The BDM mechanism
works as follows. I assign a specic value to each shopping option that reects the
price of the 12 products the subject purchases, the cost of travel, and the value of
having access to a larger selection. My assigned value thus reects a reasonable
estimate of the total value of each option to the subject. Subjects start with a budget
equal to 26 EUs to spend on each choice set. They can either choose one shopping
option, or to not shop at all. Subjects know that the assigned value depends on all
the attributes that comprise each alternative, but do not know the actual assigned
value until the end of the experiment. I then choose one choice set at random. For
the option chosen out of that choice set, I choose a price at random from a uniform
distribution between 0 EU and the total budget. If the value of the shopping option is
above the random price, subjects receive the value of their choice, but pay an amount
2The SAS code and output are available upon request.
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equal to the random price. If the value of their choice is below the random price,
subjects keep their entire budget and pay nothing. If subjects select the "no shopping"
option in the chosen choice set, they receive the value of the bundle (0 EU) as they
do not shop, and keep their entire budget. This mechanism is well-understood to
be incentive compatible under a wide variety of auction scenarios.3 The instructions
carefully explain how the BDM mechanism works using an example and why it is in
subjectsbest interest to make the choice that best reects the importance they place
on each attribute (see Instructions in Appendix A).
In my experiment, the size of each shopping basket is xed at 12 items. How-
ever, Bell and Lattin (1998) and Ho, Tang, and Bell (1998) nd that consumers
basket size plays a crucial role in their choice of store. I account for the importance
of basket size by conducting the same experiment again with a smaller basket size.
Specically, I dene a smaller shopping basket to consist of 6 items (bacon, butter,
margarine, ice cream, soda crackers, and liquid detergent), and reduce both basket
prices and the total budget in half. The resulting attribute levels for this "small
basket" experiment are summarized in table 2.4.
3Karni and Safra (1987) point out that the BDM mechanism is not incentive
compatible when the good being evaluated is a lottery. Horowitz (2006) further shows
that BDM is not incentive compatible even when the value of the good is certain.
This is because subjects are still uncertain about whether the bit is accepted and
how much they are asked to pay, so their willingness to pay typically depends on the
distribution of an unknown price. Because these observations are common in most
experiments, I assume that the arguments do not have a substantial impact on my
ndings.
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After the experiment has been conducted, I gather demographic and behav-
ioral information on each subject, including income, household size, age, education,
employment status, and shopping frequency. Each of these covariates is used in the
econometric model described in the next section. In general, my sample appears to
be broadly representative of the U.S. population (table 2.5). An average subject in
my sample is 46 years old, and belongs to a household earning $59,220 per year, con-
sisting of 2.5 people. Fully 43 percent of the subjects hold a bachelors degree and
are full-time workers. On average, subjects shop approximately 7.9 times per month,
which is more than once per week.
Table 2.5
Demographic Variables
Variable Symbol Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Annual income Inci 218 59219:720 40104:063
Household size Hszi 218 2:514 1:307
Age Agei 218 45:826 15:577
Education Edui 218 0:431 0:495
Employment Empi 218 0:431 0:495
Shopping frequency (times per month) Sfrqi 218 7:931 6:044
Note: Education takes one if subject is a college graduate and zero otherwise.
Employment takes one if subject is a full time worker and zero otherwise.
2.3 Model
I estimate a structural model of store choice and risk preference. Shopping
utility depends on both the purchase of a shopping basket, and other non-price at-
tributes of the chosen store (convenience and assortment depth). A unique feature of
my model is that basket price is stochastic, and there is a one-to-one correspondence
between a particular combination of the mean and the variance of the price and store
price format. That is, format choice is completely identied by the empirical price
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distribution used in the experiment. The objective of my empirical model is to test
how consumersattitudes toward the risk a¤ect their choice of store.
Consider consumer i, i = 1; 2; :::; I who visits store j, j = 1; 2:::; J with k
non-price attributes, k = 1; 2; :::; K and purchases product l, l = 1; 2; :::; L at time
t, t = 1; 2; :::; T . I assume that each consumer has well-dened preferences regarding
the purchase of a focal product, Qijlt, a composite commodity of all other goods, Zijt;
and a non-price store attribute, Xjk; and that the utility level of consumer i from
choosing store j at time t is given by:
Uijt = u
 

LX
l=1
Qijlt + Zijt +
KX
k=1
kXjk
!
; (2.4)
where u () is an increasing, concave, and continuously di¤erentiable function,  and
 are the marginal benets from the purchase of the shopping basket (
LP
l=1
Qijlt) and
the composite commodity (Zijt), respectively, and k is the marginal utility of the
non-price store attribute, Xjk. Each consumer faces the following budget constraint:
LX
l=1
pjltQijlt + Zijt  mit; (2.5)
where pjlt is the price of product l o¤ered by store j at time t, and mit is the total
budget available to consumer i at time t. Notice that I normalize the price of the
composite commodity to one. Basket-price uncertainty is introduced by assuming that
pjlt is normally distributed with mean pjlt and the variance 
2
pjlt
. The behavioral
implication of this assumption is that consumers do not know the actual price for each
product in their shopping basket, but know the price distribution. This is a reasonable
assumption as consumers are exposed to price information through supermarket yers,
websites, or their own shopping experience.
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My cross-sectional (over shopping baskets) manifestation of risk is not the only
way of modeling uncertainty in a retail context. Forward-looking consumers make op-
timal purchase timing, brand choice, and quantity decisions depending on not only
the current price but also their expectation of future prices (Erdem, Imai, and Keane
2003; Sun 2005; Hendel and Nevo 2006). In the context of store-choices, however,
such dynamic decision making imposes very strong assumptions on the sophistication
of consumersshopping behavior. Because a typical shopping basket is composed of
many products, across many product categories, it may be infeasible for consumers
to look at every product in their basket or form expectations regarding future prices
before they visit a store (SymphonyIRI 2012b). In fact, Point of Purchase Advertising
International (2012) reports that consumers generally make decisions on which prod-
uct to purchase only after they have entered the store. Moreover, experiments such
as the one I use are designed specically to abstract from the types of complexities
involved in dynamic decision making in order to focus subjectsdecisions on my oper-
ationalization of risk. My maintained hypothesis is that consumers face uncertainty
regarding current prices. Every day, consumers make store-choice decisions facing
cross-sectional uncertainty in current basket prices. Although future expectations
about prices may help explain consumersbrand choice decisions, they are irrelevant
to the store-choice context of my experiment. For that reason, my model is inherently
static, so I drop the time subscript t hereafter.
Assuming the budget constraint is binding, I rewrite equation (2.4) as:
Uij = u
 

LX
l=1
Qijl   
LX
l=1
pjlQijl + mi +
KX
k=1
kXjk
!
: (2.6)
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Dene the argument of u () in equation (2.6) as ij. Notice that ij is normally
distributed due to the distributional assumption regarding pij. With the assumption
that the utility function has the CARA property, the expected utility of consumer i
from choosing store j is written as:
E [Uij] = E [ij]  i
2
V [ij] (2.7)
=  E
"
LX
l=1
pjlQijl
#
  
2i
2
V
"
LX
l=1
pjlQijl
#
| {z }
Store price format
+
KX
k=1
kXjk
+
LX
l=1
Qijl + mi;
where i is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion for consumer i, E [] is the expected
value and V [] is the variance. As explained above, I assume that store format is de-
ned by a specic combination of the mean and variance of basket price in that a store
close to EDLP o¤ers prices that are less volatile and lower on average, while a store
close to HILO o¤ers relatively higher mean prices that exhibit much volatility than
EDLP. This observation implies that  E

LP
l=1
pjlQijl

  2i
2
V

LP
l=1
pjlQijl

in equa-
tion (2.7) can be converted into a single measure of store price format:
SP
s=1
s (i)Wjs
where s (i) is the marginal benet from choosing a store price format s and Wjs
is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if store j adopts store price for-
mat s and zero otherwise. Following Bell and Lattin (1998), I further allow s (i)
to depend on N demographic attributes of consumer i, din, n = 1; : : : ; N , so s be-
comes s (i; di1; : : : ; diN). Because there is likely to be considerable heterogeneity in
risk preferences, this approach allows me to control for di¤erences among consumers
while testing my core hypothesis that i helps explain store choice.
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When consumers choose the outside option, shopping utility is zero and they
keep their entire budget. That is, the expected utility of consumer i from choosing
not to shop at any store can be written as: E [Ui0] = mi. Thus, the expected utility
for consumer i is:
E [Uij] =
SX
s=1
s (i; di1; : : : ; diN)Wis +
KX
k=1
kXjk + 
LX
l=1
Qijl + mi; j 6= 0
E [Ui0] = mi: (2.8)
In my empirical application, there are three store price formats, EDLP, Hybrid
and HILO, which is written s = 1 if the store employs EDLP, s = 2 if Hybrid,
and s = 3 if HILO. For each store price format, I specify s (i; di1; : : : ; diN) by the
following linear equation:
s = si +  si + !s1Inci + !s2Hszi + !s3Agei + !s4Edui + !s5Empi + !s6Sfrqi;
si = s + si; si  N(0; 2s); (2.9)
where s, s,  s, and !sl, l = 1; : : : 6 are parameters to be estimated, Inci is house-
hold income, Hszi is household size, Agei is consumer is age, Edui is consumer is
educational attainment, Empi is consumer is employment status, and Sfrqi is con-
sumer is usual shopping frequency. Equation (2.9) incorporates both observable and
unobservable sources of heterogeneity as si is an iid normal error term designed to
account for any unobserved heterogeneity in s (i; di1; : : : ; diN).
There are three stores (i.e. J = 3) and one non-shopping option. Each store
has a di¤erent value for the format variable, the two non-price attributes, the number
of brands available in each product category, and driving time. I specify the non-price
attributes in equation (2.8) as:
KP
k=1
kXjk = 1Nbj + 2Timej where k, k = 1; 2 are
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parameters to be estimated, Nbj is the number of brands available in each product
category at store j, Timej is driving time to store j. In the experiment, I hold
shopping-basket size and total budget constant across subjects, so
LP
l=1
Qijl and mi
in equation (2.8) are normalized to zero for estimation purposes. Finally, I add
a random component to the expected utility as it is possible that expected utility
includes factors that are unobservable to the econometrician. Thus, equation (2.8) is
written as:
E [Uij] =
0B@ 1i +  1i + !11Inci + !12Hszi
+!13Agei + !14Edui + !15Empi + !16Sfrqi
1CAWj;EDLP
+
0B@ 2i +  2i + !21Inci + !22Hszi
+!23Agei + !24Edui + !25Empi + !26Sfrqi
1CAWj;Hybrid
+
0B@ 3i +  3i + !31Inci + !32Hszi
+!33Agei + !34Edui + !35Empi + !36Sfrqi
1CAWj;HILO
+1Nbj + 2Timej + ij; j 6= 0;
1i = 1 + 1i; 1i  N(0; 21);
2i = 2 + 2i; 2i  N(0; 22);
3i = 3 + 3i; 3i  N(0; 23);
E [Ui0] = i0: (2.10)
Comparing the relative magnitudes of  1,  2, and  3 allows me to test the
relationship between consumersrisk attitudes and preferences for a particular store
price format. More risk-averse consumers, who are characterized by a higher coe¢ -
cient of absolute risk aversion, may perceive that shopping at HILO stores is risky due
to higher price variability and, therefore, have an incentive to choose EDLP stores.
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On the other hand, more risk-loving consumers, who are characterized by a lower
coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, may prefer HILO stores because they have a pos-
itive probability of nding a product with lower price. Thus, my hypothesis is that:
 3 <  2 <  1.
For estimation purposes, I assume that ij are distributed iid extreme value,
so the probability that alternative j is chosen is given by:
Pj =
Z Z Z
exp (Vj)
1 +
3P
j=1
exp (Vj)
dF (1i) dF (2i) dF (3i) ; (2.11)
where Vj is the deterministic component of expected utility and F () is the cumulative
standard normal distribution. I use the simulated maximum likelihood to approxi-
mate the integrals in equation (2.11), and maximize the logarithm of the resulting
simulated likelihood function with respect to the parameters (Train 2009). This
method provides consistent parameter estimates under rather weak regularity con-
ditions. To aid in the computational speed and e¢ ciency of estimation, I use 100
Halton draws for realizations of 1i, 2i and 3i (Bhat 2003).
2.4 Results and Discussion
I estimate a number of alternative specications for (2.10) in order to examine
the robustness of my model. Therefore, I begin by describing my experimental data,
report specication tests that compare the goodness of t across models, and then
present and interpret the results obtained by estimating the preferred store-choice
model. I then draw a number of implications regarding the practical importance of
my ndings.
A total of 275 subjects completed all parts of the experiment. However, in
order to ensure that all subjects fully understood the rules of the lottery experiment,
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I embedded a control question. If subjects responded to this question in a way that
suggested they were not making rational decisions, I excluded them from further
analysis. Of the total sample, 57 subjects chose option A in the tenth choice task
of the lottery experiment. Because this means that the subject prefers a certain 20
EUs to a certain 38 EUs, I interpreted this as an indication that the subject did not
understand the rules of the lottery. That such subjects exist is perhaps not surprising,
because I draw my sample from the general public rather than from a population of
students who may be more familiar with this type of experiment, or at least the
calculation required. Because it is impossible to calculate the coe¢ cient of absolute
risk aversion from data that includes responses such as this, I exclude these subjects
and use the responses from the remaining 218 subjects for the subsequent analysis.
The exclusion of these responses is not likely to have any adverse e¤ects because
those who make irrational lottery choices appear randomly in my sample. In other
words, I retain the random nature of my sample by randomly excluding part of the
observations. Following this procedure is well accepted in the literature (Harrison,
List, and Towe 2007; Anderson and Mellor 2008).
Among the remaining responses, 138 subjects start with option A and then
switched to option B and continue to select option B thereafter while 80 subjects
switch back to option A even after having chosen option B. This type of behavior
is also reported in other lottery choice experiments (Holt and Laury 2002; Lusk and
Coble 2005; Harrison, List and Towe 2007; Anderson and Mellor 2008). In these
cases, I employ the method of calculating the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion
used by these authors. Namely, for subjects who made multiple switches, I use the
midpoint between the lower bound and the upper bound of the coe¢ cient of absolute
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risk aversion, where the lower bound is determined by the rst switch from option
A to option B, and the upper bound is determined by the last time a subject chose
option B. For example, suppose a subject chose option A for the rst three choice
tasks, switches to option B in the fourth task, switches back to option A in the fth
task, chose option B in the eighth task, and then continues to choose option B for
all remaining tasks. In this case, the lower bound is  0:030 and the upper bound is
0:084, so the midpoint that is used for the estimation is 0:027.
I nd considerable heterogeneity in subjectsattitudes toward risk. Table 2.6
reports the distribution of subjectscoe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion, while tables
2.7 and 2.8 provide some descriptive data on the relationship between risk aversion
and store choice. Specically, these tables compare the choice share of each store
price format, and the "non-shopping" option, for a range of coe¢ cient of absolute risk
aversion values. Table 2.7 reports the choice share based on a shopping basket that is
comparable to Bell and Lattin (1998), while table 2.8 is based on a smaller basket. The
summary statistics in these tables reveal some preliminary support for my hypothesis
as there appears to be a positive relationship between the coe¢ cient of constant
risk aversion and the EDLP and Hybrid shares: More risk-averse subjects appear to
choose EDLP or Hybrid stores more often. Moreover, these summary statistics show
a negative relationship between the coe¢ cient of constant risk aversion and the share
of the HILO store. This result implies that risk-averse subjects prefer EDLP stores
to HILO stores. However, this trend could be due to any one of a number of factors
such as assortment depth, store location, and subjectsdemographic attributes, so
more conclusive evidence will need to found from the econometric estimates.
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Table 2.6
Coe¢ cient of Absolute Risk Aversion
Range of coe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion Obs.
i   0:095 13
 0:095 < i   0:056 0
 0:056 < i   0:030 11
 0:030 < i   0:008 19
 0:008 < i  0:013 36
0:013 < i  0:033 59
0:033 < i  0:056 30
0:056 < i  0:084 20
0:084 < i  0:126 12
0:126  i 18
Total 218
Table 2.7
Coe¢ cient of Absolute Risk Aversion and Choice Share
Range of coe¢ cient of EDLP Hybrid HILO Non-shopping Total
absolute risk aversion Obs. (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
i   0:056 117 23:077 26:496 50:427 0:000 100
 0:056 < i   0:008 270 27:778 30:741 36:296 5:185 100
 0:008 < i  0:033 855 27:018 31:696 36:608 4:678 100
0:033 < i  0:084 450 29:111 29:778 34:889 6:222 100
0:084  i 270 24:815 33:333 36:667 5:185 100
Total 1; 962 27:064 31:040 37:003 4:893 100
Note: Obs. = number of subjects  number of choice occasions.
Table 2.8
Coe¢ cient of Absolute Risk Aversion and Choice Share (Small Shopping Basket)
Range of coe¢ cient of EDLP Hybrid HILO Non-shopping Total
absolute risk aversion Obs. (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
i   0:056 117 23:932 28:205 47:863 0:000 100
 0:056 < i   0:008 270 24:815 31:111 36:296 7:778 100
 0:008 < i  0:033 855 28:889 29:591 34:854 6:667 100
0:033 < i  0:084 450 28:444 27:556 36:889 7:111 100
0:084  i 270 24:815 36:296 32:222 6:667 100
Total 1; 962 27:370 30:173 35:933 6:524 100
Note: Obs. = number of subjects  number of choice occasions.
My choice-based conjoint experiment is designed so that store choice depends
on the variability of shopping-basket price, the number of brands available in each
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product category, and driving time to the store. I also include subjectsdemographic
attributes and risk attitudes, which are collected in the rst-stage experiment. In
order to evaluate the validity of the model specication, I conduct specication tests
using the Akaike information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC),
and likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics. In table 2.9, I report the AIC and BIC for
my proposed model, and an alternative model that does not include demographic
attributes or risk attitudes. These results show that the proposed model achieves
the lower value for AIC but, not for BIC. Despite the negative result from the BIC
criterion, the LR test supports the proposed model. For the LR test, I dene the
proposed model as the alternative specication, and the model without demographic
attributes and risk attitudes as the null specication. As shown in table 2.10, I reject
the null in favor of the alternative according to the LR test. Thus, I conclude that the
preferred specication must include both demographic attributes and risk attitudes,
so I present and interpret the estimation results from this model.4
Table 2.9
AIC and BIC
Log Number of
Model likelihood parameters AIC BIC
Proposed model  1; 942 29 3; 943 4; 105
Without demographic and risk variables  1; 980 8 3; 975 4; 020
4To investigate the inuence of the assumption about utility form, I also estimate
the proposed model using di¤erent risk measures such as coe¢ cient of constant rel-
ative risk aversion, the number of safe choices, and choice task corresponding to the
rst risky choice. I obtain similar results regardless of which risk measure I use. Nev-
ertheless, the proposed model achieves the highest log likelihood value and smallest
standard errors for some important variables. These estimation results are available
upon request.
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Table 2.10
LR Statistic When the Alternative Model Is the Proposed Model
Degree Critical LR
Null model of freedom value for 95% statistic
Without demographic and risk variables 21 32:671 74:786
Estimates from the preferred specication again support my primary hypothe-
ses. These results are shown in table 2.11. In order to examine the nature of the
relationship between risk aversion and store choice, I interact each subjects coe¢ -
cient of absolute risk aversion with a set of store-format indicator variables. In each
case, these coe¢ cients are all signicant, suggesting that consumersrisk attitudes are
important in explaining the marginal utility from choosing each store price format.
Notice that all of these coe¢ cients are negative. This is because subjects can receive a
certain budget amount by choosing the "no shopping" option in each choice set. In the
econometric model, the utility from choosing a "no shopping" option is normalized, so
all estimates are measured relative to this option. Because the "no shopping" option
is regarded as the safest choice available in each choice set in terms of price variation,
it is natural that the coe¢ cients of the interactions between subjectscoe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion and each store price format are all negative.
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Table 2.11
Estimation Result of the Proposed Model
Variable Parameter Symbol Estimate Std. error
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  EDLP Mean coef.  1  4:109 2:202
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  Hybrid Mean coef.  2  3:979 2:187
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  HILO Mean coef.  3  6:661 2:213
EDLP Mean coef. 1 2:721
 0:554
Std. dev. coef. 1  0:321 0:437
Hybrid Mean coef. 2 3:012
 0:550
Std. dev. coef. 2 0:089 0:322
HILO Mean coef. 3 2:330
 0:566
Std. dev. coef. 3 0:843 0:328
The number of brands Mean coef. 1 0:245
 0:019
Driving time Mean coef. 2  0:098 0:007
Income  EDLP Mean coef. !11  0:693 0:292
Income  Hybrid Mean coef. !21  0:469 0:286
Income  HILO Mean coef. !31  0:470 0:287
Household size  EDLP Mean coef. !12 0:603 0:927
Household size  Hybrid Mean coef. !22 0:129 0:922
Household size  HILO Mean coef. !32 0:841 0:930
Age  EDLP Mean coef. !13  1:554 0:823
Age  Hybrid Mean coef. !23  1:695 0:817
Age  HILO Mean coef. !33 0:235 0:830
Education  EDLP Mean coef. !14 0:739 0:257
Education  Hybrid Mean coef. !24 0:500 0:255
Education  HILO Mean coef. !34 0:152 0:258
Employment  EDLP Mean coef. !15  0:974 0:261
Employment  Hybrid Mean coef. !25  0:872 0:258
Employment  HILO Mean coef. !35  0:925 0:260
Shopping frequency  EDLP Mean coef. !16 0:335 0:224
Shopping frequency  Hybrid Mean coef. !26 0:300 0:223
Shopping frequency  HILO Mean coef. !36 0:439 0:225
Simulated log likelihood at convergence  1; 942
AIC 3; 943
BIC 4; 105
Note: A single-asterisk indicates signicance at a 10% level.
A double-asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
My main interest lies in examining the relative values of  1,  2, and  3 in
order to test whether there is any systematic relationship between consumersrisk
attitudes and preference for store price format. The values of these coe¢ cients in table
2.11 imply that the more risk-averse the subject, the more he or she prefers EDLP
to HILO stores. However, it is not clear whether this relationship is statistically
signicant. The 90 percent condence interval for  1 is [ 7:731; 0:486] and  3 is
[ 10:301; 3:022]. Because there is some overlap in the region between them, it is
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possible that  1 <  3 rather than  3 <  1 depending on the sample. To address this
issue, I have to formally test the relative values of each parameter. I rst test the
relationship between  1 and  3. Following Kane and Rouse (1995), I consider the
following specication of the expected utility:
E [Uij] =
0B@ 1i +  1i + !11Inci + !12Hszi
+!13Agei + !14Edui + !15Empi + !16Sfrqi
1CAWj;EDLP
+
0B@ 2i +  2i + !21Inci + !22Hszi
+!23Agei + !24Edui + !25Empi + !26Sfrqi
1CAWj;Hybrid
+
0B@ 3i + !31Inci + !32Hszi
+!33Agei + !34Edui + !35Empi + !36Sfrqi
1CAWj;HILO
+ 3  (i Wj;EDLP + i Wj;HILO)
+1Nbj + 2Timej + ij; j 6= 0;
1i = 1 + 1i; 1i  N(0; 21);
2i = 2 + 2i; 2i  N(0; 22);
3i = 3 + 3i; 3i  N(0; 23);
E [Ui0] = i0: (2.12)
The term,  3  i Wj;EDLP is added to the expected utility specication in (2.10)
to establish (2.12). The coe¢ cient on i Wj;EDLP is key to testing the statistical
di¤erence between the coe¢ cients for i Wj;EDLP and i Wj;HILO. If I reject the
hypothesis, H0 :  1 = 0 in (2.12), then the coe¢ cient for i Wj;EDLP is  1 +  3,
which is di¤erent from the coe¢ cient for iWj;HILO. If I fail to reject the hypothesis,
on the other hand, it is possible that  1 is zero and the coe¢ cients for i Wj;EDLP
and i  Wj;HILO are same and  3. In this case, I cannot conclude that there is
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a statistically signicant di¤erence between the coe¢ cients for i  Wj;EDLP and
i Wj;HILO.
Table 2.12 reports the results obtained from estimating the expected utility
specication in (2.12). I nd that the coe¢ cient on i  Wj;EDLP is positive and
signicant, which means that the coe¢ cient on i  Wj;EDLP is greater than the
coe¢ cient on i Wj;HILO, and that this di¤erence is statistically signicant. Based
on this test, my results show that consumersrisk attitudes have a di¤erent impact
on the marginal utility from choosing EDLP and HILO stores in the context of the
utility model in equation (2.10). Namely, more risk-averse consumers gain more from
choosing EDLP than HILO, because they perceive shopping at a HILO store is risky
due to greater price variation. Next, I conduct a similar test for investigating the
relationship between  2 and  3. Table 2.13 shows that the coe¢ cient for iWj;Hybrid
is positive and signicant, implying that the coe¢ cient for i Wj;Hybrid is greater
than iWj;HILO. This relationship is also statistically signicant. Finally, I compare
 1 with  2 in the same way. The results in table 2.14 show that the coe¢ cient for
iWj;EDLP is not signicant, suggesting that there is no statistical di¤erence between
the coe¢ cients for iWj;EDLP and iWj;Hybrid in equation (2.10). In total, these
tests reveal that more risk-averse consumers tend to prefer EDLP to HILO stores and
Hybrid to HILO stores.
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Table 2.12
Testing of the Magnitude Relationship 1
Variable Parameter Symbol Estimate Std. error
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  EDLP Mean coef.  1 2:553 1:363
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  Hybrid Mean coef.  2  3:978 2:187
i Wj;EDLP + i Wj;HILO Mean coef.  3  6:660 2:212
EDLP Mean coef. 1 2:721
 0:554
Std. dev. coef. 1  0:321 0:437
Hybrid Mean coef. 2 3:012
 0:550
Std. dev. coef. 2 0:089 0:322
HILO Mean coef. 3 2:331
 0:566
Std. dev. coef. 3 0:843 0:328
The number of brands Mean coef. 1 0:245
 0:019
Driving time Mean coef. 2  0:098 0:007
Income  EDLP Mean coef. !11  0:693 0:292
Income  Hybrid Mean coef. !21  0:469 0:286
Income  HILO Mean coef. !31  0:470 0:287
Household size  EDLP Mean coef. !12 0:603 0:927
Household size  Hybrid Mean coef. !22 0:129 0:922
Household size  HILO Mean coef. !32 0:841 0:930
Age  EDLP Mean coef. !13  1:555 0:823
Age  Hybrid Mean coef. !23  1:696 0:817
Age  HILO Mean coef. !33 0:234 0:830
Education  EDLP Mean coef. !14 0:739 0:257
Education  Hybrid Mean coef. !24 0:500 0:255
Education  HILO Mean coef. !34 0:152 0:258
Employment  EDLP Mean coef. !15  0:974 0:261
Employment  Hybrid Mean coef. !25  0:872 0:258
Employment  HILO Mean coef. !35  0:925 0:260
Shopping frequency  EDLP Mean coef. !16 0:335 0:224
Shopping frequency  Hybrid Mean coef. !26 0:300 0:223
Shopping frequency  HILO Mean coef. !36 0:439 0:225
Simulated log likelihood at convergence  1; 942
AIC 3; 943
BIC 4; 105
Note: A single-asterisk indicates signicance at a 10% level.
A double-asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
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Table 2.13
Testing of the Magnitude Relationship 2
Variable Parameter Symbol Estimate Std. error
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  EDLP Mean coef.  1  4:107 2:202
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  Hybrid Mean coef.  2 2:683 1:376
i Wj;Hybrid + i Wj;HILO Mean coef.  3  6:661 2:212
EDLP Mean coef. 1 2:722
 0:554
Std. dev. coef. 1  0:321 0:437
Hybrid Mean coef. 2 3:012
 0:550
Std. dev. coef. 2 0:089 0:322
HILO Mean coef. 3 2:331
 0:566
Std. dev. coef. 3 0:843 0:328
The number of brands Mean coef. 1 0:245
 0:019
Driving time Mean coef. 2  0:098 0:007
Income  EDLP Mean coef. !11  0:693 0:292
Income  Hybrid Mean coef. !21  0:469 0:286
Income  HILO Mean coef. !31  0:470 0:287
Household size  EDLP Mean coef. !12 0:603 0:927
Household size  Hybrid Mean coef. !22 0:129 0:922
Household size  HILO Mean coef. !32 0:841 0:930
Age  EDLP Mean coef. !13  1:555 0:823
Age  Hybrid Mean coef. !23  1:696 0:817
Age  HILO Mean coef. !33 0:234 0:830
Education  EDLP Mean coef. !14 0:739 0:257
Education  Hybrid Mean coef. !24 0:500 0:255
Education  HILO Mean coef. !34 0:152 0:258
Employment  EDLP Mean coef. !15  0:974 0:261
Employment  Hybrid Mean coef. !25  0:872 0:258
Employment  HILO Mean coef. !35  0:925 0:260
Shopping frequency  EDLP Mean coef. !16 0:335 0:224
Shopping frequency  Hybrid Mean coef. !26 0:300 0:223
Shopping frequency  HILO Mean coef. !36 0:439 0:225
Simulated log likelihood at convergence  1; 942
AIC 3; 943
BIC 4; 105
Note: A single-asterisk indicates signicance at a 10% level.
A double-asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
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Table 2.14
Testing of the Magnitude Relationship 3
Variable Parameter Symbol Estimate Std. error
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  EDLP Mean coef.  1  0:130 1:396
i Wj;EDLP + i Wj;Hybrid Mean coef.  2  3:979 2:187
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  HILO Mean coef.  3  6:661 2:212
EDLP Mean coef. 1 2:722
 0:554
Std. dev. coef. 1  0:321 0:437
Hybrid Mean coef. 2 3:012
 0:550
Std. dev. coef. 2 0:089 0:322
HILO Mean coef. 3 2:331
 0:566
Std. dev. coef. 3 0:843 0:328
The number of brands Mean coef. 1 0:245
 0:019
Driving time Mean coef. 2  0:098 0:007
Income  EDLP Mean coef. !11  0:693 0:292
Income  Hybrid Mean coef. !21  0:469 0:286
Income  HILO Mean coef. !31  0:470 0:287
Household size  EDLP Mean coef. !12 0:603 0:927
Household size  Hybrid Mean coef. !22 0:129 0:922
Household size  HILO Mean coef. !32 0:841 0:930
Age  EDLP Mean coef. !13  1:555 0:823
Age  Hybrid Mean coef. !23  1:696 0:817
Age  HILO Mean coef. !33 0:234 0:830
Education  EDLP Mean coef. !14 0:739 0:257
Education  Hybrid Mean coef. !24 0:500 0:255
Education  HILO Mean coef. !34 0:152 0:258
Employment  EDLP Mean coef. !15  0:974 0:261
Employment  Hybrid Mean coef. !25  0:872 0:258
Employment  HILO Mean coef. !35  0:925 0:260
Shopping frequency  EDLP Mean coef. !16 0:335 0:224
Shopping frequency  Hybrid Mean coef. !26 0:300 0:223
Shopping frequency  HILO Mean coef. !36 0:439 0:225
Simulated log likelihood at convergence  1; 942
AIC 3; 943
BIC 4; 105
Note: A single-asterisk indicates signicance at a 10% level.
A double-asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
Among the other estimates reported in table 2.11 are a number of results that
also may be of interest to practitioners. First, each store price format, EDLP, Hybrid,
and HILO, has a positive and signicant impact on expected utility. The magnitude
of this format-e¤ect is slightly larger for Hybrid than the others, suggesting that
consumers may prefer moderate price variation. Further, the standard deviation
of the coe¢ cient of HILO store is signicant, indicating that there is considerable
variation in preferences for the HILO format. Second, the number of brands available
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in each product category has positive and statistically signicant impact on expected
utility. Consumers prefer stores with deeper assortments, which is consistent with
Oppewal and Koelemeijer (2005), Borle, Boatwright, Nunes, and Shmueli (2005),
and Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox (2009). As expected, the distance to the store,
as measured by driving time, has a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on
expected utility. This nding both makes sense as consumers tend to shop at stores
that are nearer to them, and is consistent with the literature (Arnold, Oum, and
Tigert 1983; Bell, Ho, and Tang 1998; Bawa and Ghosh 1999).
Demographic heterogeneity appears to be important in explaining store choice.
Specically, I nd that income has statistically signicant negative e¤ect on marginal
utility from choosing an EDLP store, while its e¤ect on other store price formats
is not signicant. This implies that low-income households prefer certain low prices
and tend to shop more often at EDLP stores. Age has statistically signicant impact
on the marginal utility from choosing EDLP and Hybrid stores, but not from HILO,
indicating that younger people have a stronger preference for EDLP and Hybrid
stores. I nd that education has a positive e¤ect on the marginal utility from choosing
EDLP and Hybrid stores. It may be the case that higher-educated consumers tend
to be more conscious about price uctuations, do not prefer variation in the prices
they face, and choose to shop at EDLP and Hybrid stores as a result. For all formats,
employment status has negative and signicant impact. Because employment status
is dened so that a one indicates full-time employment, this result may be simply
because busy full-time workers are reluctant to shop at all. Shopping frequency plays
an important role in explaining the marginal benet from shopping at a HILO store.
The positive and signicant e¤ect of shopping frequency on subjectspreference for
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HILO stores suggests that frequent shoppers prefer the ability to nd a good deal.
Frequent shoppers are able to take advantage of price variation because they tend to
have greater knowledge about shelf prices in general through their deeper shopping
experience (Bell and Lattin 1998).
Finally, I investigate how the results of my proposed model change when I
reduce the size of the shopping basket (table 2.15). One notable di¤erence between
the results reported in tables 2.11 and 2.15 is that the coe¢ cients of the interactions
between subjects coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion and the EDLP and Hybrid
indicators become insignicant in table 2.15.5 This result implies that consumers
risk attitudes become less important when their basket size is small. When the
total amount at risk is reduced, consumers logically become less sensitive about price
variation, so this result is intuitive.
5I nd a similar tendency even when I use di¤erent risk measures such as the
coe¢ cient of constant relative risk aversion, the number of safe choices, and choice
task corresponding to the rst risky choice. This implies that my nding is not due to
my assumption regarding the nature of the utility function. These estimation results
are available upon request.
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Table 2.15
Estimation Result of the Proposed Model with Small Shopping Basket
Variable Parameter Symbol Estimate Std. error
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  EDLP Mean coef.  1  2:146 1:928
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  Hybrid Mean coef.  2  1:051 1:923
Coef. of absolute risk aversion  HILO Mean coef.  3  4:058 1:914
EDLP Mean coef. 1 2:088
 0:477
Std. dev. coef. 1  0:237 0:467
Hybrid Mean coef. 2 1:791
 0:478
Std. dev. coef. 2  0:059 0:367
HILO Mean coef. 3 2:004
 0:477
Std. dev. coef. 3  0:551 0:369
The number of brands Mean coef. 1 0:242
 0:017
Driving time Mean coef. 2  0:096 0:006
Income  EDLP Mean coef. !11  0:170 0:268
Income  Hybrid Mean coef. !21  0:219 0:268
Income  HILO Mean coef. !31  0:282 0:266
Household size  EDLP Mean coef. !12 0:232 0:834
Household size  Hybrid Mean coef. !22 1:182 0:829
Household size  HILO Mean coef. !32 0:588 0:823
Age  EDLP Mean coef. !13  1:305 0:698
Age  Hybrid Mean coef. !23  1:039 0:698
Age  HILO Mean coef. !33  0:322 0:691
Education  EDLP Mean coef. !14 0:150 0:223
Education  Hybrid Mean coef. !24 0:120 0:223
Education  HILO Mean coef. !34  0:093 0:221
Employment  EDLP Mean coef. !15  0:544 0:228
Employment  Hybrid Mean coef. !25  0:360 0:227
Employment  HILO Mean coef. !35  0:228 0:225
Shopping frequency  EDLP Mean coef. !16 0:265 0:195
Shopping frequency  Hybrid Mean coef. !26 0:222 0:195
Shopping frequency  HILO Mean coef. !36 0:271 0:194
Simulated log likelihood at convergence  2; 016
AIC 4; 089
BIC 4; 251
Note: A single-asterisk indicates signicance at a 10% level.
A double-asterisk indicates signicance at a 5% level.
Retail managers may be interested in my ndings, primarily because of the
importance and prominence of format choice. Because the format of individual stores
di¤ers even within the same chain, managers must carefully consider the implications
for market share, and for protability. My nding with respect to consumersstore
choice behavior provides some information that may be useful in this regard. I nd
that there is a systematic relationship between consumersrisk attitudes and their
preference for store-price format, so managers would be well-advised to obtain data
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on the risk-prole of their particular market. Because consumers perceive the risk
associated with basket-price variation, and because stores di¤er in terms of their
format, consumers with di¤erent risk attitudes will self-select stores that are consistent
with their risk preferences. Given that risk attitudes di¤er among consumers, any
store price format has a potential for success in a particular market. For example, if a
chain is contemplating opening in a relatively low-income area in a market, it would
benet from adopting a format more toward the EDLP end of the format continuum
as I nd that low income consumers tend to prefer less variable prices. My results also
explain the coexistence of di¤erent store price formats within each market. Because
risk attitudes di¤er and consumers self-select, each market needs a variety of stores
to cater to the revealed risk preferences of its clientele.
This study implies that coexistence of EDLP and HILO stores in the same mar-
ket is attributed to heterogeneity in risk preferences. Such a mechanism is common
in many other elds. In insurance markets, for example, a certain type of insurance
may screen a certain type of consumer e.g. a risk-averse consumer may have an in-
centive to choose a higher-deductible health plan. In job markets, a certain payment
scheme may elicit a certain type of employees e.g. risk-loving employees may prefer
incentive or variable payment which varies based on their performance. Consumers
or employeesself-selection based on di¤erent risk attitudes may play an important
role in explaining coexistence of di¤erent alternatives in the same market.
2.5 Conclusions and Implications
In this chapter, I investigate retailer motivations for o¤ering di¤erent store-
price formats. In general, retailers choose a pricing format that is characterized by
either more variable prices (HILO), or less variable, lower-mean prices (EDLP), or
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somewhere in-between. As prices vary over time and each format is dened by the
mean and the variance of prices, consumers perceive di¤erent formats as o¤ering
either a low-risk or high-risk proposition. In any uncertain choice context, attitudes
toward risk are important for observed behavior, so I expect the same to be true
for consumers store choice decisions. I examine how consumers respond to price
uncertainty when choosing where to shop.
In order to understand the relationship between consumersrisk attitudes and
retailerspricing strategies, I develop a discrete choice model of store choice. I test
this model using data generated by a two-stage, incentive-compatible experiment in
which I elicit subjectsrisk attitudes through a lottery choice experiment, and then, in
a second stage, use a choice-based conjoint experiment to determine how consumers
attitudes toward risk inuence their choice of store format.
I show that consumers perceive considerable risk in choosing between stores,
and that this risk ultimately inuences the choices they make. My estimates reveal
a systematic relationship between consumersrisk attitudes and preferences for par-
ticular store price formats. More risk-averse consumers are more likely to choose an
EDLP store that is characterized by less price variability and lower average price.
My ndings suggest that pricing strategies allow consumers with di¤erent risk atti-
tudes to self-select a particular store format, which explains the evident coexistence
of stores with di¤erent pricing formats in the same market. Moreover, I nd that this
e¤ect is less important when basket size is small.
Some consumers may search for a better price for every product in their shop-
ping basket across time and space, and purchase only those items that sell for the
lowest possible price. As discussed above, however, such complete-price search is usu-
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ally impossible due to the high search cost. As a result, average consumers buy higher
at HILO stores than EDLP stores. Under this circumstance, risk-averse consumers
may demand "insurance" to cover against basket price variation. As EDLP stores
guarantee relatively a constant basket price, risk-averse consumers are likely to per-
ceive that shopping at EDLP stores provides the insurance they seek. This may be
another reason why risk-averse consumers tend to prefer EDLP stores to HILO stores.
Namely, by shopping at EDLP stores, risk-averse consumers purchase an insurance
to manage price variation. The di¤erence between the basket price that achieves the
expected utility from shopping at HILO stores and a certain basket price realized by
shopping at EDLP stores can be interpreted as a risk premium. This risk premium
represents disutility for risk-averse consumers from facing the price variation in the
retail market and their willingness-to-pay for reducing the risk.
My study provides information that may be useful to managers charged with
designing retail pricing strategies. Most importantly, any type of store price format
has the potential to succeed if consumers di¤er in terms of their attitudes toward
risk. My results show that store price format is not merely a strategic choice of
prices, but also a screening device that e¤ectively separates consumers with di¤erent
risk attitudes. Consumersself-selection among stores is one of the reasons why there
is no single, dominant store format in most markets.
My ndings suggest a number of avenues for future research. While my model
o¤ers new insight about consumersstore-choice decisions, it does not consider con-
sumersstore-search behavior. In my experiment, the variance of basket price is held
constant across subjects. However, it is possible that the variance is endogenous
and, in fact, changes depending on subjectssearch behavior, exposure to supermar-
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ket yers, or previous shopping experience. It would be worthwhile to incorporate
consumerspotential information gain from search into my experiment and analytical
model. This research could also be extended to incorporate strategic pricing decisions
by retailers. It may be the case that retailers optimally react to the consumersstore
price format choice in consideration of rival retailersstrategies. Equilibrium analysis
of the interactions between utility-maximizing consumers with di¤erent risk attitudes
and prot-maximizing retailers may provide insight into retailersstrategies. I leave
these ideas for future research.
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CHAPTER 3.
ESSAY 2: ATTRIBUTE UNCERTAINTY AND NEW PRODUCT CHOICE
3.1 Introduction
Success in introducing new products is critical for sales growth, yet most new
products ultimately fail. SymphonyIRI (2012a) reports that nearly 80 percent of
new products introduced in the market fail to achieve more than $7.5 million in
year-one sales and only less than three percent of the new products achieve over
$50 million in year-one sales. Poor acceptance by consumers may be due to the
uncertainty about how new or unfamiliar products t their preferred attribute set.
Flavor, aroma, e¢ cacy, usability, and durability are experience attributes that are
inherently indeterminable until the product is purchased and used (Nelson 1970). One
of the ways a consumer may reduce the risk that a new product proves unacceptable
is to use quality signals. For example, a parent brand may signal the quality of
an umbrella brand (Erdem 1998), price may signal product quality (Erdem, Keane
and Sun 2008; Erdem, Katz and Sun 2010), or a rm may use advertising as a
complementary signal to price, or to convey information on product attributes (Erdem
and Keane 1996; Erdem and Sun 2002; Ackerberg 2003; Byzalov and Shachar 2004;
Chen and Narasimhan 2008; Mehta, Anand and Shachar 2011). Another is to simply
purchase a smaller amount than usual on an initial, or trial purchase. Shoemaker
and Shoal (1975) nd that consumers tend to choose a smaller than usual package or
quantity on their trial purchase of a new product, but do not explain why. In this
essay, I o¤er a theoretical explanation and an empirical test of how reducing purchase
quantities can serve as a risk reduction strategy.
My explanation is grounded in a model of a utility-maximizing consumer. On
the surface, the explanation seems trivial: Reducing the amount purchased limits the
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nancial loss and, hence, the risk of purchase. In product categories such as carbon-
ated soft drinks, ice cream, ready-to-eat cereals, and yogurt, consumers typically shop
infrequently relative to their consumption rate, so often purchase either many units of
a single product or a bundle of products on a single purchase occasion (Hendel 1999;
Kim, Allenby and Rossi 2002; Dubé 2004, 2005). If they purchase their usual quantity
and are reluctant to simply throw the new product out, the lost consumption-utility
can be substantial. Risk-reduction is therefore a consequence of diminishing marginal
utility. If utility must be concave in quantity in order to ensure an interior solution
to the utility-maximization problem, and if utility is more concave in quantity under
uncertainty, then satiation occurs at a smaller quantity. Because the uncertainty sur-
rounding the trial purchase of a new product is signicantly higher than for one that
is well-understood, consumers naturally purchase a lower quantity as a result of the
lower optimal-satiation level. Therefore, it is important to capture structural changes
in utility function as consumers make a trial purchase of a new product.
Consumers are generally regarded as risk averse with respect to their pur-
chases of consumer packaged goods (CPGs) (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Others
account for attitudes toward risk associated with uncertainty in product quality by
dening quality as "perceived quality" and nd that the risk parameter has a sig-
nicant impact on utility (Meyer and Sathi 1985; Roberts and Urban 1988; Horsky
and Nelson 1992; Erdem and Keane 1996; Erdem 1998; Byzalov and Shachar 2004;
Erdem, Zhao, and Valenzuela 2004; Erdem, Keane, and Sun 2008; Mehta, Chen, and
Narashimhan 2008; Chen, Sun, and Singh 2009). Perceived quality, however, is an
abstract construct that is di¢ cult to model. Therefore, I capture revealed prefer-
ences for the risk associated with consumerspurchases of new products by modeling
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risk-reduction behavior in terms of the concavity of the utility function: If consumers
exhibit diminishing marginal returns to purchase-quantity and their utility function
is more concave under attribute uncertainty, then they purchase less in response to
the risk that a new product does not meet their prior expectation in the subsequent
consumption occasions. Erdem, Imai and Keane (2003), Sun (2005), and Hendel and
Nevo (2006) model concavity to analyze promotion e¤ects on consumption quantity
rather than consumer risk-reduction behaviors. By assuming utility is concave in the
quantity of the chosen brand, stockpiling behavior is revealed by estimating satiation
points. I use a similar approach, but in the context of consumer risk behavior of new
product purchases and uncertainty in product attributes. If structural changes in
utility accompany the trial purchase of a new product, then explicitly modeling con-
sumersattempt to limit their exposure to risk explains observed purchase behavior
in a new and novel way.
To investigate satiation with respect to the purchase of CPGs, the model must
explicitly account for satiation or concavity of utility. Second, the model should be
consistent with the data generating process, namely, it must allow for the purchase
of multiple brands within a single category, and continuous amounts of each brand
(Hendel 1999; Kim, Allenby, and Rossi 2002; Dubé 2004, 2005). Third, the e¤ect
of quality signals, which are often considered as another set of risk-reduction tools,
should be taken into account. Fourth, demographic attributes and state-dependence
must be included because observed heterogeneity is nearly always an important de-
terminant of purchase-quantity decisions. For example, if the household is large,
consumers tend to purchase many units of a single brand or many variants of brands
to meet the demands of each person (Dubé 2004). Further, high-income households
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may not be sensitive to the risk of purchasing a disappointing product and may not
see the need to reduce purchase-quantity. Fifth, the e¤ect of any marketing variables
must be taken into account. For example, households may change their purchase
and purchase-quantity decisions depending on temporary product promotions. For
these reasons, I use a demand model that explicitly accounts for the multiple-discrete
/ continuous nature of packaged-food purchases (Bhat 2005, 2008) to estimate the
e¤ect of new product purchase on satiation, while controlling for the e¤ect of both
observed and unobserved heterogeneity on demand.
The econometric model is derived from a household-level constrained utility
maximization problem, which enables me to estimate structural parameters govern-
ing satiation or concavity of utility. By incorporating risk (trial purchases of a new
product in my context), the satiation parameters reveal how consumers in the CPG
market behave in risky, new product-purchase situations. Perceived quality is mod-
eled explicitly as variation in baseline marginal utility, or the change in utility if
consumption moves from zero to a single unit. Finally, the satiation parameter is
allowed to depend on demographic, state-dependent, and marketing mix variables to
control for observe heterogeneity on demand.
Models of the demand for di¤erentiated products typically assume consumers
purchase only one product when faced with a choice of many di¤erentiated prod-
ucts (Guadagni and Little 1983; Besanko, Gupta and Jain 1998). However, because
purchases are made in the anticipation of several eating occasions before the next
shopping trip, and for many individuals within the household, consumers tend to
purchase either multiple variants of one brand or many di¤erent brands, and varying
quantities of either. Wales and Woodland (1983) describe two alternative approaches
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for specifying a demand model in which corner solutions are inherent in the problem
itself. A researcher can solve a traditional representative-consumer demand system
(the Almost Ideal Demand system, for example) and correct for the bias that results
from the multiple zeros that follow. However, this approach is somewhat unsatisfying
as it leave the reasons for the corner solutions unexplained. Their second approach is a
structural one in which the researcher derives the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that solve
the consumers constrained utility-maximization problem while allowing for corner
solutions. Phaneuf (1999) and Phaneuf and von Haefen (2005) follow this approach
in studying the demand for recreational amenities, while Kim, Allenby and Rossi
(2002) use it in a marketing context and Bhat (2005, 2008) and Pinjari and Bhat
(2010) to study transportation demand. My approach is most similar to Bhat (2005,
2008) in that I adopt a CES model of sub-utility and assume the distribution of con-
sumer heterogeneity is extreme-value distributed. The resulting multiple-discrete /
continuous extreme value (MDCEV) model allows me to parameterize satiation in a
framework that is both grounded in a consumers utility-maximization problem and
is empirically tractable.
Identifying household-level satiation points while controlling for demographic
attributes requires household-panel purchase data. I frame my test of consumers
risk-reduction behavior using household-panel scanner data for the yogurt category in
major U.S. cities. I nd that utility is more concave, and satiation occurs, at a smaller
quantity on trial purchases of a new brand. This result suggests that consumers reduce
the risk of a new brand by purchasing a smaller than usual quantity on their trial
purchase. Moreover, I nd that risk attitudes toward trial purchases of a new brand
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are heterogeneous across consumers 79 percent of those who try a new product are
more risk-averse and 21 percent of them are more risk-loving.
My study makes a number of contributions to the empirical marketing lit-
erature. First, I am the rst to venture and test a theoretical explanation for the
reduced purchased quantities observed by Shoemaker and Shoal (1975). Second, I
demonstrate how an empirically tractable model of multiple-discrete / continuous
purchases can be used to solve a practical problem in marketing. Third, this study is
the rst attempt to measure consumersrisk attitudes toward trial purchases of a new
product. My ndings are also of importance to CPG marketers more generally. Most
importantly, consumers experience signicant risk when contemplating the purchase
of an untried-brand. Consumers have a limited number of usage occasions for most
products, and do not want to be disappointed on any of them. CPG companies would
be well-advised to design appropriate strategies to limit consumersexposure, either
by o¤ering smaller packages, selling single units instead of bundles or merchandising
through in-store samples, or o¤ering some type of guarantee.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. I provide a theoretical
explanation of consumer risk-reduction behavior in the second section. I describe
the multiple-discrete / continuous econometric model in the third section, while I
summarize and provide more detail on the data in the fourth. I present and interpret
the results in a fth section. Conclusions, implications and potential extensions are
described in the nal section.
3.2 Economic Model of New Product Choice under Uncertainty
In order to investigate consumer attitudes toward risk associated with trial
purchase of a new brand, I consider a consumer who has a preference over quality-
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adjusted consumption, Q where Q is a stochastic term that is the product of quality,
 and consumption, c of a given product. Assuming  is stochastic and c is determin-
istic, then the value of Q = c is stochastic. Utility of a representative consumer is
given by u (Q) where u () is assumed to be increasing, concave, and continuously dif-
ferentiable, andQ is assumed to be normally distributed with mean  and variance 2.
Mean utility, ; represents the consumers prior expectation of product quality and
2 represents his or her level of uncertainty. In other words, large values of 2 mean
that the consumer has little knowledge about that product. It is well-understood that
when Q is normally distributed, the expected utility can be represented by a function
of  and 2 alone, increasing in , and decreasing in 2.
Suppose that the consumer can choose either of two products, product one
with Q1  N (0; 21) or product two with Q2  N (0; 22) and that 21 < 22. These
assumptions imply that the consumer has the same prior expectation of Q on prod-
ucts one and two, but is more uncertain about product two than product one. Al-
though risk aversion would imply that the consumer purchases only product one be-
cause E [u (Q1)] > E [u (Q2)], we often observe consumers purchasing products under
greater uncertainty. Why? I reconcile the theory and the observation by hypothe-
sizing that the shape of the utility function changes depending on the nature of the
purchase occasion. Because risk aversion implies that the utility from a lottery is less
than the utility from the expected value of that lottery, the degree of risk aversion for
product one and product two is calculated as u (0) E [u (Q1)] and u (0) E [u (Q2)],
respectively. By normalizing u (0) to zero for any purchase occasion, these terms are
written as  E [u (Q1)] and  E [u (Q2)]. Since E [u (Q1)] > E [u (Q2)], the consumer
is more risk averse when purchasing product two relative to when he or she purchases
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product one, which implies larger Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion from purchas-
ing product two than product one. Using Pratts theorem, I can conclude that the
utility from purchasing product two is more concave than product one.
In sum, the consumer is more risk averse and his or her utility is more concave
when purchasing product two relative to product one. Because consumers usually
know less about new products compared to their usual products, it is expected that
utility is more concave for trial purchases of a new product relative to those of in-
cumbent products. As a result, consumers become satiated at a lower quantity for
trial purchases of a new product. In the following sections, I test this hypothesis
using a multiple-discrete / continuous econometric model that explicitly accounts for
satiation and concavity of utility.
3.3 Econometric Model
In this section, I derive a demand system that reects multiple discrete /
continuous choices over yogurt brands. In household-panel data, purchase-occasion
information is available. Because this type of data reects purchases made in antic-
ipation of potentially several eating occasions, the data show that households often
purchases multiple brands per visit (table 3.2). Therefore, a discrete-choice model is
not appropriate. Further, households purchase several units during each trip (table
3.1) so the quantity choice is approximately continuous.1 Solving the constrained
utility maximization problem for each household following the general Kuhn-Tucker
(K-T) approach of Wales and Woodland (1983) produces positive demand for a subset
of all available yogurt brands, with other food purchases dened as a numeraire or
1I describe purchases as "approximately continuous" because consumers are con-
strained by package-sizes.
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outside option. Tastes are assumed to be distributed randomly throughout the pop-
ulation and stochasticity derives directly from consumer heterogeneity. The result
is a demand system in which corner solutions are explained and incorporated into
the econometric model in a theoretically-consistent way. Estimating corner solutions
using a K-T-based model provides a means of estimating a structural model of de-
mand in which postulates regarding the primitives of utility, including satiation and
diminishing marginal utility, can be easily tested.
Following Kim, Allenby and Rossi (2002) and Bhat (2005, 2008), I allow utility
to be additive over brands, and account for satiation and diminishing marginal utility
by introducing curvature in the utility function. The utility function that results from
household h purchasing a certain amount of a brand i at occasion j is described as:
uhj (q
h
ij; X
h
ij; D
h; ) =
1
1
exp("h1j)(q
h
1j)
1 +
IX
i=2

i
i

'hij
( 
qhij
i
+ 1
!i
  1
)
;
j = 1; 2 : : : J; h = 1; 2 : : : H; (3.1)
where qhij is an amount of brand i purchased by household h on occasion j, X
h
ij is
a vector of brand-, occasion-, and household-specic attributes, Dh is a vector of
demographic attributes describing household h,  is a vector of parameters to be
estimated, "h1j is a brand-, occasion-, and household-specic random term associated
with the outside or numeraire good (i = 1) that reects unobservable factors driving
demand, 'hij is a baseline marginal utility of brand i on occasion j by household h,
i is a parameter that reects satiation or curvature of the utility function (i < 1),
and i is a translation parameter. This utility function is nicely behaved namely, it
is quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously di¤erentiable with respect to qhij.
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Bhat (2008) discusses the roles of baseline marginal utility, translation para-
meter, and satiation as follows. The baseline marginal utility, or quality, parameter
represents the marginal utility when none is consumed. The "baseline" interpreta-
tion derives from the fact that diminishing marginal utility is assumed, so marginal
utility only declines from the value of baseline marginal utility at zero consumption.
It can also be interpreted as a measure of embodied quality because higher values
of baseline marginal utility mean that the brand confers higher levels of utility from
any level of consumption, all else constant. Translation parameter denes both the
asymptotic nature and slope of the indi¤erence curve in that each indi¤erence curve
is asymptotic to the axes from (0; 0; : : : ; 0) to ( 1; 2; : : : ; I). Therefore, the
indi¤erence curve strikes the positive orthant with a nite slope, which allows for
corner solutions that depend on the level of the budget constraint. Also, translation
parameter governs degree of satiation in that a higher value of translation parameter
implies steeper indi¤erence curve slopes and stronger preference for good i. Satiation
is also measured by i, as it determines how the marginal utility of brand i changes
as qhij increases. Unlike translation parameter, however, satiation only measures sa-
tiation while translation parameter determines both the location of corner solutions
and where the consumer becomes satiated. When i = 1 for all i, there is no satiation
and a household purchases a single brand with the highest price-adjusted marginal
utility. As i falls, on the other hand, satiation increases and the utility function is
more concave with respect to brand i, and the satiation occurs at a lower level of
qhij. In this study, therefore, my primary hypothesis concerns satiation: If utility is
more concave, then satiation should be lower for trial purchases of a new brand than
for those of existing brands. In other words, if the trial purchase of new brands is
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inherently risky, then consumers can minimize their utility-loss from a bad choice by
reducing purchase quantities because utility is more concave with risk.
Baseline marginal utility is specied as:
'hij = exp
0B@ 1i + 2iHszh + 3iInch + 4iAgeh + 5iEduh
+6iInv
h
j + 7iLoy
h
ij + 8iPdij + "
h
ij
1CA ;
i = 2; 3 : : : I; j = 1; 2 : : : J; h = 1; 2 : : : H; (3.2)
where ki, j = 1; 2 : : : 8 is a parameter to be estimated, Hsz
h is household size, Inch
is income, Ageh is age, Eduh is education, Invhj is inventory, Loy
h
ij is loyalty, Pdij is
price discount, and "hij is an iid error term designed to account for any unobserved
heterogeneity that may remain in the baseline marginal utility associated with brand
i.
While household size and age are continuous variable, income is a categorical
variable in my data set. For estimation purposes, it is converted to a continuous
variable by assuming each observation lies at the mean of its associated category.
Education is an indicator variable that takes one if the household-head is a college
graduate or more and zero otherwise. Household size, income, age and education
allow me to capture observable heterogeneity in households.
I capture the potential state-dependence in demand in two ways: First, by
introducing a variable that measures household inventory at the category-level, and,
second, by a measure of brand loyalty. I expect to nd the probability of category pur-
chase to fall in the level of inventory, but brand purchase to rise in loyalty. Following
Bucklin, Gupta and Siddarth (1998), I dene inventory as:
Invhj = Inv
h
j 1 + q
h
j 1   CrhTj;j 1; (3.3)
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where qhj 1 is an amount of category products purchased on the previous shopping
trip, Crh is an average daily category consumption rate calculated from the entire
purchase history of household h, and Tj;j 1 is an interval between successive purchases,
measured in days. Equation (3.3) means that inventory accumulates with current
purchases of category products and declines according to an average consumption
rate. Inventory is also mean-centered by subtracting each households average level
of inventory during the sample period, which makes it a measure of relative category-
inventory within a household.
Loyalty is an indicator variable that takes one if household h purchased the
same brand i on the last purchase occasion. Seetharaman (2004) nds that most of
the dynamics in householdsbrand choices can be captured by this lagged choice.
Including inventory and loyalty is intended to account for any dynamics in demand.
Elements of the marketing mix may also be important in brand choice. To
this end, I include a measure of promotional activity: Price discount is an indicator
variable that takes one if brand i is sold at a discount price on occasion j and takes
zero otherwise. The price discount variable is included in baseline marginal utility to
capture an impact of marketing mix on preference for yogurt purchases.
I test my hypothesis regarding satiation and trial purchases of a new brand by
allowing satiation to vary over purchase occasions. Specically, satiation depends on
product and individual attributes as:
i = 1  exp
   1i + iTrhij ; i = 2; 3 : : : I; j = 1; 2 : : : J; h = 1; 2 : : : H; (3.4)
where 1i and i are parameters to be estimated and Tr
h
ij is an indicator variable of
trial purchase of a new brand that takes one if household h purchase a new brand i
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for the rst time at occasion j and takes zero otherwise. Because trial purchase of a
new brand typically involves a higher degree of uncertainty, I expect that consumers
are more risk-averse and their utility function is more concave. If a new brand trial
purchase causes the utility function to be more concave, then I expected to nd
i < 0 for a new brand i. Because using quality signals is also a potential means
of reducing the risk associated with new-product adoption, my model controls for
variation in evident quality as well. In my econometric model, this e¤ect is modeled
explicitly as variation in baseline marginal utility, or the change in utility for the
rst unit consumed. Baseline marginal utility is an appropriate measure of perceived
quality because it is measured from a baseline of zero consumption: Controlling for all
other observed sources of variation in baseline marginal utility, the change in utility
associated with beginning to consume brand i is captured by the intercept, 1i, or
the willingness-to-pay for the mere fact that it is brand i. I label the model with this
specication of baseline marginal utility and satiation as model 1.
It is possible that satiation depends on variables other than trial purchase. De-
mographic variables may be important in determining a households level of satiation
as households of di¤erent size, income level, age, educational attainment are likely to
vary in the amounts purchased, regardless of whether the brand is new or incumbent.
Consumersquantity decisions may di¤er depending on state-dependent variables such
as category-inventory accumulation and loyalty and marketing mix variable such as
price discount. In order to address this issue, I further specify satiation as:
i = 1  exp
264 
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i = 2; 3 : : : I; j = 1; 2 : : : J; h = 1; 2 : : : H:
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This specication is expected to capture the risk attitudes toward new product trial
more precisely because e¤ects of demographic, state-dependent, and marketing mix
variables on satiation are all controlled for. Notice that the variables explaining base-
line marginal utility and satiation are same except for trial purchase, which enables
me to examine how each variable have a di¤erent impact on baseline marginal util-
ity and satiation respectively. I label the model with this specication of baseline
marginal utility and satiation as model 2.
Heterogeneity in consumersrisk attitudes may play a decisive role in explain-
ing trial purchases of a new brand. Some consumers are likely to be risk-averse when
they purchase a new brand for the rst time. Others may be risk-loving, anticipating
that a new brand will o¤er the benets that established brands do not. In order to
account for unobserved heterogeneity in the hypothesized risk attitudes, I allow i to
consist of a mean and random element. Specically, equation (3.4) is written as:
i = 1  exp
   1i + hi Trhij ; hi = i + rhi ; rhi  N  0; 2r ;
i = 2; 3 : : : I; j = 1; 2 : : : J; h = 1; 2 : : : H: (3.6)
I label the model with this specication of baseline marginal utility and satiation as
model 3. Finally, unobserved heterogeneity in risk attitudes is also incorporated in
equation (3.5) and then satiation is written as:
i = 1  exp
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I label the model with this specication of baseline marginal utility and satiation as
model 4.
To summarize my specications: Baseline marginal utility includes same vari-
ables in all models while satiation does not. Satiation includes trial purchases of a
new brand in models 1 and 3 while in models 2 and 4, satiation includes demographic,
state-dependent, and marketing mix variables in addition to trial purchases of a new
brand. Heterogeneity in risk attitudes is incorporated in models 3 and 4. I expect
that model 4 is the most e¤ective in capturing consumer risk reduction behavior on
new brand purchases as it controls possible factors that inuence quantity decisions
and, moreover, includes heterogeneity among consumersattitudes toward risk. In
the results section below, I compare model 4 with others and show estimation results
for all models that were estimated.
With the utility model as discussed above, I derive the K-T conditions to solve
the constrained utility maximization problem and, thereby, a demand function that
allows either corner or interior solutions. First, the Lagrangian for the MDCEVmodel
is given by:
Lhj = uhj (qhij; Xhij; Dh; ) + 
 
yh  
IX
i=1
piq
h
ij
!
; (3.8)
where yh is the total expenditure made by the household h in the given purchase
occasion, pi is the price paid for brand i, and  is the Lagrangian multiplier. With
the assumption that among I brands, M brands are purchased and I  M are not,
the K-T conditions yield:
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  pi < 0 if qhij = 0; i = 2; 3; :::; I; (3.9b)
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and because the outside option is always consumed, the K-T condition for i = 1 is
given by:
'h1j(
qh1j
1
+ 1)1 1   p1 = 0: (3.10)
Equations (3.9a) and (3.9b) imply that the marginal utility of all brands are equal if
the brand is consumed and is less than the other brands if not consumed. Taking log-
arithms of equations (3.9a), (3.9b), and (3.10) and eliminating , the K-T conditions
are written as:
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where V h1j = (1  1) ln(qh1j=1 + 1)  ln p1 for the outside option and V hij = i + (i 
1) ln(qhij=i + 1)  ln pi for i = 2; :::; I.
In the MDCEV model, the probability that a particular bundle is chosen is
given by the conditions given in equations (3.11a) and (3.11b). Specically, this is the
probability that the marginal utility from M of the brands is equal to the marginal
utility available from the outside option and the marginal utility from the others is less
than the outside option. Because each bundle potentially consists of several brands,
the solution for the choice probability necessarily involves the joint distribution of "hij
that captures the distribution of tastes among households. Thus, the probability that
any M of the I brands are chosen is given by:
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where jJ j is the determinant of the Jacobian of the transformation from "hij to qhij with
typical element of Jlk =
@"hl+1;j
@qhk+1;j
. Bhat (2005) shows that the Jacobian determinant
can be simplied to arrive at: jJ j =
MQ
i=1
gi
MP
i=1
pi
gi
where gi =

1 i
qhij+i

. For estimation
purposes, it is further assumed that the error terms are distributed iid extreme value
so that equation (3.12) collapses to a relatively simple form:
P (qh1j; :::; q
h
Mj; 0; :::; 0) =
1
M 1
 
MY
i=1
gi
! 
MX
i=1
pi
gi
!0BBB@
MQ
i=1
eV
h
ij=
IP
i=1
eV
h
ij=
M
1CCCA (M   1)!;
(3.13)
where  is a scale parameter. Equation (3.13) can be interpreted as a general form
of the logit choice probability, because when M = 1, or only one brand is purchased,
the MDCEV model becomes a simple logit model. The MDCEV model is estimated
using maximum likelihood method.
Because gi and V hij for models 3 and 4 include random element r
h
i , equation
(3.13) for these models is expressed as:
eP (qh1j; :::; qhMj; 0; :::; 0) = Z 1M 1
 
MY
i=1
gi
! 
MX
i=1
pi
gi
!0BBB@
MQ
i=1
eV
h
ij=
IP
i=1
eV
h
ij=
M
1CCCA (M 1)!dF  rhi  ;
(3.14)
where F () is the cumulative standard normal distribution. I use the simulated
maximum likelihood method to approximate the integrals in equation (3.14) and
maximize the logarithm of the resulting simulated likelihood function with respect to 
(Train 2009). This method provides consistent parameter estimates under rather weak
regularity conditions. To aid in the computational speed and e¢ ciency of estimation,
I use 100 Halton draws for realizations of rhi (Bhat, 2003).
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3.4 Data Description
I use household panel scanner data from the yogurt category collected by the
Nielsen Company in major U.S. cities. Each alternative is dened by yogurt brand. I
use one new brand and ve established brands for the analysis, which I label as new
brand, brand A, brand B, brand C, brand D, and brand E for condentiality purposes.
The time-period used for estimation includes three years of purchase records, which
consist of one year prior to the new-product launch, and two years after. Two years
of data post-introduction data are used in order to ensure that households are given
su¢ cient time to try the new brand, but it has not yet become established. Because
my specication includes the state-dependent variables, inventory and loyalty, I use
one year of data prior to the new product launch to initialize householdspurchases
of the established brands. To be included in the sample, households must make at
least seven purchases of one of these six brands during each year of the three-year
period. Furthermore, on each purchase occasion, a household must also purchase
either another yogurt brand, or one other food item. Expenditure on these items is
used as the outside option, or numeraire that is always purchased on each purchase
occasion. Ultimately, I use 256 households and 9,722 purchase occasions for the
estimation.
For the MDCEV model to be appropriate for my data, household purchases
must be multiple-discrete, or households must purchase multiple brands, and purchase
quantities must be approximately continuous. Table 3.1 illustrates the mean and the
standard deviation of the purchase volume in ounces and price per ounce, showing
that the purchase volume of each brand is widely dispersed and household purchases
can be considered to be approximately continuous. Table 3.2 illustrates the purchase-
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frequency of primary, secondary and tertiary brands by households on single purchase
occasion, suggesting households purchase many varieties of brand on a single purchase
occasion. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate that the MDCEV model is consistent with
the data generating process of my data set, namely, households typically purchase
multiple brands within a single category and continuous amounts of the chosen brand.
A standard discrete choice model ignores this important characteristic of consumer
shopping behavior. Also, because my objective is to examine how purchase quantities
change when consumers purchase a new brand, the MDCEVmodel is valuable because
it parameterizes curvature in the utility function. Variation in curvature, moreover,
identies structural changes in utility as consumers try new brands for the rst time.
Table 3.1
Purchase Volume in Ounces and Price per Ounce
Purchase volume (oz.) Price per ounce ($)
Brand Obs. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
New brand 527 36:250 28:751 0:148 0:097
Brand A 1; 387 33:684 21:722 0:107 0:033
Brand B 3; 355 36:531 26:206 0:107 0:028
Brand C 4; 161 35:699 26:709 0:103 0:024
Brand D 362 22:591 18:824 0:099 0:029
Brand E 1; 076 17:004 13:899 0:158 0:039
Table 3.2
Number of Brands Purchased on a Single Purchase Occasion
Brand purchase Frequency (%)
1-brand purchase 89:498
2-brand purchase 9:370
3-brand purchase 0:977
4-brand purchase 0:154
5-brand purchase  
6-brand purchase  
Formally testing for the e¤ect of trial purchase on satiation requires holding
all other potential choice-determinants constant, but the potential validity of my hy-
pothesis is readily apparent from casual observation. Table 3.3 compares the purchase
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volume in ounces and price per ounce of the new brand on trial purchase occasions to
all purchase occasions. The summary statistics reveal some preliminary support for
my hypothesis as households in my sample appear to purchase a smaller quantity and
pay less money on their trial purchase occasions of the new brand relative to other
purchase occasions. I interpret this as revealing risk-reduction behavior associated
with a trial purchase of a new brand. This observation is also consistent with Shoe-
maker and Shoal (1975). However, lower purchase quantities could be due to any one
of a number of factors, so I need to control for them econometrically.
Table 3.3
Purchase Volume in Ounces and Price per Ounce of New Brand
Purchase volume (oz.) Price per ounce ($)
Purchase occasion Obs. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Trial purchase occasions 71 29:915 22:335 0:148 0:029
All purchase occasions 527 36:250 28:751 0:148 0:097
One limitation of using household-panel purchase data lies in the fact that it
contains only price information on items that were actually purchased, and not others
in the direct consideration set. However, estimating the MDCEVmodel requires price
information for all brands in the sample at each purchase occasion. To overcome
this problem, I estimate unobserved yogurt prices by using observations on other
households shopping in the same stores and buying the same brands. Specically, I
use a hedonic model of yogurt prices in which shelf price is a function of yogurt brand,
retail store, and week. The parameters from the hedonic model generate tted prices
for all unobserved prices for each brand, retail store and week. Overall, the model
explains 48 percent of the total variation of yogurt prices and the parameter estimates
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exhibit expected signs.2 All of the data used to estimate the MDCEV model are
summarized in table 3.4 below.
Table 3.4
Demographic, State Dependent, and Marketing Mix Variables
Variable Symbol Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Household size Hszh 256 2:571 1:231
Income ($,000) Inch 256 82:326 41:994
Age Ageh 256 53:296 9:656
Education Eduh 256 0:653 0:470
Inventory (oz., mean-centered) Invhj 9; 722 36:026 150:283
Loyalty to new brand Loyh2j 9; 722 0:037 0:188
Loyalty to brand A Loyh3j 9; 722 0:089 0:285
Loyalty to brand B Loyh4j 9; 722 0:274 0:446
Loyalty to brand C Loyh5j 9; 722 0:344 0:475
Loyalty to brand D Loyh6j 9; 722 0:018 0:133
Loyalty to brand E Loyh7j 9; 722 0:069 0:253
Price discount on new brand Pd2j 9; 722 0:025 0:157
Price discount on brand A Pd3j 9; 722 0:091 0:287
Price discount on brand B Pd4j 9; 722 0:197 0:398
Price discount on brand C Pd5j 9; 722 0:251 0:434
Price discount on brand D Pd6j 9; 722 0:020 0:142
Price discount on brand E Pd7j 9; 722 0:070 0:255
3.5 Results and Discussion
In this section, I present the results obtained by estimating the MDCEV mod-
els described in the previous section. Before discussing the individual parameter
estimates, I present specication tests that compare the goodness of t across mod-
els.
One practical weakness of the MDCEV model is that the satiation and transla-
tion parameters are not separately identied (Bhat, 2005, 2008). Recall that satiation
determines how the marginal utility of brand i changes as qhij rises (pure satiation)
and that translation parameter denes the location of corner solutions for brand i
2All parameter estimates for the hedonic model are available upon request.
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and governs the slope of the indi¤erence curve between the outside option and brand
i (satiation and translation). Because my primary interest in this study is to examine
how satiation varies with the nature of the transaction, I x translation parameter at
one for all brands in both models. Bhat (2008) refers to this as the "alpha prole"
approach. For the same reason,  is normalized to one as well.
I rst evaluate the models by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian information criterion (BIC). I report these values in table 3.5. Both of the
AIC and BIC are the lowest with model 4. I next conduct likelihood ratio (LR) tests
to compare my maintained specication (model 4) to plausible alternatives. In table
3.6, I report a set of LR statistics in which the null model is model 1, 2, or 3 and
the alternative model is model 4. Based on these tests, I reject models 1, 2, and
3 in favor of model 4. The specication tests consistently recommend model 4 in
which possible factors that inuence consumersquantity decisions are all controlled
for and heterogeneity in consumersrisk attitudes are taken into account. Therefore,
I present the estimation result of model 4 and interpret each of the parameters. As
a further robustness check, I present the estimation results obtained for all other
models in order to examine whether my primary hypothesis holds under di¤erent
model specications.
Table 3.5
AIC and BIC
Model Log likelihood Number of parameters AIC BIC
Model 1  17; 175 56 34; 462 34; 864
Model 2  16; 874 98 33; 945 34; 649
Model 3  17; 168 57 34; 451 34; 860
Model 4  16; 866 99 33; 930 34; 641
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Table 3.6
LR Statistic When the Alternative Model Is Model 4
Null model LR statistic Degree of freedom
Model 1 618:249 43
Model 2 17:022 1
Model 3 605:107 42
Table 3.7 reports the estimation results for model 4. These estimates support
my primary hypothesis, namely that utility is more concave on the trial purchases of
the new brand, and satiation occurs at a lower purchase quantity. Specically, my
results show that the mean coe¢ cient of trial purchase is negative and statistically
signicant. In the context of the utility model in equation (3.1), this means that
utility is more concave for the trial purchases of the new brand so, lacking an alternate
mechanism of limiting their exposure to risk, they purchase a lower quantity. In terms
of the structure of the MDCEV model, consumersrisk reduction behavior is manifest
in satiation at a lower consumption quantity. If the intent was to simply "taste" the
new brand, then the notion of satiation is an intuitive way of understanding how
behavior changes with respect to new products. By purchasing a smaller quantity,
households avoid the risk of trying a new brand that they may nd unsatisfactory
when the future consumption occasion, which is anticipated at the time of purchase,
actually arises. The other specications also support the hypothesis, namely the mean
coe¢ cient of trial purchase is negative and statistically signicant in any models (see
tables 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10), and so my nding does not appear to be an artefact of the
model itself.
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I next evaluate the signicance of unobserved heterogeneity. The standard
deviation of the random coe¢ cient of trial purchase is highly signicant, suggesting
that the coe¢ cient of trial purchase di¤ers among sample members. This result
makes intuitive sense as attitudes toward risk are inherently idiosyncratic. Finding
signicant heterogeneity also supports my choice of model 4 over models 1 and 2 in
which consumer heterogeneity is not considered. Under the assumption of normality,
the estimated mean of  0:297 and the estimated standard deviation of 0:368 mean
that 79 percent of the distribution is below zero and 21 percent is above. This
implies that 79 percent of those who try the new brand tend to be more risk-averse
and 21 percent of them be more risk-loving. Comparing the estimated mean and
standard deviation of model 4 to those of model 3 also supports the validity of the
specication in model 4. Table 3.10 shows that the estimated mean for model 3 is
 0:329 and the estimated standard deviation is 0:359, which means that 82 percent
of the distribution is below zero and 18 percent is above. Model 3 overestimates the
population of those who are risk-averse. Without controlling for demographic, state-
dependent, and marketing mix variables, or observed heterogeneity, in model 3, too
much of the variation in satiation is attributed to random, personal e¤ects.
Among the other estimates reported in table 3.7 are a number of results also
to be of interest to practitioners. The brand-specic parameters in baseline marginal
utility can be interpreted as brand equity, or goodwill, because the brand-specic
constant is a portion of the baseline marginal utility that is not explained by the
demographic, state-dependent, or marketing mix variables. Brand equity is positive
and statistically signicant for all brands. Brands B, C, D, and E are relatively
high-equity brand while the new brand and brand A are low-equity brands. This
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result makes sense as the new brand may not accumulate su¢ cient equity as it is
just launched at the beginning of the sample period. The reason why the new brand
has higher brand equity than brand A may be because manufacturers are likely to
advertise a new brand intensively at the time of its launch in order to try to get enough
shelf space in retail stores. These activities may contribute to an early accumulation
of equity, possibly at the expense of one or more existing brands.
Among the demographic attributes, I nd that the coe¢ cient of household size
in baseline marginal utility is negative and statistically signicant for brands B, C,
and E while its e¤ect on satiation is positive and statistically signicant for brands
B, C, D and E. It is not signicant for the other brands. This nding implies that
smaller households tend to have stronger preference for yogurt purchases than larger
households, but once the purchase decisions are made, smaller households are satiated
at smaller quantity and larger households at larger quantity. This result is intuitive
as yogurt is something that may be consumed by each member of the household.
On each shopping occasion, consumers may need to consider the preferences of each
household member, and choose brand specic to each members preferences. Relative
to an individual shopper buying for herself, however, such multiple purchases involve
non-trivial search costs so larger households may be reluctant to purchase di¤erent
brands for everyone, but tend to purchase larger quantities of fewer brands for all
members of the household.
For brand A, income has a positive and statistically signicant impact on
baseline marginal utility. For brand B, however, it has a negative and statistically
signicant impact on baseline marginal utility. This result may be due to the nature of
brands A and B. Brand A is more of a niche brand that is likely to be successful among
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high-income households, while brand B appeals instead to low-income households.
For brands A, C, and E, income has a negative and statistically signicant impact
on satiation. In other words, higher-income households tend to purchase smaller
quantities on each shopping occasion. Easier satiation may be due to the fact that I
account for multiple-variety purchases. Low-income households may not be able to
purchase multiple varieties as they are forced to consider only those that o¤er the
lowest price, or the highest price-adjusted baseline marginal utility. For high-income
households, on the other hand, satiation occurs at a smaller quantity and so they tend
to purchase a variety of brands with di¤erent tastes and nutritional contents simply
because of their lower price sensitivity. This nding may also be due to higher-income
householdsgreater proclivity for dining out if more meals are purchased outside
the home, they have less of a need to purchase at retail. Other coe¢ cients of income
are not statistically signicant.
The age coe¢ cient in baseline marginal utility is positive and statistically
signicant for brands A, B, C, D, and E and marginally signicant for the new brand.
Older households tend to have stronger preference for yogurt purchases than younger
households as they may be more health-conscious and aware of the nutritional benets
of yogurt. The age coe¢ cient in satiation is negative and statistically signicant for
the new brand and brands A and B. However, it is positive and statistically signicant
for brands D and E. Older households tend to be satiated at smaller quantities of the
new brand and brands A and B and at larger quantity of brands D and E. This result
may be simply due to the nature of each brand.
I nd that education has a negative e¤ect on baseline marginal utility for
brands A and E, suggesting that lower-educated households tend to prefer these
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brands. Education has a positive e¤ect on purchase quantities of brands A, B, C, and
D. It may be the case that higher-educated households tend to be more e¢ cient their
shopping behavior and are better at realizing the economies of scale in shopping for
groceries.
Among state-dependent variables, inventory has a positive and statistically
signicant impact on baseline marginal utility of brands B and C, suggesting that
households with more yogurt on hand tend to have stronger preference for these
brands than households with less on hand. Stockpiling by a household implies a
deeper category involvement and stronger preference for the category as a whole.
Based on my estimates, it appears brands B and C have the strongest stockpiling-
e¤ect, so may indeed be especially preferred by households who tend to hold larger
inventories.
Loyalty has a positive and signicant e¤ect on baseline marginal utility of
brand B, suggesting that households loyal to brand B tend to prefer that brand
relative to others. The loyalty coe¢ cient in satiation is positive and statistically sig-
nicant for brand A, but negative and statistically signicant for brand B. Households
that are loyal to brand A tend to be satiated at a larger quantity, while households
loyal to brand B tend to be satiated at smaller quantities. Customers of brand B
may be loyal, but purchase a smaller quantity on each shopping occasion. To es-
timate consumers risk attitudes consistently, it is important to control e¤ects of
state-dependent variables, even though many do not have a statistically signicant
on utility or satiation.
Finally, marketing mix variables play a crucial role in explaining both baseline
marginal utility and satiation. Price promotion has a positive and statistically sig-
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nicant impact on baseline marginal utility for the new brand and brands A, B and
C, suggesting that discounting prices tends to shift the indi¤erence cut everywhere
upwards. Promotion, however, has a negative and statistically signicant impact on
satiation for the new brand and brand C, suggesting that discounting prices tends to
reduce the satiation point for a typical household. For these brands, price promotion
may cause some consumers to make impulse purchases, which are typically smaller in
volume and more frequent than planned purchases. On the other hand, price promo-
tion has a positive and statistically signicant impact on the satiation parameter for
brand E, suggesting that households tend to purchase a larger quantity when brand E
is on promotion. Unlike the other brands, brand E may not be as a¤ected by impulse
purchases.
My ndings with respect to consumers risk reduction behavior in the yo-
gurt category have signicant implications for producers, and retailers, of consumer
packaged goods more generally. All manufacturers are rightly concerned with the con-
sumer dynamic involved with the introduction of new brands. I show that consumers
perceive considerable risk in trying new brands, so reduce their purchase quantities
in order to limit their risk exposure. Knowing this, rms would be well-advised to
either o¤er new brands in smaller, introductory sizes, to o¤er free samples wherever
possible or to o¤er a money-back guarantee if the product is not up to expectations.
Retailers have less of an incentive to sell new brands (unless they are private labels)
as any new brand is likely to take space from an existing, proven brand. Much of
a retailers prot, however, is in the form of trade promotions and allowances so a
manufacturers introduction of a new product represents a strategic opportunity to
cooperate and perhaps earn more than simply retail margin.
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Risk-reduction behavior using purchase-quantities is typical in both the CPG
and service industries. In the service industry, consumers usually make decisions
about which services they choose and how much they use these services while they
are exposed to the risk that expectations about these qualities will not be met. In
the educational business, for example, consumers who plan to register for paid classes
typically do not know whether they are satisfy with the service a school o¤ers. Edu-
cational benets are usually observable at least after completing a series of classes. It
is possible that satiation with respect to class hours occurs at a smaller level if con-
sumers face much uncertainty at the time of the class registration. This is similar to
the risk-reduction behavior observed in the CPG market. My model has a potential
to analyze consumer behaviors in many industries and open new avenues for research.
3.6 Conclusions and Implications
From a consumer perspective, the purchase of a new product involves a consid-
erable amount of risk. How well a new product meets a consumers prior expectations
is inherently uncertain. In order to minimize the loss in expected utility associated
with the risk of purchasing a brand they may nd unsatisfactory in subsequent use,
consumers may purchase a smaller than usual quantity on their trial purchase. Ac-
cordingly, my hypothesis is that satiation occurs at a smaller quantity when consumers
try a new brand.
I test this hypothesis using a multiple-discrete n continuous extreme value
(MDCEV) model applied to household panel scanner data from the yogurt category
in several major U.S. markets. With the MDCEV model, I am able to test if satiation
depends on whether a brand purchased is new, or familiar to the consumer. I nd that
when consumers purchase a new brand for the rst time, their utility function is more
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concave and satiation occurs at a smaller quantity, which supports my hypothesis.
My ndings suggest that consumers reduce the risk of a new brand by purchasing
a smaller than usual quantity on their trial purchase and that slow sales of new
products attributes to consumers rational response to risk perception. Moreover,
this e¤ect di¤ers across consumers as risk attitudes are naturally individual-specic:
While some consumers are risk averse when trying new brands, others may instead
prefer the excitement associated with "taking a yer" on an unfamiliar product.
My ndings have a number of practical implications. Most importantly, man-
ufacturers of CPGs should recognize that consumers experience signicant risk when
contemplating the purchase of an untried-brand. Because purchasing most CPGs
does not represent a major, long-term nancial commitment, the nature of the risk
is less nancial than it is purely utility-based. Consumers have a limited number of
usage occasions for most products, and do not want to be disappointed on any of
them. This is particularly the case when the manufacturer is asking the consumer to
give up something that is tried and true, or at least satisfactory. There are a number
of ways to limit consumersexposure to such utility risk, and I suggest some of the
more obvious such as free samples, smaller package sizes, or the o¤er of some type of
guarantee.
There are a number of avenues for future research. First, the MDCEV model
used in this analysis does not consider cross-category risk-reduction e¤ects. Con-
sumers typically purchase brands in multiple product categories on a single purchase
occasion. New brand purchases in a certain product category may inuence purchase
behaviors in another product category. In order to capture this e¤ect, the model
can be extended to a multiple category purchase setting by using a multiple discrete
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n continuous nested extreme value (MDCNEV) approach developed by Pinjari and
Bhat (2010). Second, the MDCEV model may be useful in studying strategic pricing
decisions by competing manufacturers. While prices are assumed to be exogenous
solely to analyze consumersrisk-reduction behavior, it may be the case that manu-
facturers optimally react to consumer risk-reduction behavior in consideration of rival
manufacturersstrategies. Equilibrium analysis of the interactions between utility-
maximizing consumers with di¤erent risk attitudes and prot-maximizing rms may
provide insight into rmspricing strategies. I leave them for future research.
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CHAPTER 4.
ESSAY 3: CONSUMER RISK BEHAVIOR AND FIRM RESPONSE
4.1 Introduction
In the consumer packaged goods (CPGs) industry, package size and price are
inextricably linked. Because package prices are prominently displayed, the size of the
package determines the unit-price, or the price per unit of volume for the product
contained inside. Consumers tend to respond more sharply to package-prices than
unit-prices, so manufacturers often use changes in package size to hide price changes.
According to McIntyre (2011), for example, Heinz reduced the size of some of its
ketchup products by an average of 11% and kept its package price the same, while
Kraft reduced the amount of crackers in its Nabisco Premium saltines and Honey
Maid graham crackers boxes by 15%, while keeping box prices the same, and Pep-
siCo reduced the size of its half-gallon cartons of Tropicana by 8% and, in doing so,
increased the carton price by 5 to 8%. In these examples, unit prices rose with a
change in package size. However, it is not clear whether these changes are driven
by consumer demand, cost considerations, or recognition of the strategic nature of
package sizes.
Most consumers have accurate knowledge about neither package size nor unit
price, which makes them di¢ cult to compare unit prices (Granger and Billson 1972;
Russo 1977; Wansink 1996; Raghubir and Krishna 1999; Binkley and Bejnarowicz
2003). Accordingly, manufacturers may change package size, and hence unit prices,
without changing the shelf price as a matter of prot-enhancing obfuscation strat-
egy. By doing so, they are able to extract more surplus from consumers, and avoid
destructive competition in shelf prices (Ellison and Ellison 2009). Moreover, Çak¬ra
and Balagtas (2014) nd that manufacturers change package size, rather than price,
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because consumers tend to ignore the unit-price implications of changing packages.
However, they do not account for the fact that package size decisions are endogenous,
and strategic. The implications ignoring these facts can be dramatic. For example,
if prices and package size are strategic complements, then package-size reductions by
one rm are no longer simply price increases that are likely to be ignored. Rather,
other rms may lower prices, leading to ercer price competition in the industry. In
this essay, I investigate how manufacturers of CPGs choose package size and price in
a competitive environment.
While both package size and price have a direct impact on manufacturersprof-
itability, consumers perceive them in a di¤erent way. Shelf prices are relatively clear
and transparent, whereas changes in package size are rarely announced, and often hid-
den. As a result, consumers are less sensitive to change in package size than in price,
which implies that package downsizing can serve as a more e¤ective means of increas-
ing prot than a change in shelf-price (Çak¬ra and Balagtas 2014). Further, package
downsizing makes the direct comparison of unit price particularly di¢ cult, which may
lead to rise in prots (Ellison and Ellison 2009). However, they do not answer the
question of whether package downsizing is, in fact, in manufacturersinterests. First,
changes in package size are likely to involve costly changes in production and dis-
tribution systems. Second, and perhaps more importantly, competitors are likely to
be more aware of package-size changes than consumers, and respond in appropriate
ways. Therefore, it is critical to consider not only consumer responses to package-size
changes, but cost and competitor reactions as well. Therefore, to explain equilibrium
package-size and price outcomes, I develop a structural model of consumer demand,
and manufacturersjoint decisions regarding package size and price.
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There are two types of cost associated with making packages. One is vari-
able, and the other xed. For example, the cost of packaging materials increases if
manufacturers produce larger packages. Manufacturers also incur some costs that are
independent of volume, such as set-up costs, inventory costs, and distribution costs.
Manufacturers may be able to increase unit prices by selling in smaller packages, but
it is possible that the costs of producing a new package outweigh the higher price.
In this study, I explicitly account for both types of packaging cost in estimating the
e¤ect of changing package size on protability.
Packaging costs are clearly important in explaining package-size decisions. In
an equilibrium framework, Koenigsberg, Kohli and Montoya (2010) consider the costs
of producing a particular package size, as well as the consumption rate, consumption
utility, and marginal value of consumption. They show that the equilibrium package
size depends on the curvature of the cost function in package size, as well as the e¤ect
of package size on demand. However, they do not take into account product di¤eren-
tiation, or competition among rms. Competitive reactions may be as important as
reactions from consumers as both interact to determine market share, and prot.
Package size is an often-overlooked attribute in models of di¤erentiated-product
demand. In fact, consumers may di¤er in their preference for package size for two
reasons. First, consumers are generally risk-averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
When consumers purchase an unfamiliar product, they face the risk that it does not
meet their prior expectation, so tend to choose a smaller package because doing so
can minimize their exposure to uncertainty of buying a large amount of a product
they dont like (Shoemaker and Shoal 1975). Smaller packages also allow consumers
to match their purchase and consumption rates (Koenigsberg, Kohli, and Montoya
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2010). Each package often permits several consumption occasions after purchase 
consider a box of cereal or can of co¤ee as but two examples so by using smaller
packages, consumers can exibility accommodate any preference for variety or devi-
ation from planned consumption that may arise after purchase.
If consumer demand, in part, depends on package size, then manufacturers
are likely to use it as a strategic variable. In a world with homogeneous consumers,
manufacturers would o¤er only a single package size, but would face strong price
competition with no di¤erentiation. As shown in the previous chapter, however,
consumers exhibit heterogeneous preferences for package size. In fact, consumers
with di¤erent consumption rates, storage costs, transaction costs, and marginal utility
from increased consumption prefer di¤erent package sizes (Gerstner and Hess 1987;
Subramaniam and Gal-Or 2009). Therefore, manufacturers often di¤erentiate on the
basis of package size in order to attract particular market segments. For example,
Kelloggs o¤ers Special K in some 11 di¤erent package sizes, while General Mills sells
Cheerios in 24 others. By doing so, they avoid direct price competition (Anderson,
De Palma, and Thisse 1992).
The semi-collusion literature suggests that if rms in oligopolistic markets
have multiple decision variables, price and non-price variables, they tend to compete
in non-price variables, but collude in price. This is true for a range of variables,
from investment in R&D and capacity (Davidson and Deneckere 1990; Fershtman
and Gandal 1994; Brod and Shivakumar 1999), advertisement (Dixit and Norman
1978; Slade 1995), promotion (Richards 2007), line extension (Kadiyali, Vilcassim,
and Chintagunta 1998), product-line length (Draganska and Jain 2005; Richards and
Hamilton 2006), product assortment (Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim 2009), location
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in geographic space (Friedman and Thisse 1993; Thomadsen 2007), and location
in attribute space (Jehiel 1992; Richards, Allender, and Hamilton 2013). In each
case, non-price variables can serve as strategic tools that change the nature of price
competition. Despite its prominence in product design, and salience to consumers,
competitive package sizing has received a little attention in the literature. In this
study, I investigate how manufacturers use package size as a competitive tool, and
the relationship between package size and price competition.
Accounting for the simultaneous determination of package size and price is
also important from an econometric point of view. In the previous chapter, I show
that consumers choose package sizes, at least in part, due to the perceived risk of
a mismatch between product attributes and their own preferences. In studying the
e¤ect of package size on consumer demand, I follow the extant literature by assum-
ing package size is exogenous, or determined in a prior stage of a multi-stage game
played between consumers and product manufacturers. Instead, if rms are rational,
they ought to exploit consumersresponses to the uncertainty inherent in trying any
new product, and prot accordingly. Because package size is therefore endogenous,
estimating consumer-response to changes in package size in a structural econometric
model controls for any endogeneity bias that may otherwise arise.
This observation is often overlooked in the empirical marketing literature. In-
deed, the fundamental unit of analysis is typically a brand or product line, but manu-
facturers o¤er di¤erent package sizes at di¤erent unit prices within the same product
line even though each stock keeping unit (SKU) is identical in terms of formulation,
avor, and aroma (Gerstner and Hess 1987). Empirical analysis of strategic pack-
age size and price decisions, therefore, must be made at an SKU level. There are
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some examples of SKU-level modeling. Allenby, Shively, Yang, and Garratt (2004)
develop a model of package-choice, but assume price is exogenously given so they do
not address rm pricing behavior. On the other hand, Khan and Jain (2005), Cohen
(2008), and Gu and Yang (2010) endogenize retailer, manufacturer, or retailer and
manufacturer behaviors and investigate pricing strategies for di¤erent package sizes.
They nd that rms use package size as a price discrimination tool, and can earn
super-normal prots by charging higher unit prices for smaller packages. But, these
authors focus on pricing di¤erent, exogenously-given package sizes so are silent on how
manufacturers determine package sizes as strategic variables. My structural model is
built on an equilibrium concept that accounts for the interaction between consumers
with heterogeneous preference for package size and prot-maximizing retailers and
manufacturers, endogenizing manufacturers simultaneous decision of package size
and price.
The model includes both consumer demand, and manufacturersoptimal re-
sponse to package-preferences. On the demand-side, I explicitly account for package-
size preferences as well as other elements of the marketing mix. By conditioning
manufacturer decisions on consumer preferences for di¤erent package sizes, I ensure
that manufacturer decisions are optimal responses with respect to their expectations
on how consumers will react. On the supply-side, oligopolistic manufacturers jointly
set package size and wholesale prices and retailers set retail prices taking into account
consumer demand, manufacturer and retailer costs, and competition in package size
and price. Mymodel allows me to derive the equilibrium package size and price, and to
reveal the interdependence between them. My modeling framework is similar to that
used in the product-line literature (Draganska and Jain 2005; Richards and Hamilton
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2006; Richards, Allender, and Hamilton 2013; Richards and Hamilton 2014). This
literature shows that prices and product line decisions are strategically linked, but
do not consider the importance of more product-specic decisions. Moreover, I in-
corporate both manufacturer and retailer behaviors. Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005)
show that it is important to consider interactions among consumers, retailers, and
manufacturers because estimates of consumer preferences, manufacturer and retailer
costs, and the extent of strategic interaction between manufacturers and retailers will
be biased and inconsistent otherwise.
As an example of the strategic interdependence between package size and price,
I apply the empirical model to store-level scanner data for the ready-to-eat breakfast
cereal category in the Chicago market. I nd that package size decisions by manu-
facturers reect both consumer preferences, and price competition among suppliers.
Consumers prefer small packages, in part due to the perceived risk, and have heteroge-
neous responses to package size. At the same time, the cost of producing packages of
di¤erent sizes rises in a nonlinear way. I nd that manufacturers respond to compet-
itive pressure by changing not only their price, but package size as well. Specically,
manufacturers tend to downsize packages as wholesale prices rise, suggesting that
changes in package size mitigate the impact of wholesale price increases. Further,
the received wisdom holds that manufacturers change package sizes because it is a
stealthy means of changing unit prices. However, my results suggest that this e¤ect
is only part of the reason manufacturers change prices a weak part. Rather, man-
ufacturers incur signicant costs to change package sizes, and any change in package
size is likely to incite strong price competition. Therefore, what would seem to be an
intuitive result, namely that manufacturers change prices because consumers wont
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notice, is fundamentally incorrect because it does not take into account the cost of
changing package sizes, and the strategic implications of doing so. My study is the
rst to endogenize package size decisions, and because changing packages is costly,
reducing package sizes in response to higher costs is not always rational.
This study contributes to the empirical marketing literature by endogenizing
joint decisions of package size and price. Whereas others who explain why manu-
facturers change package sizes consider only the response of consumers, I show that
cost and strategic considerations are equally as important. On a substantive level,
I show that when manufacturers change package sizes, they are responding to not
only consumer preferences, but to the structure of packaging costs, and the nature of
rivalry in their industry. Finally, I provide further evidence that package size changes
have to the potential to be a facilitating practice for semi-collusion in prices in that
o¤ering larger package sizes tends to soften price competition, which raises wholesale
margins accordingly.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, I
describe the econometric framework used to estimate the equilibrium package size
and price. In the third section, I describe the data, and present some stylized facts
drawn from my sample that motivates this study. In the fourth section, I present
the estimation and simulation results and discuss how package size a¤ects consumer
demand, production costs, and competition in the market and how package size and
price are related each other. I draw conclusions, explain some fundamental implica-
tions for rms and regulators in the CPG industry, and describe potential extensions
in the nal section.
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4.2 Model
4.2.1 Overview
In this section, I describe a structural model of consumer, retailer, and manu-
facturer behavior. On the demand side, I employ a random utility model of consumer
choice among di¤erentiated products (Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995;
Nevo 2001). On the supply side, I assume that manufacturers set package size and
wholesale prices, and retailers set retail prices taking into account consumer demand
and manufacturer and retailer costs. I model the vertical relationship between man-
ufacturers and retailers using a two-stage game: In the rst stage, manufacturers
propose a contract to retailers that species the wholesale price of each product.
In the second stage, retailers set retail prices conditional on retailersacceptance of
that contract. I estimate this two-stage game using backward induction. Namely, I
rst estimate consumer demand, and then estimate the retailer prot maximization
problem, and the manufacturer package-sizing and pricing decisions conditional on
consumer, retailer, and competitor behaviors. I discuss each stage of the model in
the following subsections.
4.2.2 Demand-Side Model
In this subsection, I describe a model consumer demand that is appropriate
for studying preferences at the SKU-level. Representative consumer demand models,
such as the AIDS model (Deaton and Muelbauer, 1980) or the Rotterdam Model
(Theil 1965; Barten, 1964), are not appropriate for describing the demand for di¤er-
entiated products like CPGs because they assume consumers purchase a little bit of
every product and provide little insight into the microstructure of demand. There-
fore, I use a random utility model in which consumers are assumed to make a discrete
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choice among di¤erentiated products. A consumer is assumed to choose the prod-
uct that provides the highest level of utility from those available in the sample, or
other products from another store as the outside option. Products are di¤erentiated
by SKU, or a specic brand, avor, and size. Di¤erent package sizes under the same
brand are treated as di¤erent products because (1) consumers may vary in the amount
of convenience they derive from each package size, and (2) manufacturers and retailers
use di¤erent pricing strategies for di¤erent package sizes. For example, some retailers
o¤er a volume discount, while others charge a volume premium for large packages.
Consumers make hierarchical purchase decisions, rst deciding whether to purchase a
product from the stores in the data set or other stores, and then deciding on a specic
product, conditional on store choice. Consequently, I employ a generalized extreme
value (GEV) model of consumer demand (McFadden 1978).
Formally, the utility from household h purchasing product i 2 I (under brand
name b 2 B) from store j 2 J at time t is represented by:
uhijt = hb +htpijt + f (qit) + dijt +! (pijt  dijt) + ijt + hijt + (1  ) "hijt; (4.1)
where hb, ht,  , ! and  are parameters to be estimated, pijt is the shelf price, f ()
is a contribution to utility by purchase quantity, qit is package size, dijt is a binary
discount variable that takes a value of one if the products price is reduced by at
least 10% from one week to the next and then returned to its previous value in the
following week, zero otherwise, pijtdijt is an interaction term between the price and
the discount variable, ijt is an iid error term that reects product attributes that are
relevant, but unobserved to the econometrician, such as brand loyalty, advertising,
and display, "hijt is a household- product-, store-, and time-specic iid error term that
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reects unobserved consumer heterogeneity, and hijt is an error term such that the
entire error term, hijt+(1  ) "hijt is extreme-value distributed (Cardell 1997). The
GEV scale parameter  is bounded between zero and one and measures the correlation
among stores. As  approaches one, the correlation of utility among stores goes to
one and stores are regarded as perfect substitutes. As  approaches zero, on the other
hand, the correlation among stores goes to zero.
Package size may have a signicant impact on utility. Because consumers
choose a particular package size depending on their perception of risk (Shoemaker
and Shoal 1975) and convenience (Koenigsberg, Kohli, and Montoya 2010), I explic-
itly account for utility from purchasing a particular package size by including f (qit).
The inclusion of package size into utility is consistent with the empirical marketing
literature (Allenby, Shively, Yang and Garratt 2004; Khan and Jain 2005; Cohen 2008;
Gu and Yang 2010; Çak¬ra and Balagtas 2014). Because the precise way in which
package size enters utility is unknown, I approximate it using a general polynomial
form. That is, to arrive at a closed form formula for f (qit), I approximate it by a
second-order Taylor series expansion (TSE) to obtain:
f (qit) = f (0) + f
0
(0) qit +
f 00 (0)
2
q2it: (4.2)
I assume contribution to utility is zero if quantity is zero, so f (0) = 0 and equation
(4.2) is then written as:
f (qit) = 1htqit + 2tq
2
it; (4.3)
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where 1ht (= f
0
(0)) and 2ht (=
f 00(0)
2
) are parameters to be estimated.1 Because
consumers prefer smaller packages (Shoemaker and Shoal 1975; Allenby, Shively, Yang
and Garratt 2004; Khan and Jain 2005; Cohen 2008; Gu and Yang 2010; Koenigsberg,
Kohli, and Montoya 2010; Çak¬ra and Balagtas 2014), I expect that 1ht  0. Even if
consumers prefer a smaller package, most of them may not accept something as small
as a single-portion size. Packages that are too small increase purchase frequency
and raise transactions costs prohibitively. At the same time, packages that are too
large are di¢ cult to store, and increase the likelihood of spoilage. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume that 2t  0.
Although the GEV model captures di¤erent degrees of substitution among
products across groups, it still su¤ers from the independent of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) property within each group, which generates an unrealistic substitution pattern.
To overcome this problem, I allow the brand-specic intercept, the marginal utility of
income, and the marginal utility of package size to vary across households in a random
way (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001). This assumption also captures
unobserved heterogeneity in brand preference, price responsiveness, and preference
for di¤erent package sizes. Formally, the brand-specic intercept is assumed to be
normally distributed across households, so that:
hb = 0 +
B 1X
b=1
1bxb + h; h s N (0; 1) ; (4.4)
where 0, 1b and  are parameters to be estimated, xb is the binary variable that
takes one if product i is brand b, and zero otherwise, and h is a household-specic
1Draganska and Jain (2005) use a similar approach to derive the functional form
of the relationship between utility and product-line length. In each case, there is no
theoretical prior, so approximating a general polynomial form is a reasonable way to
proceed.
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random component capturing brand preference. Similarly, the marginal utility of
income is assumed to be normally distributed across households, so that:
ht = 0 +
KX
k=1
kykt + h; h s N (0; 1) ; (4.5)
where ks and  are parameters to be estimated, ykts are mean household demo-
graphic attributes at time t; and h is a term capturing household-specic random
variation in price response. Finally, I assume the marginal utility of package size
di¤ers across households, so that:
ht = 0 +
KX
k=1
kykt + h; h s N (0; 1) ; (4.6)
where ks and  are parameters to be estimated and h is a household-specic term
that captures random variation in package size. Equations (4.4), (4.5), and (4.6)
allow me to incorporate unobserved consumer heterogeneity that may be important
in determining consumersproduct choice behavior. With these random coe¢ cients,
the elasticities are the function of the attributes of all the choices rather than the one
in question and the one changed. That is, the elasticities depend on the specication
of variables and mixing distribution, which generates a more realistic substitution
pattern.
The utility associated with the outside option is specied as follows:
uh00t = "h00t: (4.7)
When a household chooses the outside option, it implies that they do not purchase
any of the products i 2 I sold at store j 2 J . With an outside good, households are
allowed to substitute to other goods. In its absence, a simultaneous change in the
price of all products leads to no change in aggregate consumption.
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Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Nevo (2001), I decompose
equation (4.1) into the mean part that varies over products and stores, but not house-
holds, and the idiosyncratic part that varies over products, stores and households, or:
uhijt = ijt
 
xb; ykt; pijt; qit; dijt; ijt;; ; 

+ hijt (h; h; h;) + "hijt; (4.8)
where ijt () is the mean part and hijt () is the idiosyncratic part. I dene the
density of h, h and h as g1 (), g2 () and g3 () respectively. By integrating over
the distributions of g1 (), g2 () and g3 (), I derive the market share of product i in
store j at time t as:
sijt =
ZZZ
exp
 
ijt + hijt

= (1  )
DJ
 P
j2J
D1 J
! g1 () g2 () g3 () ddd; (4.9)
where DJ =
P
i2I
exp
 
ijt + hijt

= (1  ).
In equation (4.1), ijt are unobservable to the econometrician, but known to
consumers, retailers, and manufacturers. The retail prices determined by the interac-
tions among them are potentially correlated with unobserved demand shocks, which
yield biased estimates. To address this issue, I estimate equation (4.9) via simulated
maximum likelihood (SML) method combined with the control function approach
(Train 2009; Pertin and Train 2010; Park and Gupta 2009). The detailed estimation
method is described in the next section.
4.2.3 Supply-Side Model
Pricing and package-size decisions by CPG manufacturers depend critically on
consumer response, and cost considerations. In modeling supply decisions, manu-
facturers set package sizes and wholesale prices taking into account the structure of
their own costs, and retailer responses, while retailers pass-through manufacturers
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package size decisions and set prices to consumers taking into account their costs
and the nature of consumer demand. Manufacturers are assumed to compete hori-
zontally among themselves in both package sizes and wholesale prices. Others nd
that consumers base their store selection decisions not only on prices charged for
a single product category, but also on their basket price and stores non-price at-
tributes such as store location, service quality, and product variety (Arnold, Oum,
and Tigert 1983; Bell, Ho, and Tang 1998; Bell and Lattin 1998; Bawa and Ghosh
1999; Briesch, Chintagunta, and Fox 2009). Following Slade (1995), Besanko, Gupta,
and Jain (1998), and Sudhir (2001), therefore, I assume that retailers behave as local
monopolists in my model. Manufactures and retailers interact vertically according to
a manufacturer-Stackelberg assumption (Sudhir 2001). Assuming manufacturers are
able to set prices and package sizes rst is well-supported by the empirical literature
on vertical supply relationships (Besanko, Dubé and Gupta 2003; Villas-Boas and
Zhao 2005; Draganska and Klapper 2007; Villas-Boas 2007). I solve the model using
backward induction by rst estimating the second-stage retail pricing decision, and
then the rst-stage package size and wholesale price equations. In the reminder of
this section, I derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in package sizes and prices
to this channel game. To simplify notation, I drop time subscript t in the subsequent
discussion.
Consider rst the pricing decision facing retailer j: Following Slade (1995),
Besanko, Gupta and Jain (1998) and Sudhir (2001), I assume that retailers behave as
local monopolists. That is, retailer j carrying I products chooses the optimal retail
prices pi that maximize category prot. The prot maximization problem for retailer
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j is written as:
j = max
pi
Q
IX
i=1
(pi   ri) si   Fj; 8j; (4.10)
where Q is the size of the total market, si is the market share of product i, ri is the
retailing marginal costs for product i, and Fj is the xed cost for retailer j. I assume
the retailing costs are captured by a normalized quadratic unit cost function (Diewert
and Wales 1987), so the marginal cost is given by the following linear combination of
retailing input prices:
ri = 
r
0 + 
r
1wi +
LrX
l=2
rl z
r
li; (4.11)
where rl s are parameters to be estimated, wi is the wholesale price for product i
paid by retailer j, zrlis are other retailing input prices for selling product i.
2 Because
retailer j pass-through manufacturerspackage size decisions and choose retail price
pi to maximize its category prot, retailer js rst order condition for product i is
obtained by di¤erentiating equation (4.10) with respect to pi, so that:
@j
@pi
= si +
IX
i=1
(pi   ri) @si
@pi
= 0; 8i; j: (4.12)
Equation (4.12) is then solved for retailer js margin, which gives, in matrix notation:
p  r =   (
) 1 s; (4.13)
where p = (p1; : : : ; pI)
T , r = (r1; : : : ; rI)
T , s = (s1; : : : ; sI)
T and 
 is an I  I matrix
of share derivatives with respect to all retail prices where the (i; j) element is given
2The normalized quadratic unit cost function for product i is Ci = T1 z + 2yi +
1
2
 
zT3z + z
T4yi

where yi is the output of product i and z is the vector of normal-
ized input prices. So, the marginal cost for product i, @Ci
@yi
is written by the linear
combination of normalized prices, which supports my linear specication of marginal
costs.
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by @sj
@pi
. Equation (4.13) indicates that retail margins are the inverse functions of the
share derivatives with respect to retail prices weighted by market share.
Manufacturer m o¤ers products Im (i.e.
MP
m=1
Im = I) and is assumed to
compete in package sizes and wholesale prices in Bertrand-Nash fashion. Follow-
ing Koenigsberg, Kohli and Montoya (2010), I assume that manufacturers make si-
multaneous decisions regarding package size and price. Setting package prices and
sizes together is both reasonable and descriptive of business practice as manufactur-
ers target a specic price per unit of measure for each SKU a policy that is only
possible if prices and package sizes are determined together. Consequently, the prot
maximization problem facing manufacturer m is written as:
m = max
wi;qi
Q
ImX
i=1
(wi   ci) si   Fm  
ImX
i=1
h (qi) ; (4.14)
where ci is the marginal cost for product i, Fm is the xed cost of manufacturer m
and hm (qi) is the package-size cost function for a package of size qi. In this equation,
package costs are assumed to be separable from ci and Fm. Package size may also a¤ect
manufacturersvariable costs of production, but this e¤ect is likely to be minimal.
Moreover, my focus is the inuence of package size on xed costs such as set-up costs,
inventory costs and distribution costs so the primary e¤ect of packaging costs is
independent of production volume.3 As in the retailersprot maximization problem,
I assume the marginal cost for product i is arisen from a Normalized Quadratic unit
cost function (Diewert and Wales 1987). So, the marginal cost for product i is written
3I include product-specic intercepts into my supply-side model. These intercepts
control for the variations of the variable costs associated with producing packages.
110
as:
ci = 
m
0 +
LmX
l=1
ml z
m
li ; (4.15)
where ml s are parameters to be estimated, z
m
li s are input prices for selling product
i.
Again, the exact form of packaging costs is not known, a priori, but they can
be approximated by a TSE. Applying a TSE to an arbitrary function of package size
implies:
h (qi) = h (0) + h
0
(0) qi +
h00 (0)
2
q2i ; (4.16)
or:
h (qi) = 0 + 1qi + 2q
2
i ; (4.17)
where 0 (= h (0)), 1 (= h
0
(0)), and 2 (=
h00(0)
2
) are parameters to be estimated. The
xed cost associated with producing and distributing packages may be neither simply
increasing nor decreasing. Packages that are too small and too large may require
special packaging technology, excessive costs associated with setting up the production
line, or special handling in the distribution system and shelf display. Consequently, I
expect that the xed packaging cost function is convex, or 0 > 0, 0 > 0, and 0 > 0.
With this objective function, I then consider manufacturerms pricing decision
problem. Di¤erentiating equation (4.14) with respect to wi, manufacturer ms rst
order condition for product i is written as:
si +
ImX
k=1
 
(wi   ci)
IX
l=1
@si
@pl
@pl
@wk
!
= 0; 8i: (4.18)
In equation (4.18), wi   ci represents manufacturer margin for product i and @si@pl
@pl
@wk
represents the change in the market share of product i in response to the change
in the wholesale price of product k. The change in wholesale price a¤ects all retail
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prices, which in turn inuences the market share of the product in question. Notice
that equation (4.18) includes the retail-wholesale pass-through term, @pl
@wk
that is not
observable in the data set.4 Following Sudhir (2001), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005)
and Villas-Boas (2007), the retail-wholesale pass-through term is recovered by totally
di¤erentiating equation (4.12) to yield (in matrix notation):
 = G 1
; (4.19)
where  is an I  I matrix with (i; j) element given by @pi
@wj
and G is an I  I matrix
with (i; j) element given by:
gij =
@si
@pj
+
IX
k=1
(pk   rk)

@s2k
@pi@pj

+
@sj
@pi
; 8i; j: (4.20)
In equation (4.20), @si
@pj
represents the change in the market share of product i in
response to the change in the retail price of product j, pk   rk is the retail margin
of product k, and @s
2
k
@pi@pj
is the change in @sk
@pi
in response to the change in the retail
price of product j. As shown in equation (4.19), the retail-wholesale pass-through
matrix,  is obtained by the product of the inverse of the matrix, G and the matrix
of share derivatives with respect to all retail prices. Equation (4.18) is then solved
for manufacturer ms margin using the matrix  to nd (in matrix notation):
w   c =     G 1

  IN 1 s; (4.21)
where IN is an I  I identity matrix and  is an element-by-element multiplication.
Equation (4.21) implies that manufacturer margins depend on the inverse functions
4I assume that retailer does not know the terms of the contract between manu-
facturers and other retailers. This implies that @pl
@wk
= 0 if pl is the retail price in one
retailer and wk is the wholesale price o¤ered to other retailers. The derivatives are not
necessarily equal to zero if pl is the retail price in one retailer and wk is the wholesale
price o¤ered to the same retailer. I describe how this is revealed in the subsequent
discussion.
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of the share derivatives with respect to wholesale prices weighted by market share.
As discussed above, the share derivatives with respect to wholesale prices are the
function of the G matrix and the share derivatives with respect to all retail prices.
Retailers and manufacturers are assumed to know the structure of the game
and set retail prices and wholesale prices according to equations (4.13) and (4.21),
respectively. As Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) and Draganska and Klapper (2007)
note, however, it is possible that the actual outcome of this game di¤ers from the-
oretical predictions due to asymmetric market information, regulations, and supply
constraints. Accordingly, I allow for deviations from either prot-maximizing retail
prices, or Bertrand-Nash wholesale prices by using "conduct parameters." Specically,
equations (4.13) and (4.21) are written as:
p  r =  

1




 1
s (4.22)
and
w   c =  '   G 1

  IN 1 s; (4.23)
where  and ' are conduct parameters to be estimated. The conduct parameters
represent how the equilibrium outcomes respond to the changes in demand conditions
expressed in elasticity terms. Also, each of the conduct parameters measures the
extent of deviation from Bertrand-Nash pricing conduct. If  = ' = 0, then both
retailers and manufactures set prices competitively. If  = ' = 1, then retailers
set prices as perfect local monopolists, and manufactures as perfect Bertrand-Nash
competitors. In each case,  > 1 and ' > 1 imply retailers and manufactures exercise
greater market power.5 The last case is likely to happen if retailers or manufactures
5Corts (1999) points out the conduct parameters are biased because the estimation
based on the static conjectural variations approach cannot be independent of any
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compete in non-price attributes such as service quality, advertisement, and product
assortment and set price collusively.
Finally, I consider the package-size decisions of manufacturer m. Di¤erenti-
ating equation (4.14) with respect to qi, manufacturer ms rst order condition for
product i is given by:
Q
ImX
k=1
(wk   ck) @sk
@qi
  1   22qi = 0; 8i: (4.24)
In equation (4.24), wk   ck represents manufacturer margin for product k and @sk@qi
represents the change in the market share of product k in response to the change in
the package size of product i. Equation (4.24) is then solved for manufacturer ms
optimal package size to nd:
q = 0 + 1Q  (w   c) ; (4.25)
where q = (q1; : : : ; qI)
T , 0 (=   122 ) and 1 (= 122 ) are parameters to be estimated,6
  is an I  I matrix of share derivatives with respect to all package sizes with (i; j)
element given by @sj
@qi
. Because   (w   c) is the products of the share derivatives with
respect to package size and the estimates of manufacturer competitive response to
changes in demand conditions expressed in price elasticity terms, 1 measures the
e¤ect of competition and package size substitutability on equilibrium package sizes.
Although the own-share derivative is expected to be negative and the cross-share
share derivative to be positive in sign, the sign of 1 is an empirical question as it
depends on both   and w   c.
dynamic oligopolistic behaviors. I acknowledge this issue. But, there are no other
methods to measure market power.
60 is not identied in my econometric model. But, it does not have any impacts
on the subsequent discussion.
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In summary, the retailer and manufacturer decisions are characterized by equa-
tions (4.22), (4.23), and (4.25), respectively. My intent is to reveal how manufacturers
use package size and price as complementary tools in strategic competition. The in-
teraction between the equilibrium wholesale prices determined by equation (4.23) and
the equilibrium package sizes determined by equation (4.25) is my primary concern.
Because explicitly including cross-response parameters between package-size and price
makes the model econometrically intractable, I conduct a series of simulations to de-
termine their joint equilibrium realizations. By conducting the simulations, therefore,
I examine how manufacturers respond to a change in their competitive environment
caused by package downsizing. Equations (4.22), (4.23), and (4.25) involve in many
factors such as market shares and own- and cross-share derivatives with respect to all
retail prices, wholesale prices, and package sizes, so simulation is an e¤ective way to
show how the outcome variables of interest are determined in equilibrium. To conduct
the simulation, the parameters in equations (4.22), (4.23), and (4.25) are required.
4.2.4 Estimation and Identication
The equilibrium model is estimated in two stages. In the rst stage, I esti-
mate the demand model (equation (4.9)), and in the second stage, conditional on
the demand estimates, the supply model (equations (4.22), (4.23), and (4.25)) is es-
timated. While fully simultaneous estimation may be more e¢ cient, this two-stage
approach provides consistent demand estimates regardless of the assumptions made
regarding the supply-side model (Yang, Chen, and Allenby 2003). On a practical
level, two-stage estimation also renders a highly complex model of consumer, retailer,
and manufacturer interactions tractable to estimate. In this subsection, I describe
the estimation methods used for both the demand and supply models.
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Identication of retailer and manufacturer conduct in structural models such
as this can never be proven conclusively, but rests on the logic of the identication
strategy, and the quality of the estimation results. For the current model, market
share and retail price vary across product, retailer, and time, which easily identify
price-response parameters (table 4.1). Although package size changes less often, and
in a discrete way, over the sample period, manufacturers o¤er a variety of package
sizes. The average package size is 16.1 ounces and the standard deviation is 3.6
ounces. So, cross-sectional variation is enough to identify the package-size-response
parameters. With respect to wholesale prices, others rely on implicitly-estimated
wholesale price variation (Villas-Boas and Zhang 2005; Draganska and Klapper 2007;
Villas-Boas 2007), so identifying manufacturer is inherently more questionable than
in this study. Because I use observed wholesale prices, which vary substantially
over time and across products (table 4.1), identifying manufacturer behavior is much
easier (Nakamura and Zerom 2010). Moreover, input prices for both retailers and
manufacturers are highly volatile over the sample period (gure 4.1 and table 4.3),
so variations in input costs enable me to identify key parameters of the demand and
supply models. However, note that the retail prices and manufacturer and retailer
margins are likely to be endogenous.
For the demand model, retail prices are likely to be endogenous in store-level
retail scanner data. Because unobserved (to the econometrician) factors such as
advertisement, in-store promotion, and shelf placement are known to consumers, re-
tailers, and manufacturers, observed prices are likely to be correlated with unobserved
demand shocks, which may yield inconsistent estimators. There are two approaches
to address this endogeneity issue. One is to use a simulated generalized method of
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moments (SGMM) approach (Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995), and the other is the
control function approach (Park and Gupta 2009; Petrin and Train 2010). I employ
the control function approach, because SGMM tends to be sensitive to sampling error
and, as a result, requires multiple markets and multiple stores in each market (Berry,
Linton and Pakes 2004). Further, the control function approach has been shown to
be useful in contexts similar to mine (Park and Gupta 2009).
The control function approach is intended to introduce a proxy variable that
accounts for the unobserved factors, ijt a¤ecting retail prices, such that the remaining
variations in retail prices, pijt independent of the error term, "hijt and the standard
estimation approaches is consistent. For illustration purposes, I rewrite equation (4.8)
as:
uhijt = V (xb; ykt; pijt; qit; dijt; h; h; h;; ; ; ) + ijt + "hijt: (4.26)
Suppose the endogenous price variable, pijt is expressed as a linear combination of n
observed instruments, vijtn and an unobservable factor, ijt, so that:
pijt =
NX
n=1
nvijtn + ijt; (4.27)
where ,ns are parameters to be estimated and "hijt and ijt are independent of pijt,
but "hijt and ijt are correlated. The correlation between "hijt and ijt reects the
price endogeneity problem. I decompose "hijt into the mean part conditional on
ijt and the deviation part that is independent of ijt: "hijt = E ("hijtjijt) + e"hijt .
The conditional expectation is a function of ijt, and is called the control function,
denoted by CF (ijt). With the conditional expectation term, or control function,
and the deviation part, equation (4.26) is written as:
uhijt = V (xb; ykt; pijt; qit; dijt; h; h; h;; ; ; ) + ijt + CF (ijt) + e"hijt : (4.28)
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Because e"
hijt
is independent of pijt, standard simulated maximum likelihood (SML)
is applicable.
For the control function (CF (ijt)), I use the residuals from equation (4.27) i.e.
bijt = pijt   NP
n=1
bnvijtn. Specically, the control function approach takes a two-step
process. In the rst step, the variable that is thought to be endogenous is regressed
on exogenous instruments to generate a vector of residuals. In the second step, the
demand model is estimated using the residuals as an explanatory variable. Because
the IV residuals account for unobservable factors in prices that may be correlated
with errors in the demand equation, this method controls for the potential implied
bias, and provides consistent demand estimates. I then use SML to estimate the full
model, including the control function (Train 2009; Petrin and Train 2010). SML uses
random draws from the distributions that reect consumer heterogeneity so, to aid in
the computational speed and e¢ ciency of estimation, I use 100 Halton draws (Bhat
2003).
E¤ective demand instruments must be correlated with price, but not the un-
observable factors. As suggested by Villas-Boas (2007) and Draganska and Klapper
(2007), the set of instrumental variables includes a variety of cost, brand, and dynamic
variables. First, manufacturer and retail level input prices such as grain prices, sugar
prices, wholesale prices, gas prices, diesel prices, and wages are used because input
prices are likely to be correlated with retail prices, but not the unobservable demand
factors. Second, brand specic intercepts account for unobservable supply factors
that inuence retail prices. Third, lagged share values are likely to be correlated with
current-period prices, but only weakly correlated with current-period demand shocks
(Villas-Boas and Winer 1999). This set of instruments explains 36.3% of the total
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variation in the endogenous retail price and produces an F statistic is 186.5, which
implies that the instruments are not weak (Staiger and Stock 1997).
Instruments for the supply model are also required because retailer and man-
ufacturer margins in the price and package-size equations are also likely to be en-
dogenous. Again, factors such as supply contracts, supply constraints, and retailer
marketing strategies are known to retailers and manufacturers, and so inuence mar-
gins at both levels, but are unobservable to the econometrician. The control function
approach is used again, as in the demand model. In the rst-stage IV regression,
endogenous margins are regressed on exogenous instruments to again obtain a set of
residuals. The set of residuals is then used as an explanatory variable in the price
and package-size equations, which provides consistent estimates of the key parameters
of interest. To take advantage of the e¢ ciency gains arising from contemporaneous
correlation among the supply-side equations, seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
is used to estimate the supply-side model with the control function.
In the supply model, the instruments must be correlated with margins, but not
correlated with the unobservable factors in the price and package-size equations. On
an intuitive level, supply instruments are variables that shift the demand curve and,
hence, identify equilibrium points on the supply curve. I use the set of instruments
well-accepted in the literature (Draganska and Klapper 2007; Villas-Boas 2007). For
the manufacturer margin, demographic variables such as household income, house-
hold size, age, educational attainment, and employment status are used to capture
variation in demand. Second, retail input prices are used as instruments because vari-
ations in retail costs are likely to inuence the derived-demand for breakfast cereal
by retailers. Third, lagged margins are used because they are likely to be correlated
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with current margins, but not with the unobservable factors. Fourth, manufacturer-
specic binary variables capture idiosyncratic supply factors that are unobservable
to the econometrician, but are known to retailers and manufacturers. Finally, binary
variables accounting for seasonal e¤ects are included to account for temporal varia-
tion that may be important in determining manufacturersmargins. For the retailer
margin, demographic variables, lagged margins, and store-specic binary variables
are used, following the same general logic as with the manufacturer-margin equa-
tion. This set of instruments explains 1.8% of the total variation in the endogenous
manufacturer margin and 91.0% of the retailer margin. The F statistics are 15.6 for
the rst-stage IV regression for the manufacturer margin, and 15,507 for the retailer
margin, respectively. Because each of these F statistics is greater than 10, I again
conclude that the instruments are not weak in the sense of Staiger and Stock (1997).
4.3 Data Description
I estimate the empirical model using store-level scanner data (IRI Infoscan)
from the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal category for the Chicago market. Specically,
the data consists of 156 weeks (April 2007 - March 2010) of supermarket chain-level
retail sales of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal. The data set includes UPC level unit
sales and dollar sales sold in two major supermarket chains in Chicago: Dominicks
and Jewel. Each product-alternative is dened as an SKU. For tractability, I focus
on 35 major SKUs, subject to the restriction that each product is sold in both stores.
All other SKUs are assumed to be in the outside option. The outside option is
the di¤erence between total market sales and the sales captured by the data, where
the total market is dened as the population of Chicago multiplied by per capita
consumption. Per capita consumption is calculated by assuming each consumer in
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the Chicago market has an average serving-size per day as in Nevo (2001). Dening
the outside option this way means that the model captures not only the IRI-products
excluded from the analysis, but also those sold in stores that do not provide their
sales data to IRI.
The breakfast cereal category represents an ideal case-study of package size
and pricing strategy. First, breakfast cereals are frequently purchased and consumed
by a wide variety of consumers, so the distribution of preferences help identify the
demand parameters. Second, there are two major manufacturers, General Mills and
Kelloggs, which are well-understood to compete strategically using multiple tools an
observation that also helps identify competitive interactions at the manufacturer level.
Finally, manufacturers often change the size of their packages relative to manufactur-
ers who sell products in cans or bottles, and variation in package size is necessary to
identify the core parameters of interest.
The manufacturer pricing data is provided by Promodata, Inc., and includes
the price charged by manufacturers before allowances are applied, markups charged
by wholesalers to retailers, the e¤ective date of new case prices, "deal allowances," or
o¤-invoice items o¤ered to retailers by the wholesaler, the type of promotion suggested
by the wholesaler to the retailer, and the allowance date. For the analysis, I dene
the wholesale price as the price charged to the retailer net of any allowances. One
limitation of this data set is that it captures prices charged by wholesalers to non-
self-distributing retailers. While some retailers do indeed self-distribute, I assume
that the wholesale price is likely to be highly correlated with that charged to self-
distributing retailers. There are two reasons why this is a valid assumption. First,
the Robinson-Patman Act requires any deals o¤ered in a market to be o¤ered to
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all (Richards and Hamilton 2014). Second, manufacturers typically do not want
to build ill-will among their retail customers by o¤ering deals that di¤er sharply
between competitors. Although wholesale price information is proprietary, the risk
that competitive information may be shared among retail buyers is often not worth
the small benet that can be earned by discriminating among buyers. At the very
least, compared with existing methods of imputing wholesale prices (Villas-Boas and
Zhao 2005; Villas-Boas 2007), the resulting error is likely to be minimal.
Variation in wholesale prices, market shares, and retail prices is critical to iden-
tify the parameters of interest in the empirical model. Table 4.1 shows the market
share, retail price per ounce, and wholesale price per ounce of the 35 products in each
store. The data in table 4.1 reveals that market shares vary across package size and
retailer, and that manufacturers set di¤erent prices for di¤erent package sizes even
within the same product line. Within each product line, manufacturers can either
charge a discount or a premium for product sold in smaller packages. This table
shows that retailers and manufacturers generally charge higher unit prices for smaller
packages, which is consistent with the nding by Gerstner and Hess (1987). Con-
sumers may have heterogeneous package-size preferences, and my previous ndings
show that consumers tend to prefer smaller packages. Retailers and manufacturers
may understand this fact, albeit implicitly, and adopt di¤erent marketing strategies
for each package size.
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The data summary also reveals that fully 15 out of 35 products changed pack-
age size once during the sample period, so co-variations in package size and price are
at least conceptually identied in the data. In fact, the discrete nature of package-size
changes helps make this case more clearly. Table 4.2 compares market share, retail
price, and wholesale price before and after changes in package size. When manu-
facturers downsize packages, most retail prices, and all wholesale prices, rise. For
example, when Kelloggs changed the size of the Froot Loops package from 15 ounces
to 12.2 ounces, the retail price increased from $0.224 per ounce to $0.243 per ounce
in Dominicks, and from $0.226 per ounce to $0.295 per ounce in Jewel. Therefore,
retailers clearly do not intend to hold unit prices constant after a change in package
size. Further, along with this package downsize, Kelloggs raised the wholesale price
of Froot Loops from $0.198 per ounce to $0.258 per ounce. This simple compari-
son shows that manufacturers apparently use changes in packaging to mount implicit
changes in price. However, despite the price increases, each product in table 4.2 gains
market share after the package-size change. For example, Froot Loops increased its
market share from 0.087% to 0.121% in Dominicks and from 0.355% to 0.404% in
Jewel. In what seems like an act of marketing magic, package downsizing allowed
manufacturers to raise not only market share, but prices, and margins as well. If this
example holds more generally, however, then it begs the question as to why manu-
facturers do not downsize more often. There may be something important such as
demand, cost, or strategic considerations that the summary in table 4.2 does not take
into account. Therefore, formal econometric estimation, to identify the simultaneous
interaction of all possible motivations to change package size, or not, is necessary.
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Estimating costs, however, requires detailed data on input prices that comprise
retailer and manufacturer costs. Both retailer and manufacturer costs are functions of
a number of input prices specic to their production processes. Retailerscosts consist
of average weekly commercial gas prices, average weekly diesel prices, as well as the
wholesale prices described above. Manufacturerscosts include average weekly indus-
trial gas prices, average weekly diesel prices, and average weekly prices of agricultural
commodity inputs such as corn, wheat, oats, rice, malt, and sugar. Manufacturers
use some of these grains for producing each product. Using volume sales of each
product as a weight, I combine grain prices into a single measure and use it for the
estimation. The gas price data is from the U.S. Department of Energy (2011) and is
smoothed to produce weekly series from the native monthly series, while agricultural
commodity prices are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service (2011). Figure 4.1 depicts the time series plot and table 4.3 reports the mean
and the standard deviation of the input prices. Note that the value of week one is
normalized to 100 in each series of costs. These graphics reveal substantial variation
in input prices over time and the fact that some important input prices rose over the
sample period. For example, sugar prices rise consistently, while the prices of other
inputs rise until around week 65, and decrease afterward. Rising input prices, in turn,
provide ample motivation for manufacturers to seek innovative ways to raise margins.
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Figure 4.1
Input Costs
Table 4.3
Input Costs
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Gas price for retailers 103:506 27:090
Gas price for manufacturers 96:981 23:948
Diesel price for retailers and manufacturers 107:387 24:701
Grain price for manufacturers 123:944 25:156
Sugar price for manufacturers 136:903 32:775
Note: Grain price is the weighted average of main grain prices.
Week 1s value is normalized to 100 in each series.
Demand also depends on observed heterogeneity, or variation in household
demographic and socioeconomic attributes. For the demand model and the rst-stage
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IV regressions in the supply-side model, I include mean household income, household
size, age, educational attainment (which assumes a value of one if a householder is
college-graduate or more, zero otherwise), and employment status, which is dened as
the number of workers in a household. Each is smoothed to produce a weekly series
from the native yearly observations obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census (2011).
Table 4.4 presents the mean and the standard deviation of each demographic variable.
Each of these variables capture variation in demand-shifting demographic attributes
over time, which is useful in estimating the demand-side model and constructing
instruments for retailer and wholesaler margins. Of these variables, household income,
educational attainment, and employment status are relatively variable over the sample
period, while household size and averge age are less so. Clearly, this pattern was
inuenced by the Great Recession of 2008 - 09.
Table 4.4
Demographic Variables
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Household income ($,000) 67:934 1:107
Household size 2:606 0:004
Age 42:007 0:264
Educational attainment of a householder 0:322 0:012
Employment (number of workers in a household) 1:092 0:018
4.4 Results and Discussion
In this section, I present the results obtained by estimating the structural mod-
els described in the previous section. The parameter of primary interest in my demand
model is package-size response. My hypothesis is that consumers prefer smaller pack-
ages and preference for package size is heterogeneous among consumers. The key
parameters in the supply model, on the other hand, are the coe¢ cient estimates for
the margin variables, or how retail and manufacturer conduct a¤ect package size and
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pricing in equilibrium. Prior to presenting the results from the supply model, how-
ever, I rst present the estimates obtained from the demand model, and interpret their
implications for the structure of package-size demand. Next, I describe the estimates
from the supply-side of the model, and explain how the costs of increasing package
size present practical limitations to manufacturersability to respond to consumers
demand for variety in package sizes. Finally, I discuss the strategic implications of
changing package sizes, and draw some more general ndings for CPG manufacturers
and retailers.
4.4.1 Demand Results
I rst establish the validity of the maintained demand model by conducting
specication tests of the random-coe¢ cient nested logit model relative to the simple-
logit alternative. Table 4.5 reports the estimation results from the xed-coe¢ cient
nested logit model, random-coe¢ cient nested logit model without control function,
and random-coe¢ cient nested logit model with control function respectively. First, I
compare the random-coe¢ cient nested logit model with the xed-coe¢ cient specica-
tion. To test the validity of the random-coe¢ cient specication, I conduct a likelihood
ratio (LR) test in which the random-coe¢ cient logit model is the alternative, and the
xed-coe¢ cient nested logit model is the null specication. The LR test statistic
is 28,811 with 3 degrees of freedom, so the null is rejected in favor of the alterna-
tive specication. Moreover, the standard deviations of the random parameters in
the random-coe¢ cient nested logit model are all signicant, so I conclude that the
random-coe¢ cient specication outperforms the xed-coe¢ cient version.
129
T
ab
le
4.
5
E
st
im
at
io
n
R
es
u
lt
s
of
D
em
an
d
M
o
d
el
F
ix
ed
-c
o
e¢
ci
en
t
R
an
d
om
-c
o
e¢
ci
en
t
R
an
d
om
-c
o
e¢
ci
en
t
n
es
te
d
lo
gi
t
m
o
d
el
n
es
te
d
lo
gi
t
m
o
d
el
n
es
te
d
lo
gi
t
m
o
d
el
w
it
h
co
n
tr
ol
fu
n
ct
io
n
w
it
h
ou
t
co
n
tr
ol
fu
n
ct
io
n
w
it
h
co
n
tr
ol
fu
n
ct
io
n
V
ar
ia
b
le
E
st
im
at
e
t
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
t
va
lu
e
E
st
im
at
e
t
va
lu
e
B
ra
n
d
p
re
fe
re
n
ce
C
on
st
an
t
 
1
:1
0
9

 
4
:6
1
1
 
0
:2
0
2

 
1
0
:1
7
0
2
:2
8
0

4
4
:0
2
5
H
on
ey
N
u
t
C
h
ee
ri
os
0
:7
8
4

1
6
:9
6
6
0
:1
9
1

2
3
:7
8
2
0
:7
7
9

8
5
:0
6
6
C
h
ee
ri
os
0
:8
6
6

1
5
:8
7
9
0
:5
8
3

1
0
3
:3
4
2
1
:0
5
3

7
2
:2
7
8
F
ro
st
ed
F
la
ke
s
0
:2
5
9

6
:8
5
8
0
:4
4
2

9
9
:8
6
5
0
:5
4
8

6
7
:0
1
5
R
ic
e
K
ri
sp
ie
s
0
:4
5
6

1
0
:8
5
9
0
:6
0
0

1
6
9
:0
6
5
0
:3
1
4

2
2
:7
9
9
F
ro
ot
L
o
op
s
0
:1
6
8

4
:4
7
2
0
:4
1
1

1
5
9
:9
4
6
0
:7
5
9

1
0
3
:8
9
2
F
ro
st
ed
M
in
i-
W
h
ea
ts
0
:2
3
3

5
:5
6
6
0
:0
3
3

1
0
:2
5
8
0
:4
5
8

5
8
:4
9
8
S
p
ec
ia
l
K
R
ed
B
er
ri
es
0
:6
1
6

1
2
:7
6
7
0
:6
7
3

2
0
2
:6
0
5
1
:2
5
2

1
2
1
:0
4
9
S
p
ec
ia
l
K
O
ri
gi
n
al
0
:5
0
1

1
1
:0
9
3
0
:2
4
7

6
5
:9
6
3
0
:5
1
9

5
7
:9
1
4
C
o
co
a
K
ri
sp
ie
s
0
:0
6
9
1
:4
7
6
 
0
:0
0
1
 
0
:1
8
7
0
:2
5
2

2
4
:8
1
8
A
p
p
le
J
ac
k
s
0
:1
0
0

2
:6
5
8
0
:1
7
7

8
3
:2
4
4
0
:3
7
0

5
3
:6
3
6
R
ai
si
n
B
ra
n
0
:0
8
0
1
:6
7
7
 
0
:0
2
2

 
5
:4
7
8
0
:3
8
0

3
4
:4
5
2
R
ai
si
n
B
ra
n
C
ru
n
ch
0
:2
2
1

4
:9
9
7
 
0
:1
2
8

 
9
:0
1
3
0
:4
7
6

4
5
:8
5
5
C
or
n
F
la
ke
s
0
:1
9
0

5
:1
1
9
0
:2
1
8

6
3
:2
9
6
0
:4
4
9

5
8
:9
4
5
C
ri
sp
ix
0
:4
1
9

7
:3
0
2
0
:1
8
8

4
8
:6
5
4
0
:8
1
7

5
2
:0
4
4
H
on
ey
B
u
n
ch
es
of
O
at
s
0
:2
3
0

6
:2
2
4
0
:3
8
7

1
2
0
:5
8
9
0
:6
9
9

1
0
2
:8
3
7
H
on
ey
B
u
n
ch
es
of
O
at
s
w
it
h
A
lm
on
d
s
0
:1
4
3

3
:9
1
6
0
:0
5
3

9
:0
8
5
0
:3
1
9

5
6
:3
7
7
F
ru
it
y
P
eb
b
le
s
 
0
:0
2
0
 
0
:4
4
4
0
:1
4
4

3
1
:6
3
3
 
0
:1
7
8

 
1
2
:0
5
1
C
o
co
a
P
eb
b
le
s
 
0
:0
9
9

 
2
:1
5
0
 
0
:1
8
9

 
6
:8
7
9
0
:1
8
7

2
7
:3
0
0
O
at
m
ea
l
S
q
u
ar
es
0
:4
0
0

8
:4
3
9
0
:3
3
4

6
8
:6
8
4
0
:7
6
9

7
3
:2
4
1
C
ap
N
C
ru
n
ch
C
ru
n
ch
B
er
ri
es
0
:0
4
6
1
:0
1
7
 
0
:0
1
2

 
2
:0
1
9
0
:6
4
1

8
9
:4
3
8
M
ar
ke
ti
n
g
m
ix
D
is
co
u
n
t
0
:6
8
2

1
2
:0
3
6
0
:2
0
1

1
6
:7
6
9
0
:1
7
5

1
5
:9
8
7
P
ri
ce
 
0
:5
2
5

 
8
:8
0
6
 
0
:0
0
3
 
0
:2
0
9
 
0
:0
3
7

 
2
:9
3
4
P
ac
ka
ge
si
ze
0
:8
4
5

3
:6
8
9
 
0
:3
3
4

 
5
:1
4
3
 
0
:1
5
7

 
2
:7
4
6
P
ac
ka
ge
si
ze
sq
u
ar
ed
 
0
:0
3
7

 
3
:9
9
1
0
:0
1
1

4
:1
1
4
0
:0
0
4
1
:4
3
2
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
te
rm
s
P
ri
ce

d
is
co
u
n
t
 
0
:0
2
6

 
1
1
:8
3
3
 
0
:0
0
7

 
1
5
:6
0
9
 
0
:0
0
6

 
1
5
:7
0
7
P
ri
ce

h
ou
se
h
ol
d
in
co
m
e
0
:6
8
1

7
:8
9
3
0
:0
1
7
0
:7
7
8
0
:0
2
1
1
:1
3
0
P
ac
ka
ge
si
ze

h
ou
se
h
ol
d
in
co
m
e
 
1
:4
6
8

 
4
:3
8
8
0
:3
2
3

3
:4
3
1
0
:2
7
5

3
:3
2
0
P
ac
ka
ge
si
ze
sq
u
ar
ed

h
ou
se
h
ol
d
in
co
m
e
0
:0
5
8

4
:3
2
1
 
0
:0
1
0

 
2
:4
2
8
 
0
:0
0
7
 
1
:8
7
7
S
td
.
d
ev
.
of
ra
n
d
om
p
ar
am
et
er
s
C
on
st
an
t
 
 
0
:0
5
9

6
9
:8
6
9
0
:3
9
6

3
0
4
:2
9
2
P
ri
ce
 
 
0
:0
2
8

3
0
9
:5
5
1
0
:0
1
6

9
3
:6
4
7
P
ac
ka
ge
si
ze
 
 
0
:0
8
9

8
8
5
:1
0
0
0
:0
1
9

2
1
3
:1
2
6
W
it
h
in
st
or
e
co
rr
el
at
io
n
G
E
V
sc
al
e
p
ar
am
et
er
0
:5
3
7

3
6
:4
1
2
0
:8
5
4

3
6
7
:9
9
1
0
:8
8
0

4
0
3
:8
9
0
C
on
tr
ol
fu
n
ct
io
n
IV
re
gr
es
si
on
re
si
d
u
al
s
0
:0
3
8

6
:5
2
4
 
 
0
:0
0
9

6
:2
5
8
E
st
im
at
e
of
st
d
.
d
ev
.
S
td
.
d
ev
.
 
 
0
:1
7
6

2
2
6
:1
7
9
0
:1
5
9

9
4
:1
0
1
S
im
u
la
te
d
lo
g
li
ke
li
h
o
o
d
at
co
n
ve
rg
en
ce
 
1
0
;
1
4
7
3
;
1
0
8
4
;
2
5
8
N
ot
e:
A
n
as
te
ri
sk
in
d
ic
at
es
si
gn
i
ca
n
ce
at
a
5%
le
ve
l.
130
Next, I investigate the dimensions of the endogeneity problem, and exam-
ine whether the control function is able to adequately address the issue. From the
results reported in table 4.5, which shows estimates obtained without the control
function, it is clear that the estimated coe¢ cients are di¤erent from those of the
random-coe¢ cient nested logit model with control function. In particular, if the en-
dogeneity problem is ignored, the marginal utility of income (or price coe¢ cient) is
much smaller. This nding is inconsistent with prior studies of breakfast-cereal de-
mand (Nevo 2001; Richards and Hamilton 2014) so represents evidence of apparent
endogeneity bias. Further, I conduct a regression-based endogeneity test (Wooldridge
2010). The t-statistic for the IV regression residuals in table 4.5 indicates that the
control parameter is statistically di¤erent from zero, which indicates that the control
function e¤ectively corrects for the endogeneity bias that would otherwise be present.
The third test is a t-test of the GEV scale parameter. If the scale parameter is
not signicantly di¤erent from zero, then consumers do not regard stores as di¤erent
sources of cereal, and a simple logit model would su¢ ce. The t-statistic for the GEV
scale parameter shows that it is statistically di¤erent from zero, which suggests that
the nested logit specication is superior to the simple logit. In summary, therefore,
these specication tests support the validity of the random-coe¢ cient nested logit
model, so this model is used to calculate demand elasticities, which form key inputs
to the manufacturer and retail supply equations estimated in the second-stage.
The demand model provides several ndings that are of practical and theoret-
ical importance. First, the GEV scale parameter is close to one, which implies that
breakfast cereals are highly substitutable for each other. Although this result would
be somewhat surprising if the model were estimated only at the brand level, recall
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that the data includes several SKUs of the same brand. It is perhaps not surprising,
therefore, that di¤erent SKUs of the same brand are highly substitutable. Further,
the sample cereals are all from the same broad sub-category of products family and
children cereals so they are likely to be relatively substitutable by construction.
Second, the standard deviation of the random price coe¢ cient is signicant,
which suggests that the marginal utility of income di¤ers among consumers. There-
fore, unobserved heterogeneity is an important feature of the breakfast cereal market.
While this result is consistent with others that use cereal for their subject matter
(Nevo 2001; Richards and Hamilton 2014), it is perhaps more important in an SKU-
level model as it suggests that consumers respond to price changes within the same
brand-family in substantially di¤erent ways.
Third, the discount variable is positive and the interaction term between the
discount variable and the price variable is negative. This means that a temporary price
discount causes demand to shift outward and rotate counter-clockwise, or become
more elastic when a retailer promotes the item through a temporary price reduction.
Finding that demand becomes more elastic is both intuitive and consistent with the
literature on retail price promotions. Although expected, this nding is important for
retail practice as it implies that margins fall signicantly during promotion periods
as consumers become more sensitive to promotional price changes and are, therefore,
more willing to substitute to other products.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the coe¢ cient on the package size vari-
able is negative, suggesting that consumers prefer a smaller package. This nding
is consistent with Khan and Jain (2005), Cohen (2008), and Gu and Yang (2010).
Consumers prefer smaller packages because they allow consumers to match purchase
132
volumes more closely to consumption rates (Koenigsberg, Kohli, and Montoya 2010).
An alternative interpretation is that smaller packages reduce the risk that purchases
fail to meet consumersprior expectations of how the product is likely to perform
in terms of taste, nutrition, texture, or any other salient attribute (Shoemaker and
Shoal 1975). Further, the interaction term between the package size variable and
income is positive, suggesting that higher income consumers tend to prefer larger
packages. This is consistent with Cohen (2008) as higher-income households tend to
purchase larger packages on each shopping occasion perhaps because any mismatch
between their purchase and consumption plans, or their perception of the risk asso-
ciated with a poor attribute match may be trivial for them. It also may be the case
that higher income families simply have larger homes, more storage, and the ability
to reduce transactions costs by buying packages that will last for many consumption
occasions. In addition, the standard deviation of the random package-size coe¢ cient
is statistically signicant, which implies that package-size preferences are heteroge-
neous among cereal shoppers, as expected. If consumers di¤er in their demand for
packages of di¤erent sizes, then this nding may explain manufacturersmotivation
for o¤ering di¤erent package sizes within the same product line.
These estimates also allow me to calculate the optimal package size for each
cereal brand. According to the package-size / utility relationship shown in gure
4.2, package size has a nonlinear, concave e¤ect on utility. Moreover, the demand
estimates imply and the estimates imply an optimal package size of 12.0 ounces. In
the sample of cereals used here, for example, some of the more popular brands 
Honey Nut Cheerios 12.25-ounce box, Rice Krispies 12-ounce box, Froot Loops 12.2-
ounce box, and others are sold in near optimal sizes. However, this optimal size
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is derived using only demand-side estimates. In the following subsection, I discuss
the optimal package size that incorporates supply-side costs and competition among
manufacturers.
Figure 4.2
E¤ect of Package Size on Utility
Whether each package-size is priced optimally depends on the own-price and
cross-price elasticities with other brands and other SKUs within the same brand.
Table 4.6 shows the matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities for a few of the products
in the sample o¤ered by General Mills and Kelloggs in Dominicks, while table 4.7
reports similar estimates for SKUs sold in Jewel. Clearly, the random-coe¢ cient
nested logit model is not subject to the IIA property of simple logit models as all
cross-price elasticities di¤er, and reveal a greater willingness among consumers to
substitute among like products. That is, substitution across products is stronger for
products with similar package sizes relative to those with di¤erent package sizes. For
example, the rst row of tables 4.6 and 4.7 shows that a price change for Honey Nut
Cheerios 14/12.25-ounce box has a greater impact on the share of Cheerios 15/14-
ounce box than Cheerios 10/8.9-ounce box, Frosted Flakes 14-ounce box than Frosted
Flakes 17-ounce box and so on. Compared with the results reported in tables 4.6 and
134
4.7, the substitution patterns di¤er slightly from one store to the next, which again
shows the value of using a GEV specication.
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If prices and package sizes are determined simultaneously, package-size elas-
ticities are also of practical importance to manufacturers and retailers alike. Table
4.8 presents the matrix of own- and cross-package-size elasticities in Dominicks and
table 4.9 reports those in Jewel. The package size elasticities are smaller than price
elasticities, which is consistent with the nding of Çak¬ra and Balagtas (2014). This
nding implies that consumers are relatively insensitive to changes in package size
and likely pay more attention to changes in price. However, the fact that most of
them are statistically signicant from zero suggests that these elasticities are not to
be ignored. Own-package-size elasticities tend to be negative and cross-package-size
elasticities be positive. Negative own package-size elasticities conrm the nding that
consumers prefer smaller package sizes, in general, while the positive cross e¤ects sug-
gest that larger package sizes for one SKU cause the utility from another SKU to rise,
as expected if consumers prefer smaller packages.
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While these demand results are of considerable interest themselves, the ob-
jective of this analysis is to determine how consumer preferences for package size
condition manufacturer decisions to o¤er SKUs that di¤er in terms of their package
size, how they are to be priced, and how retailers pass-through manufacturer price
changes to the consumer level.
4.4.2 Supply Results
I use the demand estimates reported in table 4.5 to calculate market shares
and share derivatives with respect to all retail prices, wholesale prices, and package
sizes. The share derivatives are then substituted into the supply model in (4.18) and
(4.20), which are, in turn, used to estimate retailer pricing, manufacturer pricing, and
manufacturer package-size equations (4.22), (4.23), and (4.25). In these equations,
retail and manufacturer margins are likely to be endogenous and the supply estimates
biased if no consideration is made for the simultaneous nature of margins, prices, and
package sizes. To overcome this problem, I again use the control function approach
in which endogenous margins are regressed on exogenous instruments to obtain the
residuals, and the set of residuals is then used as an explanatory variable in the price
and package-size equations.
Once the control function is brought into the supply model, the model is es-
timated by SUR. I begin by conducting specication tests on the proposed model,
followed by the interpretation of the parameters. First, an LR test is used to compare
the supply-side model against a naïve model that consists of only constants. The LR
statistic is 9; 082 which is chi-square distributed with 48 degrees of freedom. There-
fore, the naïve model is rejected in favor of the maintained supply-side specication
and I conclude that the supply-side model ts the data better than no model at all.
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Second, I compare the results of the model with and without instrumental variables to
show the extent of bias present if endogeneity is not properly accounted for. In tables
4.10, 4.11, and 4.12, I present the estimation results from the supply model without
the control function. In the non-instrumented model, the estimated Wu-Hausman
test statistic value is 57.7 and its p-value is 15.9%, which suggests that the null hy-
pothesis that the margins are exogenous is marginally rejected. However, the conduct
parameter in manufacturer price equation is negative when the endogeneity problem
is ignored. This implies that the equilibrium prices decrease in response to an up-
ward shift of demand curve as the conduct parameter measures how the equilibrium
prices respond to changes in demand conditions. Because this is somewhat nonsen-
sical, I conclude that the margins are endogenous and the instrumental variables are
necessary.
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After determining the preferred specications for the manufacturer price and
package-size equations, and the retail price equation, I then interpret the estimates
from each in turn. In general, the supply-model estimates provide reasonable results
in terms of goodness of t and economic and statistical signicance. First, recall that
the retail price equation examines the relationship between retail prices and retail
costs and demand conditions expressed in elasticity terms. Table 4.10 shows the
estimates obtained for the retail pricing equation. In terms of goodness-of-t, the
results in this table show that the variables used in this equation explain 30.5% of the
total variation in retail price. Further, the t-statistic for the IV regression residuals
indicates that the residual parameter is statistically di¤erent from zero, suggesting
that the control function approach again addresses the expected endogeneity of retail
margins in the expected way. Retail cost variables such as wholesale price, gas price,
and diesel price variables are all positive, suggesting that retailers tend to charge
higher prices as costs increase. Each cost variable is statistically signicant, except
for diesel price, so the cost component of the model appears to t the data well.
The extent of strategic behavior is estimated through the conduct parame-
ter. In table 4.10, the conduct parameter is statistically di¤erent from, but close to,
zero, which suggests that the retail market is more competitive than the maintained
assumption in which retailers act as a local monopolist. Nevertheless, retailers still
have non-zero margins. The small conduct parameter implies that retail prices are
relatively unresponsive to changes in demand induced by price changes by other re-
tailers. My estimated retail-conduct parameter is smaller than those estimated for
other product categories such as ketchup (Villas-Boas and Zhao 2005), ground co¤ee
(Draganska and Klapper 2007), and uid milk (Richards, Allender, and Hamilton
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2012). It may be the case that most retailers use the pricing of breakfast cereals as
a means of increasing store tra¢ c (Walters and MacKenzie 1988) because breakfast
cereals are frequently purchased by consumers across all income strata. Retailers may
recognize that a price increase in breakfast cereals causes adverse e¤ects not only on
the category, but across the entire store, so are reluctant to change prices even if they
experience a signicant growth in demand.
Next, I interpret the estimates from the manufacturer price equation. With
this equation, I investigate whether variation in wholesale prices is explained by vari-
ation in input prices such as grain, sugar, gas, or diesel prices, other product specic
costs, and the demand conditions facing manufacturers. Table 4.11 reports the esti-
mation results from manufacturer price equation. The estimated goodness-of-t sta-
tistics are again good as variation in the explanatory variables explains fully 84.9% of
the total variation in wholesale price. A t-test on the IV regression residuals implies
that the control function approach appropriately accounts for any endogeneity of the
implied margin term. Therefore, the conduct parameter is estimated consistently. All
variables are statistically signicant and the coe¢ cient estimates for the cost variables
are largely intuitive. Each cost coe¢ cient, except for the price of diesel fuel, has a
positive e¤ect on wholesale prices, suggesting that manufacturers set higher prices
when costs rise.
Manufacturers appear to price competitively in the cereal market. Speci-
cally, the price equation estimates show that the conduct parameter is positive and
signicant, but very close to zero, indeed only 5.2% of the retail conduct parameter.
Therefore, competition in the cereal market appears to be stronger among manufac-
turers than among retailers. One reason for this nding may be that manufacturers
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have little bargaining power in the face of rising private-label share. Private labels are
particularly strong in the cereal category, and constitute one of the primary pricing
challenges facing manufacturers. As a result, manufacturers are less responsive to
changes in demand than are retailers. Another reason why the manufacturer con-
duct parameter is relatively small may be the presence of high and rising production
costs. Although my model controls for concurrent variation in manufacturing costs,
if manufacturers expect higher production costs in the future, they may price more
competitively than otherwise would be the case in order to maintain market share.
This dynamic would appear through the conduct parameter. Another reason why I
nd more deviation from Bertrand pricing than others in this literature may be the
fact that I also control for changes in package size. Failing to account for changes
in package size may mean that much of the competitive response in unit prices is
subsumed in package-size changes in more traditional analyses. I return to this issue
after interpreting the results obtained from the package-size equation.
Estimates of the package-size equation reveal how manufacturers choose pack-
age size in response to the estimate of competitive response and pack-size elastici-
ties.7 Estimates of the manufacturer package-size equation imply that manufacturers
simultaneously consider how manufacturers competitively respond to varying demand
conditions, and consumerstendencies to substitute among package sizes. The results
obtained from estimating this equation are shown in table 4.12. In this case, the
control function parameter is not signicant, perhaps because the null hypothesis of
exogeneity is only marginally rejected. But, as discussed above, I assume that the
endogeneity problem is present on logical grounds, and retain the control function
7The variation in the market size is negligible small.
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despite its lack of signicance. In terms of the quality of the specication, the ex-
planatory variables account for 0.1% of the total variation in package size. Although
this coe¢ cient of determination is small, variations in package size are clearly driven
by many random factors. Moreover, the remaining parameter estimates suggest that
this model captures some of the more important determinants of package size.
The coe¢ cient of the interaction term between market size, package-size elas-
ticities, and estimate of competitive response to changes in demand conditions ex-
pressed in price elasticity terms is positive and signicant.8 This parameter captures
the competitive response of manufacturers to changes in rivalspackage sizes, so is
interpreted in a manner analogous to the pricing conduct parameter above.9 In other
words, the parameter measures the slope of the manufacturer reaction function in
package-size space such that a positive estimate indicates package sizes are strategic
complements, and a negative estimate indicates they are strategic substitutes. The
positive estimate is intuitive. Recall that the own-package-size elasticities of demand
are negative and the manufacturer conduct parameter is positive. So, the positive co-
e¢ cient means that an increase in wholesale price of one product leads to an increase
in competitive response, ceteris paribus, which causes a reduction in package size of
that product. This negative relationship between price and package size explains the
8For the purpose of illustration, I ignore the e¤ect of the market size variable
and consider manufacturer package-size equation with two products, so that: q1 =
0 + 1
h
(w1   c1) @s1@q1 + (w2   c2) @s2@q1
i
and q2 = 0 + 1
h
(w1   c1) @s1@q2 + (w2   c2) @s2@q2
i
where 1 is positive,
@s1
@q1
and @s2
@q2
are negative, and @s2
@q1
and @s1
@q2
are positive. This
simplication helps to understand the discussion in this paragraph.
9Of course, this interpretation does not carry the same intuition that a value of
0 implies no strategic response, and a value of 1 indicates Bertrand behavior. The
precise value of the parameter depends on the units of measure for the product at
hand.
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common observation that rms simultaneously raise prices and downsize packages.
The result implies that manufacturers use changes in package size to mitigate the
e¤ects of changes in input prices, passing wholesale price increases onto retailers in
an indirect way.
In terms of the interactions in package size among manufacturers, the intuition
of my nding is that when one package is reduced in size, the wholesale price of
that product increases. Also, according to the demand results, the cross-package-size
elasticities of demand are positive. Taken together, a decrease in one package size
then leads to an increase in its wholesale price, and so the appropriate competitive
response to that product, ceteris paribus, is an increase in competitorspackage sizes.
Larger packages from competitorsproducts imply a decline in wholesale price for that
product because there is a negative relationship between price and package size. That
is, a package downsizing for one product causes a decline in competitorswholesale
prices, which intensies competition among manufacturers. The opposite case occurs
when package size rises. When one manufacturer increases the size of his product,
the wholesale price of that product decreases, implying a reduction in competitive
response. Because the cross-package-size elasticities are positive, an increase in the
size of one package, ceteris paribus, leads to a reduction in competitorspackage sizes,
which in turn leads to an increase in competitorswholesale prices. That is, a rise
in package size softens price competition among manufacturers. In sum, a positive
conduct-parameter estimate in the package-size equation implies wholesale prices and
package sizes are strategic complements, and a decrease in package size intensies
price competition, reducing manufacturersincentives to make smaller packages for
fear of inciting a destructive competitive response. For reasons that will be made
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clear below, I demonstrate the nature of strategic rivalry among manufacturers using
a counterfactual, numerical simulation that also incorporates the cost of changing
package sizes.
Packaging costs are important determinants of the incentive to change package
size as well. Estimates of the package-size equation describe the shape of the cost
function in package size, and permit the derivation of an optimal package (see gure
4.3). Figure 4.3 shows that costs decrease until the optimal package size of 16.1
ounces, and then increase afterward. Evidently, packages that are too small may
require special packaging technology, excessive costs associated with adjusting the
production line, or special handling in the distribution system and shelf display. For
similar reasons, manufacturers incur higher costs if packages are too large. In the
current sample, for example, Special K Red Berries 16.7-ounce box, Oatmeal Squares
16-ounce box, and CapN Crunch 16-ounce box, etc. are sold in sizes that are very
nearly optimal. Recall that the optimal size based on demand estimates alone was 12.0
ounces. Due to competition among manufactures and packaging costs, the optimal
package size is more likely greater than the size that consumers prefer. This result
suggests that brand managers must consider both the demand and supply e¤ects
associated with changes in package size. For example, Kelloggs reduced the size of
its cereal boxes of Apple Jacks from 19.1 ounces to 17.0 ounces and 15.0 ounces to
12.2 ounces, respectively. Based on the costs associated with the larger size, Kelloggs
can expect both an increase in share and a reduction in cost. In the latter case, on
the other hand, Kelloggs can expect an increase in share, but must incur the cost
of switching to the new packages. This result suggests that package downsizing is
not always e¤ective, both due to competition among manufacturers, that reduces the
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marginal benet of changing package size, and higher marginal costs associated with
producing larger packages. Ultimately, however, the incentive to change package size
depends on the equilibrium e¤ect on margins.
Figure 4.3
Fixed Cost Associated with Making Packages of Di¤erent Sizes
Because my model describes equilibrium outcomes in the breakfast cereal mar-
ket, I am able to calculate implied margins on both the retailer and manufacturer
level, and simulate changes in each margin based on either shocks to the market,
or under alternative assumptions for the estimated parameters. According to equa-
tions (4.22) and (4.23), the price-cost margins are calculated as the product of the
demand conditions expressed in elasticity terms and the conduct parameters. Us-
ing the estimated retail and manufacturer conduct parameters, the results in table
4.13 show a base-case simulation for each implied cost and margin. As the results
in this table show, manufacturer margins are smaller than retail margins, while the
high retail margins are mainly due to the store-specic factors associated with the
Jewel chain. Apparently, Jewel shoppers are unusually loyal and are willing to pay
more for national brands from this chain, relative to the competition. Table 4.14
compares implied retail margins and costs of Dominicks with Jewel, and shows that
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the implied margin for Jewel is in fact 3.5 times greater than Dominicks. Jewel may
have market power either because it more e¤ectively uses non-price store attributes
such as store location, assortment size, and service quality. In fact, Jewel has been
the biggest grocer in Chicago area and had more than 20% of market share in 2007.10
Moreover, 68 out of 186 local Jewel stores were remodeled from 2008 to 2010 to build
new displays, and bigger meat and deli departments (Sterrett 2009). This renovation
might contribute further to the development of Jewels apparent strategic advantages.
Importantly, these results show that competition in package size can act as a facil-
itating practice for enhanced market power in the output market. More generally,
competition in non-price attributes is likely to soften price competition and increase
market power. For example, rms use strategic variables such as product-line length
(Draganska and Jain 2005; Richards and Hamilton 2006), location in geographic space
(Friedman and Thisse 1993; Thomadsen 2007), and location in attribute space (Jehiel
1992; Richards, Allender, and Hamilton 2013). Competition in each of these variables,
like rivalry in package size, changes the nature of price competition so conclusions
regarding price competition alone are highly misleading.
10Data describing Jewels nancial performance is not available because it is a part
of Albertsons, which is privately held.
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Table 4.13
Implied Costs and Margins Across Product
Retailer Manufacturer
Product Cost Margin Cost Margin
Honey Nut Cheerios 14/12.25 oz. 0:19460 0:08013 0:25147  0:00016
Honey Nut Cheerios 20/17 oz. 0:17005 0:07976 0:22521 0:00011
Cheerios 10/8.9 oz. 0:23307 0:08878 0:29813  0:00143
Cheerios 15/14 oz. 0:17948 0:07923 0:23415 0:00003
Frosted Flakes 14 oz. 0:16833 0:07831 0:21863 0:00078
Frosted Flakes 17 oz. 0:15396 0:07811 0:20339 0:00060
Rice Krispies 12 oz. 0:19651 0:08159 0:25291 0:00123
Rice Krispies 18 oz. 0:15974 0:07865 0:21137 0:00108
Froot Loops 15/12.2 oz. 0:17936 0:07962 0:23253 0:00067
Froot Loops 19.7/17 oz. 0:14541 0:07824 0:19449 0:00067
Frosted Mini-Wheats 18 oz. 0:12766 0:07700 0:17208 0:00102
Frosted Mini-Wheats 24 oz. 0:10404 0:07643 0:14639 0:00062
Special K Red Berries 12 oz. 0:20169 0:08169 0:25940 0:00207
Special K Red Berries 16.7 oz. 0:18454 0:07990 0:24058 0:00090
Special K Original 12 oz. 0:20192 0:08176 0:25969 0:00179
Special K Original 18 oz. 0:16957 0:07905 0:22307 0:00058
Cocoa Krispies 17.5/16.5 oz. 0:13518 0:07731 0:18067 0:00099
Apple Jacks 15/12.2 oz. 0:18103 0:08009 0:23441 0:00149
Apple Jacks 19.1/17 oz. 0:14781 0:07833 0:19728 0:00067
Raisin Bran 20 oz. 0:10920 0:07632 0:15054 0:00103
Raisin Bran 25.5 oz. 0:09087 0:07614 0:13132 0:00086
Raisin Bran Crunch 18.2 oz. 0:13053 0:07766 0:17637 0:00078
Corn Flakes 12 oz. 0:15492 0:08085 0:20509 0:00119
Corn Flakes 18 oz. 0:12787 0:07738 0:17288 0:00100
Crispix 12 oz. 0:19390 0:08479 0:25070  0:00016
Honey Bunches of Oats 16/14.5 oz. 0:14810 0:07801 0:19630 0:00010
Honey Bunches of Oats 21/19/18 oz. 0:13095 0:07783 0:17832 0:00011
Honey Bunches of Oats with Almonds 16/14.5 oz. 0:14877 0:07793 0:19698 0:00010
Honey Bunches of Oats with Almonds 21/19/18 oz. 0:13164 0:07772 0:17905 0:00011
Fruity Pebbles 13/11 oz. 0:17230 0:07930 0:22433 0:00001
Cocoa Pebbles 13/11 oz. 0:17270 0:07921 0:22477 0:00006
Oatmeal Squares 16 oz. 0:14465 0:07914 0:19412 0:00009
CapN Crunch Crunch Berries 15 oz. 0:15124 0:07962 0:20120 0:00134
CapN Crunch 16 oz. 0:14073 0:07862 0:18881 0:00004
CapN Crunch 22 oz. 0:11098 0:07721 0:15542 0:00011
Table 4.14
Implied Costs and Margins Across Retailer
Retailer Cost Margin
Dominicks 0:19375 0:03551
Jewel 0:12016 0:12287
On the other hand, the relatively low level of manufacturer margins is some-
what surprising. One reason why this may be the case is that, over the sample period,
manufacturers experienced a signicant rise in input costs, especially grain prices, that
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they were evidently reluctant to pass on to consumers. In fact, the implied manu-
facturer cost is higher than the retail cost. At the same time, consumers expected
higher cereal prices due to rising commodity costs, so retailers accommodated these
expectations by increasing retail prices. This nding is consistent with the recent
literature on consumer search and pass-through (Tappata 2009; Chandra and Tap-
pata 2011; Gómez, Richards, and Lee 2013) that suggests asymmetric pass-through
is largely due to retailers accommodating consumer expectations of likely retail price
changes, and not the undue exercise of market power.
The results in table 4.13 also reveal a substantial di¤erence in margins between
small and large packages. For example, although there is some variation among
brands, the margin for smaller packages is generally greater than for larger packages
a nding that is consistent with the notion that retailers o¤er a volume discount
by reducing margins on larger packages. If they are indeed rational, retailers and
manufacturers likely know that consumers prefer smaller packages, and charge higher
prices per unit of volume relative to larger packages.
My primary hypothesis is that manufacturers use price and package size as
complementary tools in strategic competition with one another, so the interaction
between them is key to explaining market outcomes in an inherently strategic envi-
ronment. In order to better understand the strategic relationship between price and
package size, I conduct a counterfactual simulation and investigate how manufactur-
ers adjust package size and price in response to a package downsizing by a competitor.
As discussed above, changes in package size have a signicant e¤ect on consumer de-
mand, which in turn inuences market share, and retail and manufacturer margins.
Because equations (4.22), (4.23), and (4.25) imply that retailersprice decisions and
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manufacturersprice and package-size decisions depend critically on their respective
competitive response to rivalsbehaviors, it is likely that retailers and manufacturers
strategically respond to competitorspackage-size decisions using package size, price,
or both. Simulation determines exactly how they are related, in a comprehensive,
strategic sense that takes into account consumer response and cost considerations as
well.
Consider one example. Suppose General Mills reduces the size of a Cheerios
15/14-ounce box by 10%. Because the optimal package size from a consumer perspec-
tive is 12.0 ounces, General Mills can expect to gain market share. But, in equilibrium,
competitors react using both price and package size. Package downsizing by one rm
provides an incentive for the others to change package size in response, but competi-
tors also recognize that a change in package size is costly. Therefore, competitors
may respond to an observed downsizing not by changing package size, but by chang-
ing wholesale prices. According to equation (4.23), wholesale price is determined by
input costs and competitive reactions. A change in the size of one package a¤ects the
state of competition, and ultimately, the wholesale price of other products. Because
many factors are involved, simulating the market equilibrium provides an answer to
exactly how competitors interact in price and package size.
To see why simulation is necessary, I derive the response in wholesale prices
due to a package downsizing. Whether wholesale prices increase or decrease depends
on how consumers respond to the change in price of the simulated product size (small
package) and the original product (larger package). For the purpose of illustration,
consider the case with two products and ignore the retail-wholesale pass-through
terms. Suppose the rst product is downsized. Then, the wholesale price of the
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second product is written as:
w2   c2 =
@s1
@w2
@s1
@w1
@s2
@w2
  @s2
@w1
@s1
@w2
s1  
@s1
@w1
@s1
@w1
@s2
@w2
  @s2
@w1
@s1
@w2
s2; (4.29)
which implies that a change in w2 is determined by @s1@w1 ,
@s1
@w2
, @s2
@w1
, and @s2
@w2
. If @s1
@w1
@s2
@w2
 
@s2
@w1
@s1
@w2
increases, @s1
@w2
decreases, or @s1
@w1
increases, ceteris paribus, w2 decreases. But,
it is impossible to derive a systematic relationship between wholesale price and share
derivatives in an analytical way. So, I reveal the interaction between wholesale prices
and package sizes via numerical simulation.
Using the estimated demand and supply parameters, I calculated equilibrium
prices, margins, and market shares at both the retailer and manufacturer levels under
the scenario described above. Table 4.15 reports the percent change in retail price-
cost margins, manufacturer price-cost margins, equilibrium retail prices, equilibrium
wholesale prices, and equilibrium package sizes relative to their original values. This
table shows that competitors generally lower wholesale prices in response to package
downsizing. Package size and wholesale price are, therefore, strategic complements.
For example, if General Mills reduces the size of a box of Cheerios, Kelloggs re-
duces the price of Rice Krispies 12-ounce box by 0:078%, Rice Krispies 18-ounce box
by 0:124%, and Froot Loops 15/12.2-ounce box by 0:180%. Therefore, competitors
lower wholesale prices in response to the downsizing of one product. Downsizing
sharpens price competition, and dramatically reduces the incentives for manufac-
turers to reduce package size. For example, in this simulated market, General Mills
lowers the price of Cheerios in an equilibrium response to competitor reactions, which
further reduces the margin of the targeted product. What simple demand analysis
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suggests may be a good strategy to cover a cost increase, therefore, achieves exactly
the opposite result.
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Competitors respond by increasing the size of their packages. For example,
Kelloggs increases the size of a Rice Krispies 12-ounce box by 0:018%, Rice Krispies
18-ounce box by 0:005%, and Froot Loops 15/12.2-ounce box by 0:026%. Recalling
the negative relationship between the wholesale price and size of the same package,
and the fact that competitors react to package downsizing by reducing their wholesale
price, competitors will increase their package sizes in response to a downsizing by a
rival. That said, the percentage change in package size is small. Because equilibrium
package size is a function of the estimates of the competitive response and the response
in market share with respect to package size, and this product is small, competitors
may recognize that price is more e¤ective tool for covering cost increases in this case.
Retailers respond to package downsizing in a di¤erent way. The smaller Chee-
rios package size attracts more consumers because consumers prefer smaller packages.
As a result, retailers can charge a higher price on the new Cheerios 15/14-ounce box
and the retail margin for the Cheerios 15/14-ounce box increases. In fact, the re-
tail price of Cheerios 15/14-ounce box increases by 0:084% and the retail margin by
0:263%. Rising retail prices in response to package downsizing is a common obser-
vation, as noted in the introduction. At the same time, retailers tend not to change
the prices for other products in a meaningful way. For example, retailers change the
price of Rice Krispies 12-ounce box only by 0:002%, Rice Krispies 18-ounce box by
0:002%, and Froot Loops 15/12.2-ounce by 0:020%. Because retailers maximize cat-
egory prot rather than brand prot, they do not have an incentive to change retail
prices except for the product being downsized. As a result of package downsizing,
retailers can expect two positive e¤ects. First, the retail margin for the downsized
product increases. Second, one of the major retail costs wholesale price decreases
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because price competition among manufacturers is sharpened. As a result, we have
the somewhat paradoxical result that retailers can benet more from package down-
sizing than manufacturers.
For manufacturers, the optimal reaction to package downsizing is to lower
wholesale prices. In other words, package size and price are strategic complements.
Package downsizing intensies price competition among manufacturers and reduces
manufacturer margins. Therefore, package downsizing may not be in manufacturers
best interests when strategic interactions are taken into account. Because manu-
facturers implicitly understand the equilibrium response to downsizing, this nding
may explain why package downsizing is relatively rare. Manufacturers recognize the
deeper consequences associated with package downsizing, so tend to rely on raising
wholesale prices instead.
Next, consider the opposite case. How do manufacturers optimally react to
package upsizing? My simulation result implies that if manufacturers increase the size
of their packages, competitors are likely to raise their wholesale prices. Again, this
is a manifestation of the nding that package size and wholesale prices are strategic
complements. Package upsizing is not a common business practice. However, if we
consider the brand rather than the UPC as a fundamental unit of analysis, launching
a large package can be regarded as package upsizing. In order to capitalize on a
volume premium, manufacturers often introduce large packages as additions to an
existing product line, which increases the average package size of the product line,
and has the same e¤ect as package upsizing. Competitors respond to the upsizing
by raising their wholesale prices, softening price competition among manufacturers
and raising manufacturer margins. This insight is not new, but is another example
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of a more general phenomenon from the industrial organization literature. Firms in
oligopolistic markets are likely to compete in non-price variables such as investment in
capacity and R&D, advertisement, and location in attribute space in order to facilitate
implicit collusion in price (Dixit and Norman 1978; Davidson and Deneckere 1990;
Jehiel 1992). Competition in package size and price in the breakfast cereal market is
an example of semi-collusion when multiple strategic tools are available.
This simulation demonstrates that changes in package size a¤ect retail and
manufacturer margins, and nature of competition among manufacturers. Package
size and price are strategic complements. If a manufacturer downsizes its package,
competitors lower wholesale prices in response. Price competition is sharpened and
manufacturer margins are reduced. If a manufacturer upsizes its package, on the
other hand, competitors raise wholesale prices, price competition is softened, and
manufacturer margins rise. The underlying mechanism of this outcome is consumers
responses to changes in price and package sizes. Whether package size and price are
strategic complements or substitutes depends on the response of market share with
respect to wholesale prices. Further, if consumers were more sensitive to changes in
package size, manufacturers would use package size more often than wholesale price in
order to cover a production-cost increase. Finally, I nd that retailers gain more from
package downsizing than manufacturers. Strategic interactions among manufacturers
and between retailers and manufacturers play a critical role in explaining equilibrium
package size, and price decisions.
My ndings have broad implications, both for manufacturers and retailers.
First, my ndings highlight the importance of package choice. If pricing is a primary
concern for CPG marketers, package size should be of equal importance. I show
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that both package size and price have substantial e¤ects on manufacturers prof-
itability e¤ects that are not independent, but inextricably linked through the cost
of production and the way these changes alter the competitive environment among
manufacturers. Second, consumers prefer small packages, but their preference is sub-
ject to a considerable amount of heterogeneity. Manufacturers, therefore, would be
well-advised to launch at least one small-pack product, and multiple package sizes to
meet consumersdiverse tastes regarding package size, particularly during the intro-
duction phase. Consumerstaste for small packages means that both manufacturers
and retailers can charge higher prices for small-packages due to consumersprefer-
ence for exibility, and their aversion to the risk of buying a product they dont like.
Third, manufacturerspackage-size decisions depend not only on the derived demand
from retailers, but on responses from rivals, and the costs associated with making
di¤erent packages. Contrary to the literature on this point, CPG managers may have
an incentive to downsize packages according to consumersdemand for package size,
but doing so may not always yield the desired outcome. If production costs rise
and manufacturers wish to restore margins by reducing package size and raising unit
prices, then not only will they experience higher packaging costs, but the competi-
tive response from rivals may mean that margins, in fact, fall in response. In this
case, CPG managers should be aware of the direct costs associated with downsizing,
understand competitorsreactions to downsizing, and anticipate consumer responses
should the chosen size be below the optimal level.
There are implications that go beyond my specic application to the CPG in-
dustry. Although conventional economic thought holds that price is all-important, the
evident salience of package size suggests that prices are relevant only in the context of
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usage patterns. The way consumers use products or services make price changes more
or less important, and may, in fact, dominate the relevance of prices. For example,
consider a travel agent marketing cruises in the Caribbean. Although the "price"
of a cruise can be denominated in either the total price for the entire experience,
or a price per day of sailing, consumers are likely to have a strong preference for a
trip duration that ts with their lifestyle. Whereas retired people are more likely to
favor longer excursions, younger, working professionals seeking a few days of sun and
relaxation would prefer shorter trips. The "price" of the cruise in these examples is
clearly relevant only in terms of the greater consideration of how large a package is
o¤ered.
Similarly, life insurance, retirement plans, and restaurant meals are all services
that are o¤ered as packages packages that serve as points of competition among
suppliers, and address, or not, consumerspreferences for specic package sizes. For
example, when people choose a life insurance, they are interested in insurance pre-
mium as well as fees. Risk-averse people may prefer a higher-premium life insurance
while risk-loving people may be satised with a lower-premium life insurance. Be-
cause the amount of insurance premium involves peoples risk attitudes, how insurance
companies set the premium for each insurance is critical to understand how the life
insurance market works. Peoples choice of retirement plan is similar. When people
choose 401(k) plan, for example, they tend to consider not only how much they have
to pay for fees, but also how their personal assets are managed, and how much they
can expect to receive in the future. People who are willing to accept risk and aim to
gain high returns may prefer high-risk high-return investments. On the other hand,
people who seek to avoid risk or people who have a long-term life plan may choose
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low-risk low-return investment. Finally, consumers consider many factors when they
choose a restaurant meal. Especially, for health-conscious people, caloric content is
one of the important choice attributes for the entire meal package. Such consumers
are likely to choose a meal by considering both price and caloric content, so if a restau-
rant chooses to o¤er lower-calorie meal choices, they may charge a higher price, and
earn a larger margin. In this case, which is common practice, particularly among fast-
casual, chain-restaurants, restaurants may compete in caloric content, and collude in
price.
4.5 Conclusions and Implications
In this chapter, I investigate how manufacturers choose package size and unit-
price, or the price per unit volume. Package size and price are important elements of
the marketing mix because consumers observe both package size and package price
directly, but must infer the unit price. Whereas others regard this disconnect between
package prices and unit-prices, or "actual" prices as an opportunity for manufacturers
to pass hidden price increases on to consumers, the reality of the situation is not as
simple. Indeed, when cost and strategic considerations are taken into account, actual
manufacturer behavior is likely to be exactly the opposite.
My primary concern is how manufacturers make package size and pricing de-
cisions in consideration of consumer preferences, production and distribution costs,
and strategic interactions among manufacturers. To that end, I develop a structural
model of interactions among consumers, retailers, and manufacturers when both pack-
age size and price are supplier-decision variables. Consumers make discrete choices
among di¤erentiated products, while manufacturers set package size and wholesale
prices, and retailers pass-through manufacturerspackage size decisions and set retail
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prices taking into account consumer demand and manufacturer and retailer costs. In
this way, I model the process of product design and pricing as a simultaneous deci-
sion of how large a package to o¤er, and what unit-price to charge. As a structural
model of market equilibrium, my model reveals the interdependence of manufacturer
package-size and pricing decisions, with optimal responses from competitors in both
dimensions.
I apply this model to store-level scanner data from the ready-to-eat breakfast
cereal category from two major retailers in the Chicago market. I nd that package
size is an important attribute in a consumers choice among cereal SKUs, and that
these purchase decisions condition manufacturersproduction decisions. Specically,
consumers prefer small packages, in part, due to the perceived risk, but their pref-
erence for package size is heterogeneous. So, that explains why manufacturers o¤er
multiple packages within the same product line. When manufacturers o¤er a partic-
ular package size, they consider consumer demand, the costs associated with making
packages, and potential competitive responses from rivals. Consequently, equilibrium
package size outcomes result not only from consumer preferences, but from more
complex responses from manufacturers to their perceived incentives.
My results overturn what has become a received wisdom in the literature. The
fact that consumers tend to over- or under-estimate package size allows manufactur-
ers to use changes in package size as obfuscation strategy (Granger and Billson 1972;
Russo 1977; Wansink 1996; Raghubir and Krishna 1999; Binkley and Bejnarowicz
2003; Ellison and Ellison 2009). Moreover, others nd package downsizing is an e¤ec-
tive way for manufacturers to maintain margins in the face of cost increases, because
consumers are less responsive to changes in package size than to changes in price
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(Çak¬ra and Balagtas 2014). However, I show that manufacturers may be better o¤
raising prices, and leaving package sizes alone. On the surface, package downsizing
may mitigate the e¤ect of an input-price increase, but also generates a strategic re-
action from competitors. If a package is downsized, competitors tend to lower their
wholesale prices in response. Price competition in the wholesale market is intensied,
and manufacturer margins decrease. This dynamic explains why downsizing is a rel-
atively rare event, and not a common occurrence as the consumer-response literature
would lead us to believe.
I also nd that retailers may benet from package downsizing more than man-
ufacturers. Retailers can charge consumers a higher price for the downsized product
because consumers prefer smaller packages. Retailers can also expect lower costs
as wholesale-price competition reduces their purchasing costs. If the packages are
upsized, on the other hand, competitors raise their wholesale prices, and wholesale
margins rise at the expense of retailers. Package downsizing intensies price compe-
tition among manufacturers, while package upsizing softens price competition. As a
consequence, introducing line-extensions with larger packages allows manufacturers
to potentially collude in setting prices.
My ndings are consistent with the more general literature on semi-collusion
in components of the marketing mix. Advertising, capacity investment, and product-
line length are all ways suppliers can soften price competition essentially drawing
competitor attention away from prices, and toward some other means of competing.
As another example of this more general line of research, I show that package size is
a facilitating practice that has the potential to enhance manufacturer market power.
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Nor are the implications of my research limited to the CPG market. I argue
that many types of service  retirement plans, insurance contracts, and vacations
are but three  are o¤ered as packages so are subject to the same insights that I
highlight here. Package-size or complexity and service-price are inextricably linked,
and are likely both sources of competitive rivalry. Making such services "smaller" in
the sense of o¤ering a more narrow range of benets, or coverage levels, may seem an
obvious way to raise margins, but may in fact have the opposite result. Larger, more
complex service contracts are logical result of competition in package size and price.
There are a number of avenues for future research. First, I estimate my demand
model using market-level data, so cannot include many household-level features that
may have an inuence on package choice behaviors. Second, consumers in my model
are assumed to be myopic. However, it is possible that consumers are forward-looking
and choose a particular package size depending on their knowledge of product quality
and retailers temporary price discounts (Erdem, Imai and Keane 2003; Sun 2005;
Hendel and Nevo 2006; Osborne 2011). It would be worthwhile to consider how
manufacturers choose package size in response to consumersdynamic package choice
behavior. These questions are left for future research.
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CHAPTER 5.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In this dissertation, I examine how purchasers of consumer packaged goods,
or CPGs, behave under uncertainty, and how suppliers optimally react. Uncertainty
a¤ects consumersand suppliersdecision-making processes in both direct and indi-
rect ways, a full consideration of which helps explain common observations, or even
overturn received wisdom. I consider three sources of uncertainty and how optimal
behavior by agents throughout the CPG supply chain can explain three stylized facts
in the retailing industry. First, food retailers choose a pricing strategy, or price for-
mat, that is either every-day-low-price (EDLP) or promotion-based pricing (HILO).
Each generates a di¤erent pattern of price variation, or form of uncertainty, which
tends to attract di¤erent types of shoppers. Second, consumers face uncertainty even
after choosing a store. When consumers purchase a new product, they do not know
a priori whether they will like it. The product they purchase or, more precisely, the
package it comes in, will reect their preferences for the risk that the new product
will not meet their needs. New product purchases are a clear source of uncertainty.
Third, I endogenize supplier behaviors so that manufacturer and retailer response to
consumer uncertainty becomes, in essence, another form of uncertainty. By endoge-
nizing supplier behaviors, I show that conventional wisdom regarding manufacturer
pricing amidst cost uncertainty, is almost completely wrong.
In the rst essay, I o¤er a new explanation for how di¤erent store formats 
EDLP and HILO can coexist, even though retailing is relatively competitive. In
the retailing economics literature, the notion that consumers choose stores based on
the size of their shopping basket is of the order of a stylized fact. However, EDLP
and HILO stores di¤er not only in the average price o¤ered, but EDLP prices vary
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less over time than do HILO prices. If retailing were perfectly competitive, then
conventional economic theory would lead us to expect one format to dominate the
market. In local retail markets, however, EDLP and HILO stores coexist. The rst
essay reconciles this seeming paradox by considering consumerspreferences for risk. I
develop a two-stage, incentive compatible experiment to measure subjectsrisk pref-
erences, and to examine how their attitudes toward risk inuence their preference
for store price format. My model reveals the relationship between consumer hetero-
geneity in risk preference and store choice decisions. In particular, more risk-averse
consumers are more likely to choose EDLP stores while risk-loving consumers prefer
HILO stores. Risk-averse consumers seek to avoid variation in retail prices. On the
other hand, risk-loving consumers tend to take advantage of price variation as they
are willing to search in order to nd the best deal. My ndings suggest that retailers
pricing strategies allow consumers with di¤erent risk preferences to self-select among
store price formats, and consequently di¤erent store-price formats are able to coex-
ist despite the relatively competitive nature of food retailing. Because store price
format is dened by variations in prices, my explanation is more fundamental than
conventional explanations that rely on shopping-basket size.
In the second essay, I extend the notion that consumers respond optimally to
risk to the context of new product choice. New products promise to deliver ben-
ets that existing products do not. However, approximately 80% of new products
ultimately fail. The second essay provides a fundamental explanation why. Namely,
while others examine the role of advertising and packaging as signals of embodied
quality, they do not answer the question as to why consumers are reluctant to ac-
cept new products. Simply, consumers are uncertain whether they will like a new
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product. Accordingly, they tend to choose smaller quantities, or smaller packages,
of new products compared to those that they have purchased in the past. I explain
this observation as a manifestation of risk-averting behavior by utility-maximizing
consumers. I use a multiple-discrete / continuous extreme value (MDCEV) model of
demand applied to household-level panel scanner data for the yogurt category to test
this theory. I nd that when consumers try a new product, their utility function is
more concave and satiation occurs at a smaller quantity, suggesting that consumers
reduce the risk associated with the trial purchase of a new product by choosing a
smaller quantity. My nding suggests that slow sales of a new product can be ex-
plained as a rational response from risk-averse consumers. The obvious implication of
this nding is that CPG marketers would be well-advised to design appropriate mar-
keting strategies to reduce consumersrisk, such as o¤ering smaller packages and trial
coupons for new products, or o¤ering a money-back guarantee should the consumer
not like the product.
In the third essay, I delve deeper into the question of package size to examine
how manufacturers are likely to optimally respond to the risk-averting consumers I
found in the second essay. In this essay, I attempt to reconcile the observation that
manufacturers o¤er a variety of package sizes within a same product line, and yet
change package sizes only rarely in spite of empirical evidence that consumers tend
to ignore changes in package size and are, therefore, apparently willing to absorb the
higher unit-prices that result. I explain this observation as an equilibrium outcome
of rms that set package sizes and prices simultaneously when considering consumer
response, packaging costs, and potential rival reactions. If a rms choice of package
size reects consumersrisk preferences, and all manufacturers share this realization,
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then all suppliers are likely to use package size as a strategic tool. I test this theory
by estimating a structural model of consumer, retailer, and manufacturer interaction
using store-level scanner data from the ready-to-eat breakfast cereal category. I nd
that consumers prefer smaller packages, and that their preference for package size
is heterogeneous. Because package size preferences are important demand-shifters,
manufacturers are able to use packaging as a competitive tool, and the heterogeneity
of package preferences provides manufacturers an incentive to o¤er multiple package
sizes within a same product line. Manufacturers choose package size conditional on
consumer demand, packaging costs, and strategic responses from rivals. My estimates
show that package size and price are strategic complements. In other words, if man-
ufacturers reduce package sizes, competitors lower their prices in response, and price
competition becomes sharper. On the other hand, if manufacturers sell larger pack-
ages, competitors will raise prices, and price competition is softened. While existing
studies that consider only consumer demand for di¤erent package sizes suggest that
consumers are insensitive to changes in package size, and that package downsizing
is therefore an e¤ective prot-enhancing tool, my ndings suggest manufacturers are
not able to change package sizes without considerable cost, and without inciting dam-
aging price-competition from competitors. As a result, changes in package size are
infrequent, and tend not to produce the desired result.
In the rst two essays, I establish a link between consumersrisk perceptions
and their store and product choice patterns. In the nal essay, I examine how suppliers
optimally react to risk-averse consumer behavior. The primary implication from the
rst two essays is that consumers face signicant risk when they make the most basic
choices required of them on a daily basis, so suppliers manufacturers and retailers
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 can be expected to adopt marketing strategies that both limit consumers risk
exposure and exploit their risk-averse behaviors. Package downsizing is one example.
In the nal essay, however, I show that simple conclusions based on a consideration of
consumer behavior alone can be misleading because manufacturer choices can trigger
competitive responses that often thwart the original objective. In the context of the
third essay, manufacturers are reluctant to reduce the size of their products because
package downsizing makes sharpens price competition and reduces margins, which is
opposite the original intent. Recognition of the strategic nature of package sizes is
therefore critical to understanding how CPG markets operate.
The attitudes towards risk addressed in this dissertation are fundamental, gen-
eral characteristics of consumer behavior in nearly every purchase environment. In
insurance markets, for example, risk-averse consumers may prefer a higher-deductible
health plan while risk-loving consumers are satised with a lower-deductible. Insur-
ance products not only help consumers diversify risk, but also screen consumers with
di¤erent risk attitudes, just like package sizes and store formats. Heterogeneity in
risk preferences can also explain the proliferation of insurance products just as they
can explain why manufacturers o¤er so many di¤erent package sizes, and Walmart
hasnt completely dominated the retail grocery industry. As a second example of
the fundamental nature of my ndings, consider the service industry. When choos-
ing services, consumers usually make decisions about which services to use, and how
much to use them. If consumers are uncertain about service quality, they may exhibit
risk-reduction behavior by choosing a limited cable package, a slower internet speed,
a conservative haircut, or a three-day vacation to a city they havent visited before.
The framework used in this dissertation is, therefore, not limited to the CPG mar-
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ket, but has broader implications for choices, and rm performance, in many other
markets.
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A.1 OVERVIEW
You are to choose where to go shopping for your favorite grocery items from
several di¤erent types of food and household essentials. In this experiment, you
will pick a number of items from several di¤erent categories and have an amount of
money to spend (each of the number of items, number of categories, and budget are
determined during the game). I refer to this basket of goods as your "bundle." There
will be 9 questions. Each choice represents a supermarket that has the following
3 attributes: (1) total bill, (2) the number of brands available in each category,
and (3) the driving time to the supermarket. Assume you do not know the exact
price charged for each product before going to a store. That is, you do not know
which products will be on sale, so your total bill is not known prior to checking out.
Therefore, the "total bill" attribute reects both the usual price and sale price, but
you only know that sometimes you pay the sale price and sometimes the regular price.
In each question, please indicate the decision you would make based on your own
preferences. Alternatively, you may choose not to shop at either supermarket listed
in that question. Please carefully examine each option before you make a decision and
click on the decision that you would make based on your own preferences. Assume
that the options in each question are the only ones available to you. Do not compare
choices across questions.
A.2 COMPENSATION
You will start with a budget to spend on your chosen bundle. The budget will
vary depending on the shopping game, but will be su¢ cient to purchase whatever
bundle you prefer. Please choose between one of the three bundles or to not shop at
all. I will then assign a value to each bundle that reects not just the price of the
187
items you purchase, but the cost of travel, and the value of having access to a larger
selection. If you select not to shop, the value of the bundle is 0 EU as you do not
go shopping. I will then draw a number at random between 0 EU and your total
budget for that question. If the value of the bundle you have selected is above this
random draw, then you will get the value of the bundle, but pay an amount equal
to the random draw. If the value of the bundle is below the random draw, then you
keep your entire budget and pay nothing. For example, if your budget is 30 EUs, the
value of the bundle is 20 EUs, and the random number is 10 EUs, then you will pay
10 EUs out of your budget, but receive 20 EUs back. Think of this as getting 20 EUs
in groceries for a price of 10 EUs. You will then receive 40 EUs (30 EUs   10 EUs
+ 20 EUs) at the end of the game. If your budget is 30 EUs, the value of the bundle
is 10 EUs and the random number is 20 EUs, then you keep 30 EUs in payment
at the end of the game. In this way, it is in your interest to make the choice that
best reects the importance you place on grocery prices, the ability to select from
among many brands, and the cost of traveling to the store. After you nish making
all choices, I will randomly pick one choice that determines your payo¤. Call this the
"payo¤ choice." All choices have an equal probability of being chosen for payment, so
please carefully choose the bundle that most reects your preference in all the choice
occasions.
A.3 SHOPPING BASKET SIZE AND TOTAL BUDGET
Assume the followings in the next nine questions that appear within this web
page.
 Items: 12 items You will go shopping for your favorite 12 grocery items.
 Budget: 26.00 EUs You have 26.00 EUs to spend.
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 Categories: 12 categories You are allowed to buy one item from each of the
following 12 categories, bacon, butter, margarine, ice cream, soda crackers,
liquid detergent, ground co¤ee, hot dogs, soft drinks, granulated sugar, tissue,
and paper towels.
 You know your favorite item(s) in all of these 12 categories even if you usually
do not buy anything from one or some of them.
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